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Negotiating with the USSR

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Raymond L. Garthoff
David Floyd
F.P. & A.M. Hoeber
Edward J. Rozek
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East-West Trade

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The Soviets are still Russians

Edward L. Rowny

MY six and one-half years' experience as the military representative on the United States SALT negotiating team has convinced me that the Soviets have not changed their inherited traits—they are still Russians. There is nothing inherently wrong with the idea of negotiating with the Soviets, but we must know what objectives we want to pursue and not seek agreements simply for the sake of agreements. We should be willing to take prudent risks if by doing so there is a promise of achieving greater stability between the two superpowers. But we should not delude ourselves into believing that any agreement is better than no agreement. Above all we must not enter into any agreement which endangers the security of the United States.

More than one thousand hours of face-to-face negotiations with the Soviets, over a longer period of time than that spent by any other US negotiator, has taught me certain lessons. First, that where we share common objectives with the USSR it is possible to arrive at a deal. Second, however, that the Soviets see negotiations as a tool—as a means to an end—rather than the end itself. Third, that to negotiate with the Soviets we must not only follow the precept, "Know thyself," but more importantly, we must know and understand the Soviets.

My fundamental conclusion, as a result of my long experience of negotiating with the Soviets is that the United States has tended to negotiate for negotiation's sake. We have put more emphasis on aiming at an agreement than on the object of the negotiations. Our most fatal error is that we have tended to believe that the Russians are like us, whereas they are in reality more unlike us.

When I found myself assigned to the US SALT team I had already spent some two decades preparing for that event—even though I never anticipated I would ever find myself in that position. I had studied international relations at Yale where I received a master's degree and was completing (by working after hours) my doctorate which was subsequently awarded me by The American University. In my military assignment I had worked at formulating the military aspects of foreign policy and had worked at designing US nuclear concepts and policies. During my studies I had acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the Russian language—a task I pursued in earnest once I was assigned to SALT.

My first steps at preparing myself for my new assignment was to read—and in some cases re-read—the classic works on negotiating with the Soviets. I reviewed Vernadsky's *Russian History,* read Szamuely's *The Russian Tradition*, and Billington's *The Icon and the Axe.* I also

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reviewed the standard books on negotiating with the Soviets—John Deane's *Strange Alliance,* Arthur Dean's *On Dealing with Russia,* George Kennan's *The Technique for Dealing with Russia,* Dean Acheson's *On Dealing with Russia,* Philip Mosely's *Soviet Techniques of Negotiation,* and many others.

From a reading of these works I wrote out for myself the main Soviet approach to negotiating as seen through the eyes of those who had experience at the job. I also drew up two lists, the first of the Soviet's 10 most effective elements of negotiating style, and second their 10 most successful negotiating techniques. Although each list could have numbered 20 or 30 points, I picked the arbitrary number of 10 as an exercise in discipline at deciding which were the most effective and successful elements.

REINFORCED and armed with this background I stepped enthusiastically and hopefully into the negotiating arena. I would now divide my SALT II negotiating experience into three parts. First, a period of great expectations which culminated with the initialling of the Vladivostok Accords in November 1974. The second phase was a period of great frustration, a phase Lenin might have called "no success—no failure." It ended after a short final period of high expectations with one of deep disappointment when the Soviets rejected President Carter's proposals of March 1977. Finally, the third phase was one of great disillusionment. During this period the United States desperately pursued the culmination of a SALT II agreement which was sealed with a Carter-Brezhnev kiss at Vienna on 18 June 1979.

During the first phase I found myself in the familiar pattern of other negotiators during their initiation into negotiations with the Soviets—a period of high adventure, optimism and hope that somehow we would succeed where others had failed. Most of what I had read about the Soviets' negotiating style and techniques was borne out by my own experience. The Soviets, true to form, habitually attempted to influence the outcome of negotiations by dominating the outcome of the administrative arrangements and by controlling the agenda. We on the United States side followed the predictable pattern of not wishing to be drawn into seemingly picayune details. It seemed somehow beneath our dignity and not worth the candle to match the effort the Soviets expended on such matters.

It soon became evident that the Soviets would follow their predictable pattern of placing great importance on their security. Whenever differences developed between us the Soviets could be counted upon to explain their positions and behaviour in terms of their historic fear of being invaded. Our assurances to them that we had no designs on their territory and in fact shared no common borders with them did little to change their attitudes.

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Third, the Soviets early and continuously displayed their penchant for secrecy. At times this was carried to ridiculous extremes. For example, attempting to make "small talk" with a newly arrived wife of a Soviet negotiator, I asked her, in Russian, how many children she had. She became quite agitated. Sidling over to one of their known KGB operators she asked if it was all right for her to divulge such information. On another occasion a Soviet general approached me and said: "I understand you're going to Brussels tomorrow." When I told him that I indeed planned to visit NATO, he said, "Oh, I didn't want to embarrass you with my knowledge of your plans." He was all the more perplexed that I was unperturbed. As a matter of fact, an item about my trip had appeared in that morning's *Herald Tribune* which was habitually read by the Soviets. Examples of the Soviets' extreme penchant for secrecy are legion—they would take endless pages to recount.

Fourth, the Soviets early on reminded me what I should have known about trying to negotiate a compromise with them. One evening after having a few vodkas I said to *one* of the *two* generals who were my opposite members (the Soviets true to Orwell's description need to be "more equal than others"): "Look, this problem is not so difficult to resolve. There are six points at stake—we Americans are prepared to give you A, B, and C if you give us D, E, and F." He did not disagree and I convinced our chief negotiator that I should propose such a deal formally. The next day I tabled our proposal, carefully spelling out points A, B, and C. At this juncture the Soviets got up to leave. I tried in vain to get them to return to the table. They told me that I had offered A, B, and C, and thereby had indicated that these points were of little importance to us. The Soviets simply pocketed the first three points which affected us and showed no willingness to talk about the second three points which affected them. Having learned my lesson, the next time around I said to my counterparts, "If you give us D, E, and F, we will discuss what we're willing to give you." Their reply was, "What do you take us for—fools?"

On one occasion early in the negotiations I attempted to explain to the Soviets how the United States prepared its negotiating positions. I told them that Washington habitually examined all sides of a question and by negotiating among ourselves arrived at a position which we would find acceptable if we were in their shoes. "We therefore arrive at a position which I would graphically describe as being somewhere in the middle of this table," I explained, "whereas you Soviets have introduced a position which is way over at the wall."

"The solution is obvious," one of my counterparts told me, "you should begin with a position which is over at the opposite wall. It would be quite impossible for us to go back to Moscow with a solution other than half-way between our two positions. If you think our position is extreme," he confided in me, "you should adopt an oppos-

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ing position you believe is equally extreme." "It makes no negotiating sense for you to open with your settling price," he lectured me, "that's not the way to negotiate." "Have you ever tried to buy a rug from a Persian?" he asked.

I have already indicated that I was provided "double coverage," evidence of the influential role of the Soviet military in arms control negotiations. On one occasion Ambassador Johnson, having reached agreement with Minister Semenov, was subsequently told the deal was off because he had been overruled by his generals. This pattern was repeated more than once.

DURING the second phase when we attempted to turn the Vladivostok *aide-mémoire* into treaty language, we were to learn the meaning of patience. The Soviets placed their own interpretation on the words contained in the *aide-mémoire* and would not budge. After all, they said, they had been told by Moscow what Brezhnev and Gromyko had in mind when they entered into the agreement. There could be no deviation from those positions, they said.

Often when we reached an impasse the Soviets merely repeated their arguments—over and over again. They would have made good Madison Avenue advertising salesmen. At times, simply because we had heard their arguments so often, we began believing them. Alternatively, we became convinced that the Soviets believed what they were saying, or else they would not be repeating the same argument so often.

To the Soviets, words, as they did to Alice in Wonderland, meant what they wanted them to mean. Books could be written about the Soviets' use and misuse of words. To cite only one example, I thought on one occasion I was about to achieve a breakthrough because a Soviet general had agreed to discuss the "characteristics" of the Backfire bomber. (The Soviets would never address themselves to capabilities of Soviet systems, saying that to do so would reveal military secrets.) Referring to some charts in *Interavia,* a Swiss magazine, I proceeded to show the general, in objective terms, that the Backfire possessed intercontinental capabilities. "No," the Soviet general said, "you have not presented objective arguments but only engineer's estimates. Figures lie, and liars figure," he said. "Therefore, your arguments are subjective. But Leonid Brezhnev has said that the USSR will never use the Backfire against the United States. And that is the objective truth," he said, leaving me incredulous and speechless.

The Soviets often displayed that they suffer from a serious inferiority complex. On one occasion a Soviet general told me it would be equitable if the Soviets were permitted greater numbers of weapons because the United States possessed better technology. Later, when I alluded to US technological advantages the same Soviet general was

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highly incensed. "Whatever the US can do, the USSR can do," he maintained.

During this phase the Soviets gave repeated evidence that they believed in the oft repeated adage—"What's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable." This was even carried into social (sic) occasions. (A "social occasion" with Soviet negotiators is a contradiction of terms.) We had invited the Soviets to a boat ride on Lake Geneva. In an attempt to liven up the otherwise deadly atmosphere I began to play Russian folk songs and modern tunes on the harmonica. The Soviets joined our group in singing and stomping their feet, obviously having a good time. At the conclusion, Minister Semenov took off his sailor's cap and collected coins from the crowd. He then stopped in front of me and emptied all the coins into his pocket. "Fifty-fifty," he said, "you had the pleasure of playing and I will have the pleasure of spending the money."

THE third phase of negotiations on SALT II I have called the period of great disillusionment. The United States, in its zeal to arrive at an agreement, allowed the Soviets to take undue advantage of us. The end result was an agreement which was unequal and not adequately verifiable and hence not in our national security interest.

During this phase the Soviets successfully employed a number of their tried-and-tested techniques. One can be called "taking the raisins out of the cake." By standing pat and being stubborn the Soviets lured us into making successive proposals. Henry Kissinger has said that the United States could not stand to let time pass without some "progress" being made. If the Soviets did not accept our proposal in a couple of months, he has said, we would get nervous and make still another proposal. The Soviet technique was to pick and choose what it liked from each of our proposals without regard to what we expected them to grant us from the package. Thus the Russians would pick out the raisins, leaving us with the dough.

Another technique was to suggest that agreement had been reached "in principle" and the details could be left to be worked out at lower echelons. It was just such a technique that was employed following the meetings between Mr Gromyko and the President in September 1978. President Carter announced that agreement had been "reached in principle" and that the remaining points would be agreed to within several weeks. As the Soviets had done before, they pocketed all the points favourable to them without any further comment. Those points which were unfavourable to them, and to which the President thought he had received acquiescence, the Soviets insisted be re-negotiated from scratch as though they had never been dealt with previously. As a result, instead of meeting us half-way, as we thought they had, agreement could only be reached if we compromised half-way between their

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new position and ours. The end result was that we met them three-quarters of the way.

Another negotiating ploy used by the Soviets is one which has been called the " red herring technique." The Soviets would often introduce an entirely new, often extraneous, aspect to the argument. They would then induce us to spend all our time and energy on disproving the validity of their newly added point. When they would finally agree to drop their point, we would conclude that a substantial victory had been achieved. We would often settle on the previous Soviet terms without having budged them from their original position.

Another Soviet negotiating technique was to permit themselves an occasional reversal of position. Thus, while the Soviets could—and did —for the most part show great patience and inflexibility in adhering to their positions, they were capable, when it suited their purposes, of a complete reversal. While we often felt that the Soviets would feel a " loss of face " by abandoning a previously held position, they showed no evidence that they were embarrassed, or even concerned, by their turn-about.

A common Soviet technique was to get us to agree to a deadline. Then, by using 11th hour tactics, the Soviets would stall on some point important to us, or even introduce a new issue at the last moment. The Soviets were well aware of our impatience. Knowing that we were afraid that no agreement might result after all our labours and knowing that we felt a need to " show progress " and " bring home the bacon," the Soviets would take advantage of these weaknesses. Unfortunately, they often succeeded with this tactic.

AT the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I submitted a comprehensive analysis of the SALT II situation in January 1978. I submitted a similar analysis in early January 1979 and again in March 1979. On 21 May 1979, when the final outcome of SALT II was apparent, I informed the JCS that I could not support the Administration's position and requested to be retired from the service. Although my request was granted I was asked to return to Geneva for the final round of negotiations. I did so and helped win several minor victories. However, I did not go to Vienna for the final signing of SALT and retired at the end of June 1979.

I had three major reasons for not being able to support the agreement. First, the agreement as initialled was unequal. Second, it was inadequately verifiable. And third, it undermined NATO cohesion and Allied solidarity.

The treaty agreed to was unequal for three main reasons. First, it gave the Soviets a unilateral right to 308 heavy missile launchers without giving us compensation for such an important asymmetry. Second, it gave the Soviets the right to exclude 375 intercontinentally-capable

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Backfire bombers from their totals. And third, it did not provide for equal *levels* of strategic forces as called for by Public Law 92–448.

The treaty was unverifiable because it did not adequately define systems being limited, notably MIRVed missile launchers and cruise missiles. Importantly, it gave the Soviets the right to encrypt telemetry and would permit them to test more than one new type of ICBM.

The treaty undermined NATO cohesion and Allied solidarity for a number of important reasons. Among these was that it did not achieve a meeting of the minds on what was meant by non-circumvention and non-transfer. Another was the inclusion of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles in a Protocol. Despite our unilateral pronouncements that the Protocol would not establish a precedent for future weapons deployment, the Joint Statement of Principles to which we had agreed stated that the first order of business in SALT III would be to resolve the issues of the Protocol.

Prior to SALT II our Allies could rely upon US strategic power to provide the "umbrella" in the event of an outbreak and escalation of hostilities in Europe. Now that it had become clear to European military and strategic analysts that a SALT II agreement would codify a situation locking the United States into a strategically inferior position vis-à-vis the USSR, the Allies saw the need to improve both their conventional and theatre nuclear force postures. The NATO countries agreed to provide for a three per cent a year budget increase in real terms. The US administration sought and achieved agreement among the principal heads of state in Europe that they would support the SALT II agreement. However, there were clear indications from highly placed officials in Europe that their governments were not happy with the outcome of SALT II. As Secretary Kissinger and General Haig pointed out, the European heads of state were constrained to support SALT because they had no other choice. Not to support the United States on SALT II was to run the risk of losing the vital US commitment to NATO and to drive European countries into the hands of the Soviets.

On 6 October 1979 Brezhnev launched a massive campaign to intimidate the European partners of NATO. He announced a unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 tanks and 20,000 troops from the Warsaw Pact. He accompanied this move by sending strong letters to each of the West European governments. However, despite these blandishments and notwithstanding the nervousness on the part of the Belgian, Dutch and Danish governments, the North Atlantic Council approved, in December 1979, a theatre nuclear force improvement plan calling for 108 extended range Pershing missiles and 464 long-range ground-launched cruise missile launchers.

The US administration had attempted to link the plan for TNF modernization to European support for SALT II. However, it quietly dropped its linkage after Lord Chalfont of the United Kingdom and

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Baron von Stauffenberg of Germany visited the United States and pointed out the folly of such linkage.

The prospects for passage of SALT II before Congress adjourned were highly dubious. These prospects were dealt a mortal blow by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the President asked that debate on the Treaty be shelved. Yet the Administration indicated that in the interim it will live up to the terms of the SALT II agreement so long as the Soviets do the same. This in my view would be a mistake. Rather, the Senate should pronounce its firm intention of redressing the growing strategic balance as rapidly as possible. Where such actions are in contradiction to the terms of the shelved SALT II agreement, such terms should not be allowed to stand in the way.

IT is clear that the US public is ahead of its leadership in the realization that the United States needs to improve its defence posture and to do so rapidly. It needs not only to spend more but needs to spend it in the right places and in accordance with a long-range strategic plan. As Kissinger has said—" no gimmicks." It is also clear that the United States must put negotiations in their proper place. Unlike us, the Soviets first established goals and objectives, then designed and deployed forces to carry out such goals and objectives, and then—only as a third priority did they enter into negotiations on their strategic arms. The United States, on the other hand, has had its priorities backward. First it decided to negotiate. Then it allowed negotiations to influence its design and deployment of its forces. And only as a third priority task did it look around to see what could be achieved with its truncated forces. It is high time the United States reversed its order of priorities.

Finally, we must recognize that the Soviets have a long-range objective of implementing the Brezhnev Doctrine, of promoting wars of liberation for the purpose of spreading " good socialism " at the expense of " bad capitalism." We need to be on guard to counter the Soviet tactic of insisting on " normalization " and revival of *détente* which is certain to follow consolidation of their gains in Afghanistan. They will simply use this tactic to assist them in their drive towards warm water ports and control over Middle East oil.

We will, inevitably, return to negotiating with the Soviets. We will do so because it will be in the interest of both superpowers to do so. When we do we will hopefully be in a position of being able to negotiate from strength. We will, if we have learned anything from our experience, have lost our naïvité concerning Soviet objectives and motivations. We will, if we employ good common sense, recognize how the Soviets negotiate and prevent the United States from suffering losses from negotiating processes. In such future negotiations the

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main lesson to learn is that the Russians are, as the Marquis de Custine pointed out 150 years ago, of a different culture from us. We spring from different roots and do not share a common heritage.

My six and one-half years at the negotiating table taught me two fundamental lessons. First, that the Soviets are still Russians. Second, that they are more unlike us than like us.

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The Death of Stalin and the Birth of Mutual Deterrence

Raymond L. Garthoff

WHAT is perhaps the most important change in Soviet foreign policy consequent upon the passing of Stalin from the scene a quarter of a century ago has, remarkably, gone virtually unnoticed. To be sure, it has long been clear to most observers that Stalin failed to appreciate what his successors have long acknowledged: that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and modern delivery systems have "fundamentally altered the nature of war," [1] that world nuclear war could no longer be countenanced as inevitable, and indeed that possession of such weapons by the United States and then by the Soviet Union as well would lead to a strategic stalemate reflecting mutual deterrence.

This changed Soviet view in the post-Stalin period has been acknowledged by some (though not by all) Western observers. What has not been noted, however, is the evidence that even before Stalin's death some of his key lieutenants in the Politburo had not only reached such conclusions, but evidently sought to challenge long-standing doctrine in the interests of a more realistic policy. Moreover, though we can only speculate on this, the clash over crucially important ideological doctrine may have contributed to Stalin's decision to purge a number of his chief Politburo associates—an intention frustrated in the nick of time only by his apparently fortuitous demise.

The present discussion, however, is limited to the argument that the recognition by Stalin's successors of the inexpediency and non-inevitability of war, and the corollary concept of mutual deterrence, had its origins in Stalin's own Politburo where, despite his opposition, there was a dawning awareness of the threat posed by nuclear war to world socialism, and indeed to world civilization.

Stalin, while not blind to the political and military importance of nuclear weapons, and determined to have such weapons, was evidently unable or unwilling to grasp their significance for Marxist-Leninist theory and for Soviet policy. Any recognition of the effect of such weapons by other Soviet leaders could not, of course, have found open expression under Stalin's tight rule. But with the benefit of hindsight one can trace the foreshadowings of later historical developments, and an interesting picture emerges.

In retrospect, we can perhaps now better understand the meaning of Stalin's last theoretical pronouncement, written some six months before his death: "Some comrades," Stalin said, believed that "wars between

[1] M. Suslov, "Report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 14 February 1964," Radio Moscow, 3 Apr. 1964.

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capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable . . . These comrades are mistaken. . . . They say that the thesis of Lenin that imperialism inevitably gives rise to wars must be considered obsolete . . . That is incorrect." Stalin also continued to display inexplicable optimism about the outcome of a nuclear world war, should one occur: " . . . war with the USSR would certainly pose the question of the continued existence of capitalism itself." And on the prospects for averting war: " In order to prevent the inevitability of wars, imperialism must be destroyed." [2]

WHO were these " some comrades " who dared to express views obviously not shared by Stalin and, according to him, not consistent with Lenin's thesis? (In the same work Stalin also criticized some other unnamed " comrades " for views clearly referring to ideas expressed by the late Politburo member Nikolai Voznesensky—who had paid for his errors with his life.) And some of the views Stalin was attacking appeared to be expressed in a veiled fashion even after this statement in the formal Report of the Central Committee presented to the Party Congress in October 1952 by Georgy Malenkov. While Malenkov did not, to be sure, say that " wars between capitalist countries had ceased to be inevitable," he did say that " The contradictions now rending the imperialist camp *may* lead to a war. . . ." But with that one possible significant exception, the unnamed " comrades " did not openly challenge Stalin while he still lived.[3]

Who, then, were these anonymous " some comrades "? To judge from the later record, they would appear to have included some—and perhaps even a majority—of Stalin's closest colleagues and successors. For the Presidium and Central Committee in 1956 proclaimed:

> As is well known, there is a Marxist-Leninist thesis that so long as imperialism exists wars are inevitable . . . But at the present time this thesis has radically changed. The world camp of socialism has come into being and has become a mighty force . . . [possessing] material means to prevent aggression . . . we must maintain the greatest vigilance . . . But there is no fatal inevitability of war. Now there are powerful social and political forces which possess means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing a war, and if they should attempt to start one to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressors, foiling their adventuristic plans.[4]

[2] I. V. Stalin, " Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," *Bol'shevik*, No. 18 (September 1952), pp. 18–19. Similarly, an authoritative unsigned editorial in *Pravda* on 9 Sept. 1952, flatly declared: " The fate of the globe will ultimately be decided by the *inevitable* clash between the two worlds."

[3] See Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 238–71, especially pp. 240–5, including the references cited in this paragraph. The contradiction between Stalin's and Malenkov's statements in 1952 has been noted, among others, by William Zimmerman, in Charles Gati (ed.), *Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War* (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and New York, 1974), pp. 104–5, but without relating it to the question of the *deterability* of war.

[4] First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev, " Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU " (14 Feb. 1956), *XX s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet* (Stenographic Account: The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

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Stalin had attributed to the unspecified "comrades" who had dared to challenge a thesis of Lenin the idea that war was obsolete because there were "powerful popular forces" in the world which were opposed to it. (And, indeed, Malenkov in the Central Committee Report to the Party Congress in 1952 had adduced this as one restraint on the United States attacking the Soviet Union.) The Presidium and Central Committee in 1956, however, stressed that in addition to "powerful social and political forces" opposing war, the Soviet Union also now possessed "serious means," "material means"—a nuclear deterrent—to prevent war. In fact, of course, the Soviet nuclear deterrent in the mid-1950s was still of marginal capability, but it was coming into being.

Malenkov was the first Soviet leader to state publicly, in March 1954, that a world war in the nuclear age "would mean the end of world civilization." [5] Malenkov, to be sure, was soon pounced upon by factional opponents, including Khrushchev in particular, for thus echoing President Eisenhower's similar statement of 8 December 1953. But it is clear that this criticism was only intended to embarrass him; it was not an expression of real disagreement, and indeed his very critics, once in power, soon sounded the same theme themselves.

On the same day, a year after Stalin's death, that Malenkov first publicly acknowledged the complete inexpediency of nuclear war, his Politburo colleague Anastas Mikoyan seconded him and added to that judgment an explicit reference to the deterrent role envisaged for Soviet nuclear weapons: "Atomic and hydrogen weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union are a means for deterring aggressors and for waging peace." [6]

It is not possible on present evidence to distinguish precisely which Soviet leaders had reached this kind of conclusion *before* Stalin's death. We have little direct evidence from that period, and the evidence from the early post-Stalin period—while considerable—must be weighed against the fact that political conflicts sometimes lead to the expedient dissimulation in public of their views by adherents of various factions. In general, it would appear that among those who probably held this revisionist viewpoint in 1952–53 were the Presidium Members Malenkov, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin. Certainly these four all did by 1954–55. (The case of Malenkov is clearest, based on his 19th Party Congress Report in 1952, as well as his 1954 statement.) Another group remained opposed to the revised view: Molotov throughout, and probably Kaganovich and Voroshilov (if they held any view at all on it in 1952–53) until 1956. A middle grouping which comprised Khrushchev, Bulganin, and probably later included Suslov and Voroshilov, may not have held any view on the subject in 1952–53, until it opposed Malenkov and his

Union), Vol. 1 (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1956), pp. 36–8. This statement, which also appeared in *Pravda*, 14 Feb. 1956, was endorsed in speeches by others, including Malenkov in *Izvestiya*, 19 Feb. 1956, and Mikoyan in *Pravda*, 18 Feb. 1956.

[5] "Speech of G. M. Malenkov," *Pravda*, 13 Mar. 1954.

[6] "Speech of A. I. Mikoyan," *Kommunist*, Yerevan, 12 Mar. 1954.

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associates on this and other points for factional reasons in late 1953–55; but then, from 1956 on, members of this middle group themselves adopted and expressed this position.

The difficulty of identifying the doctrinal differences between these groups is compounded by the fact that quite apart from their differences of policy, the Malenkov and Molotov factions (consistently opposed to each other on this particular issue, and many others) nonetheless in 1957 combined forces politically, and were then joined by Bulganin and Shepilov from the Khrushchev group, for the staging of the abortive, but nearly successful, attempt by "the Anti-Party Group" to depose Khrushchev and his faction. During the 1952–53 period Brezhnev was too junior, and Kosygin temporarily out of a position of authority, so it is almost certain that neither of them was involved then, though both were consistent supporters of the new revised view after 1956.[7]

ALTHOUGH it is difficult in some cases to be sure of the real views of these men during 1952–56, the picture is much more clear for the period since that time. The passage cited earlier rejecting "the fatal inevitability of war" stated the official line taken on the issue and was a direct refutation of Stalin; it was the work of the Central Committee, and was read by Khrushchev (who had succeeded Malenkov as First Secretary of the Party) in his public speech to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. The authoritative *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* has endorsed this line in each of its subsequent editions (the latest in 1977). Clearly, Stalin's successors have been well aware of the doctrinal implications of their changed evaluation of the world in the nuclear era. Thus, explicitly in conjunction with discussion of the denial of the inevitability of war, the Party *History* notes that: "The 20th Congress posed and resolved on a new basis a number of basic questions of principle concerning international development. Creatively developing Marxism-Leninism, it enriched revolutionary theory by important conclusions and theses." Moreover, "The Congress demonstrated that the Party, its Central Committee, is not only a collective political and organizational centre, but also a collective centre for the development of Marxist theoretical thought."[8]

Since 1956 Soviet political leaders have held that a nuclear war would

[7] The identification of differing individual views on this subject, both before and after Stalin's death, needs more study. An extensive and useful review of materials bearing on contending Soviet views on the inevitability of war and deterrence in the post-Stalin period—though, in this writer's judgment, flawed by too great a readiness to assume that expressed views were necessarily real ones, and by a lack of appreciation of the evolving post-1956 Soviet position—is to be found in Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (Praeger, New York, 1959), pp. 65–166. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Praeger, New York, 1959), pp. 21–4 and 33–4; and Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 19–31.

[8] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), 5th ed. (Politizdat, Moscow, 1977), p. 569, and see also pp. 564–5.

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not only threaten to end world civilization, but would also pose a tremendous risk to communism, rather than conceivably facilitate its progress, as Stalin had held.[9] Molotov's was the only dissenting voice on this: in 1961, long stripped of all power, he wrote a confidential letter to the 22nd Party Congress, arguing that "without serious conflict, without war, advance towards communism is impossible." He denied the possibility of avoiding world war, and argued that peaceful coexistence should be regarded as "only a temporary tactic" and "an aspect of the Cold War," rather than as the general line of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.[10] But he was alone; he had long before been overridden, and his views were sharply rejected.

The post-Stalin Soviet doctrinal view of war was expressed in *Kommunist* in the following passage:

> Marxist-Leninist theory has never held that war constitutes a source or prerequisite necessary for the emergence of revolutions . . . But the question of the relation of war and the revolution has assumed a different character in our times . . . The creation of modern weapons of mass destruction, of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the means of their delivery to any point on the globe, has fundamentally altered the nature of war, making it many times more destructive . . . [A world war] would cause the complete destruction of the main centres of civilization and the annihilation of whole peoples. It would bring untold suffering to all mankind. Only madmen could want such a catastrophe to happen . . . The working class does not think of creating a Communist civilization on the ruins of the centres of world culture, on desolated territories contaminated by thermonuclear fallout, which would be the inevitable consequences of such a war . . . It is therefore obvious that a contemporary nuclear war, however one looks at it, can in no way be a factor that would accelerate the revolution and bring nearer the victory of socialism.[11]

This view was formally incorporated in the new Party Programme adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.[12]

Similarly, the "Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties" in Moscow in November 1960, in addition to reaffirming the non-inevitability of war, spoke of the deaths

[9] For example, see N. S. Khrushchev, *Pravda*, 16 Jan. 1963, and L. I. Brezhnev, *Pravda*, 29 Oct. 1973, 22 July 1974, and 24 Nov. 1976.

[10] Molotov's letter was not published, but it was disclosed and its position refuted by several of the Soviet leaders; see A. I. Mikoyan, *Izvestiya*, 22 Oct 1961; P. S. Satyukov, *Izvestiya*, 27 Oct. 1961, and O. V. Kuusinen, *Izvestiya*, 27 Oct. 1961. See also A. A. Kirillov, *Predotvrashchenie voiny—vazhneishaya problema sovremennosti* (The Prevention of War—Most Important Problem of the Present Time) (Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1962), p. 42.

[11] A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky, "Lenin's Theory of the Socialist Revolution and the Present Day," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1960, pp. 15-16. This article was in particular directed against the views of the Chinese Communists.

[12] *XXII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 17–31 oktyabrya 1961 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Stenographic Account: The Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 17–31 Oct. 1961), Vol. III, (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1962), pp. 231–73.

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of hundreds of millions in such a war, "the serious threat to all mankind," and of the "historic mission" of communists "to save mankind from the nightmare of a new world war." [13]

THESE and other statements made in the 1950s and 1960s not only reflected the conclusion that war was not acceptable as a policy choice, but also implied that it was unthinkable as a contingency. This has posed two major problems, one doctrinal, the other military. The doctrinal dilemma is this: while jettisoning Stalinist views on the inevitability of war and the idea that war is necessary or desirable as a catalyst of socialist advance in the world, communists must assume that "socialism" is destined to survive and to triumph even if a world nuclear catastrophe were to occur. If that view were openly discarded, it could place in question the whole Marxist-Leninist world-view, and even the basis for legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Hence we see reaffirmations of confidence in the ultimate triumph of socialism even if, despite Soviet efforts to prevent it, a world nuclear war should occur.

The policy debates of the post-Stalin era have involved not so much the basic postulates of the non-inevitability, non-desirability, and deterability of war, as their possible corollaries.

By 1921, with the failure of "world revolution," but the survival of Bolshevik Russia, the idea of "deterrence"—though not expressed by that term for many years—was recognized as the key role for military power to play on socialism's behalf. More specifically, Soviet military power would dissuade imperialist powers from resorting to military power against the USSR (and, later, against the other countries of the socialist camp) in their effort to thwart the progressive course of history. This remains the Soviet view.[14]

What is new in the post-Stalin period is the role of *nuclear* deterrence. Thus, in describing the 1950s, the Party *History* declares: "No state of the capitalist camp could threaten the Soviet Union with the atomic bomb without risk of receiving a retaliatory nuclear strike." [15] Nuclear deterrence was thus seen and described as the chief factor in averting the inevitability of war, and it continues to be so regarded.

The most sensitive questions touched upon in the policy debates (beginning with Malenkov's unwise espousal of a kind of "minimum deterrence" in 1954–55 [16]) have been concerned with the implications

[13] *Programmnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm* (Programmatic Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1961), p. 63.

[14] See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis* (Praeger, New York, 1966), in particular Chapters 4, 10 and 12.

[15] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, 4th ed. (Moscow, 1973), p. 557. The fifth edition (1977) updates the expression by substituting "thermonuclear" for "atomic," and referring to a "crushing" retaliatory strike (p. 544).

[16] See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 21–4, and Horelick and Rush, op. cit. pp. 19–27.

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of mutual deterrence for Soviet military policy, programmes, forces, and budgets. Is nuclear war recognized by both sides as being *so* unpromising and *so* unthinkable that it can never occur? What role, then, would there be for military preparedness for nuclear war? Assuming, as in fact both sides do, acceptance of a continuing need for powerful survivable military forces to sustain and to buttress mutual deterrence, there remains the further important question: is a war-fighting capability needed for deterrence, and in the event of war, for a "victory"?

These questions go well beyond the scope of the present discussion. The development over recent years of Soviet political and military views on mutual deterrence, and on the related question of agreed strategic arms limitation, require their own careful study.[17] But, in addressing such questions, it may be useful as well as historically interesting to be aware of the early Soviet recognition of the non-inevitability and deterability of war in the nuclear age, and that it began even before Stalin's death.

[17] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 1978, represents an extensive contribution to investigating this subject.

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The Soviet View of Deterrence: Who Whom?

Francis P. Hoeber
Amoretta M. Hoeber

AN article of faith among the dominant school of American strategic analysts, reflected in US strategic doctrine since 1963, is that nuclear war is unthinkable and therefore that the United States and the Soviet Union, in an age in which both have large strategic nuclear forces, must deter each other.[1] A condition of this faith is that such mutual deterrence exists when and only when both sides embrace the concept of annihilation of militarily naked civilian populations and property as their ultimate threat and abjure the use of strategic nuclear forces for any purpose other than to threaten such punishment to prevent an attack by the other side. Given the necessity of mutuality for such a concept to make any sense, this school of thought imputes a similar view to the Soviets—or, if that seems not quite feasible, it assumes an embryonic form of the same view and trusts in US persuasiveness or simply the passage of time to develop the required convergence.

The problem with the mutual deterrence approach is that it *does* only make sense when it is mutual; yet the views attributed to the Soviets are *not* the real core of Soviet thought. Overlooked are the importance to the Soviets of their political-military objectives, the role of military forces in the pursuit of those objectives, the implications this has for the Soviet military posture vis-à-vis that of the West, and the overall impact of the resulting posture divergences. Consideration of these factors can only lead to the conclusion that *mutual* deterrence is *not* a Soviet objective.

This is not to say that the Soviets desire war, or that they do not understand the brutal implications of a nuclear conflict. The Soviets would, of course, prefer to gain their goals of expansion and world revolution without having to suffer war. They make this point often:

> It is especially important to have this in mind in modern conditions where imperialism is threatening humanity with nuclear war. War with the employment of nuclear weapons can undermine the very foundations for the existence of human society and inflict tremendous damage to its progressive development. There-

[1] How long this view has obtained is perhaps debatable. One could start with the first important published book on strategy in the nuclear age, Bernard Brodie's *The Absolute Weapon* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1946), or with Albert Wohlstetter's "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. XXXVII, January 1959), or with the 1963 introduction of the concept of Assured Destruction by Secretary McNamara after he abandoned his 1962 proposal for counterforce-only or city-avoidance doctrines.

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> fore, the most important requirement for progress in our time is the preventing of a new world war. Capitalism, as the main obstacle on the way to the progressive development of human society, must and should be eliminated by the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses under conditions of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems—world war is not necessary for this.[2]

As to the horrors of such a war, these too have been clear. Indeed, it was Khrushchev who described the aftermath of nuclear war as a world in which "the living will envy the dead" (even though he also made nuclear threats, or "sabre rattling," and issued his classic, ambiguous taunt: "We will bury you"). It has been argued that Khrushchev's view of nuclear war, with his apparent rejection of the orthodox view that it is the obligation of the state and the people to survive and prevail against any threats, was one of the factors leading to his overthrow. It has been further argued that Soviet doctrine has significantly changed since that time. But the evidence shows that there has been considerable continuity on this point. Since Khrushchev's time—Soviet military literature has emphasized again and again not only the need to prevent the imperialists from initiating nuclear war but also the view that such war could only impede social progress.

> A new world war, which will take on an unprecedented destructive nature and which will lead to the destruction of hundreds of millions of people, not only would not accelerate, but would delay the transition of humanity to socialism; without war, man will make the transition to socialism more rapidly and easily.[3]

This position was reconfirmed, for example, at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. However, the Soviets remain Clausewitzian in their belief in the concept of war as an extension of diplomacy.

THERE have been several extensive studies of Soviet writings which have supported these briefly stated conclusions.[4] Even those proponents of the mutual assured destruction school do not like to argue about the stated Soviet position, as actually written. Rather, they attempt to explain these statements away. One example of such convoluted explanations is that given by Ambassador Raymond Garthoff:

> Mutual deterrence in Soviet writings is usually expressed in terms of assured retaliatory capability which would devastate the aggressor, because this formulation (rather than "mutual assured destruction" capability) is more responsive to *ideological sensitivity* over the idea that the Soviet Union could be considered a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred—only adver-

[2] Col. V. Morozov, "Book on Laws of Armed Conflict," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 7, 1965, FPD 962, pp. 79–80.

[3] Col. V. Morozov, "The Third Edition of 'Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army'," *Voyennaya mysl'*, 1963, FDD 956, p. 81.

[4] See Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (Hoover Institution Press, 1979). Other such works are cited in this study.

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> saries (the United States, more broadly and imperialists, and also the Chinese Communists) are described as potential aggressors. In addition, this formulation avoids identification with the specific content of the American concept of "mutual assured destruction," often expressed in terms of a countervalue capability for destroying a specified percentage of the opponent's industry and population. This American interpretation is much more limited than the Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence resting on mutual capability for devastating retaliation unacceptable to a rational potential initiator of war, without calculations of arbitrary industrial and population losses which theoretically would be acceptable costs. [Emphasis added.] [5]

We have to apply Occam's razor. Garthoff added the word "mutual," which is not used by the Soviets, and constructed a laboured argument about "ideological sensitivity" to explain why they do not refer directly to "mutual assured destruction." It appears to us that fewer assumptions are required by the simple argument that the Soviets mean what they say. They wish to deter the imperialist threat; but nowhere do they say that they wish to be deterred. Even if they do not intend nuclear attack on the United States, we must recognize that they have shown a willingness to use conventional force (hitherto within their sphere of influence and beyond it by proxy; most recently in Afghanistan, beyond their heretofore asserted sphere of influence).

At the same time, the Soviets *have* over two decades both said they wanted and in actuality pursued the goal of strategic superiority, treating parity only as a transition from inferiority. Superiority has always had an important place in their stated doctrine:

> . . . the advantage in principle accrues to that side which significantly surpasses the other in strength in the aggregate or in individual and the more essential components of combat might.[6]

The relentless pursuit of superiority has taken two simultaneous routes, the military and the political. The military road starts with a traditional Soviet (and Russian) emphasis on quantity, or mass. This is demonstrated by their focus on the importance of reserves. The concept of reserves of nuclear weapons refers in Soviet writings to those forces remaining after the initial nuclear exchange. It is the post-exchange balance that is viewed as the primary measure in what the Soviets call the correlation of nuclear forces. In fact, an important scenario in Soviet strategy has the war continuing until one side exhausts its stock of nuclear weapons. If the other side still has a sufficient quantity (which appears to be measured at least in the hundreds), it then wins by default.[7]

[5] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 3, no. 1, Summer 1978, p. 124.

[6] Col. S. Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 6, 1969, FPD 0008/70, p. 32.

[7] See Douglass and Hoeber, op. cit., for a fuller treatment of the concept of reserves.

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But a fork in the road to military superiority leads to qualitative challenge to the complacent American assumption of technological superiority:

> No lags will be allowed in the military field: maintaining reliable military-technical superiority is a task conditioned by the international duties of the Soviet Union.[8]

And,

> Using the achievement of Soviet economics, sciences, and technology, the party and state are doing everything necessary to bring about our constant qualitative and quantitative military and technical superiority over the armies of the leading capitalist states.[9]

We can leave aside as beyond the scope of this article the long-standing and increasing Soviet superiority in conventional ground forces and their rapid catching-up in naval forces—noting only that nuclear deterrence leaves the Soviets free to use these forces in non-nuclear conflict—and turn to a brief review of the Soviet pursuit of superiority in strategic offensive and defensive forces.

WE need not go back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when the United States had unquestioned strategic superiority (in retrospect, a period of reassuring stability). It was during the 1960s that the Soviet build-up of ICBM and SLBM forces began in earnest. Indeed, in 1969 the then Secretary of State declared that the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) could begin because the parties could negotiate from positions of equal strength, or parity. The 1972 SALT I five-year Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms was said to "codify" parity, although Soviet forces had approximately doubled during the negotiations. Greater numbers of missiles and throw-weight were conceded to the Soviet Union under the Interim Agreement because these factors were said by the Administration to be offset by the US qualitative advantages (MIRVs and accuracy) and a three-to-one advantage in the number of bombers, which were in any event not covered by the agreement.

The US qualitative advantage was evanescent. The Soviets started testing MIRVs in 1973 and deploying them in 1974–75, proving that they were under advance development during the 1969–72 negotiations —the first clear case of Soviet deception in SALT. As Soviet accuracy continued to grow, US improvements in accuracy were unilaterally slowed during that period in a series of self-denying ordinances. (For example, the Startrack programme to enhance the accuracy of

[8] Maj. Gen. Ye. Nikitin and Col. S. Baranov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Measures of the CPSU for Raising the Combat Might of the Armed Forces," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 6, 1968, FPD 005/69, p. 7.

[9] Marshall of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, "The Lessons of the Beginning Period of the Great Patriotic War," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 8, 1964, FDP 904, p. 29.

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SLBMs was cancelled in 1969.) Soviet accuracy is now conceded to have caught up with that of the United States in the generation of missiles now being deployed (the SS–17, –18, and –19).

By almost every quantitative and qualitative measure, the Soviets are projected to pass the United States by or before 1985, and they are permitted to do so under the SALT II Treaty, signed though not yet ratified. Estimates of the disparities of some of these measures for 1985 are shown in Table 1.

Those figures are static measures. They are terribly important in perceptions; nevertheless, as everyone points out, one must really look at dynamic potential "outcomes" of a nuclear exchange. In last year's *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1980,* the Administration published charts showing US inferiority in outcomes from 1980 until 1985. (The US programmes, notably the cruise missile and the MX ICBM, which it is claimed will redress the balance, were delayed during the SALT II Treaty negotiations; even by Administration figures, they cannot offset the Soviet advantage until the 1986–90 period.) But the comparison was dropped from this year's Fiscal Year 1981 report because of widespread criticism of bias *against* the United States in the calculations (making the situation even worse than it was pictured).

To measure dynamic outcomes properly, one must also look at strategic defensive forces, and it is here that the Soviet Union has had its most impressive build-up, as the United States has stood still or actually dismantled defences in order to assure that it was deterred, or "in hostage," under the doctrine of mutual deterrence. Defence can be broken down into active (weapons) and passive (natural and artificially-enhanced characteristics of targets).

Among active defences is counterforce capability, or the destruction of weapons before they are launched. The several-fold Soviet advantage in prompt hard-target kill capability is shown in the Table. The Soviets, by Administration as well as unofficial calculations, have the ability to destroy up to 90 per cent of the US ICBM force (plus SLBMs in port and all non-alert bombers on the ground) in a first strike in the *early* 1980s. There are no claims, official or otherwise, of a corresponding US capability.

As to what are more commonly thought of as active defences, the Soviets have deployed, and are continuously modernizing, vast air defences. The United States has dismantled all but token air defence forces. The ABM Treaty of 1972 limited each side to two ABM sites with 100 missiles each; the 1974 Protocol reduced this to one site. On the US side, that one site has been dismantled, following passage of the Kennedy Amendment in 1975. Meanwhile, the Soviets have maintained an active R & D programme on ABM several times that of the United States, giving them a break-out possibility that the United States could not match in any reasonable period. In addition, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are operational in the Soviet Union,

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TABLE 1

US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES IN 1985 [10]

	Strategic Nuclear Launch Vehicles		Megatonnage	
	US	USSR	US	USSR
ICBMs				
—MIRV	536	820	423	4,314
—Non-MIRV	504	360	1,026	4,590
Total	1,040	1,180	1,449	8,904
SLBMs				
—MIRV	664	356	383	750
—Non-MIRV	80	620	80	796
Total	744	976	464	1,546
Heavy Bombers				
—Non-ALCM	226	90*	1,624	420
—ALCM Carriers	120	0		
Total	346	90	1,624	420
GRAND TOTAL	2,130	2,246	3,537	10,870

	Warheads		Hard Target Kill Capability (CMP—thousands)**	
	US	USSR	US	USSR
ICBMs				
—MIRV	1,608	5,752	45	211
—Non-MIRV	504	480	13	127
Total	2,112	6,232 (Prompt)	58	338
SLBMs				
—MIRV	5,648	3,752	15	18
—Non-MIRV	240	1,324		2
Total	5,888	5,076 (Prompt)	15	21
MISSILE TOTAL	8,000	11,308 (Prompt)	74	359
Heavy Bombers (ALCMs, SRAMs, Bombs)	4,504	420 (Delayed)	229	33
GRAND TOTAL	12,504	11,728	303	392

*Excludes Backfires and Badgers. **CMP = Counter military potential.

[10] Based on testimony of Paul Nitze, 11 September 1979 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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whereas the United States discontinued an ASAT R & D programme in 1963 (*sic*) because " it had no military mission."

In addition to the active defence disparities discussed above, the Soviets, in contrast to the United States, have instituted vast passive defences. They emphasize the hardening and concealment of command, control and communications facilities, and the protection of military forces by dispersal and camouflage. Further, for two decades they have had an intensive civil defence programme, since 1972 headed by a Deputy Minister of Defence, costing up to $2 billion a year and involving a broad range of programmes for the protection of leadership, essential workers, wartime production facilities (with plans for their continued operation), and population. The United States has had a token programme of only about $100 million per year.

One may choose to debate the effectiveness of Soviet civil defences if war should come, and, indeed, there are great uncertainties in all the parameters of strategic offence and defence, as in other elements of warfare, but the point is this: in a period in which the Soviets have striven, apparently successfully, to fix the levels of US strategic offensive forces through SALT, their intensive and extensive defensive efforts can have tremendous perceived and real leverage. It is highly probable that in the 1980s it will appear to the Soviets, to the United States, and to US allies that the Soviets have a palpable and usable strategic superiority, and that after a threatened or actual Soviet first strike, the US deterrent would be deterred. There is nothing mutual about this; a nation that builds such comprehensive and burdensome defences is *not* holding itself in hostage and ensuring its opponent's deterrent capability.

IN addition to the military measures described above, the Soviets have not neglected the political dimension of strategic superiority. They have used both tough negotiation and deception in SALT to encourage the United States to stand still and even to self-disarm (as in the cancellation of the B-1, the closing of the Minuteman II production line, and the delays in the accuracy, cruise missile, MX, and Trident programmes). We have noted the Soviet concealment of its MIRV development during the SALT I negotiation. We might add that they bargained for and won concessions in numbers of SLBMs in part on the basis that they had to offset the US advantage of forward bases for its missile-carrying submarines in Scotland and Spain—and then in the year following the signing of the Interim Agreement, tested the 4,300 nautical-mile SSN–8 SLBM that can cover the United States from the Soviet bases at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk.

They have also used SALT negotiations in pursuit of fragmentation of the NATO alliance and isolation of the United States, as in the cases of the Protocol prohibiting the deployment of surface-launched cruise missiles of over 600km range and the limit on technology

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transfer to allies under the "noncircumvention clause." A non-SALT example of political pressures was the successful Soviet campaign against the neutron bomb as a European defence against Soviet tanks. Indeed, the whole Soviet policy of *détente* goes in this unilateral direction. And yet many in the West overlook all these Soviet efforts to lull the West in the pursuit of their own objectives. In 1977 a newspaper article cited an ignored 1973 British intelligence report about

> . . . Brezhnev telling a secret meeting of East European Communist party leaders in Prague that *détente* was a strategem to allow the Soviets to build up their military and economic power so that, by 1985, "a decisive shift in the correlation of forces" would enable the Russians to "exert our will wherever we want to." [11]

Eugene Rostow has stated the case vividly:

> Why have the American people found it so difficult to accept the Soviet view of Soviet policy? In the teeth of our experience since 1945, many of us persist in believing that *détente* in our relations with the Soviet Union is not an aspiration but reality; that Soviet motivations are the same as our own; and that the Soviet Union is a conservative state, governed by a cautious, elderly ruling elite interested in only preserving the status quo.
>
> The Soviet Union makes it clear that its policy is quite different. On 5 August 1978, in the course of a full dress speech in Karelia [the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic that includes the territory taken from Finland in 1940], Yuri Andropov, a member of the Politburo and head of the KGB, defined *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms that are breathtaking:
>
> > Here in Karelia, one must stress the significance attached to the lengthy experience of neighbourly, genuinely equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today form an integral and stable system of equal cooperation in various spheres of political, economic and cultural life. This is *détente* embodied in daily contacts, *détente* which makes peace more lasting and people's lives better and more tranquil. In the last analysis this is the highly humane meaning of the foreign policy of socialism and the foreign policy activity of our party and the Soviet state.[12]

In short, the whole Soviet thrust is toward building credible threats while denying credibility to US threats. The United States policy of placing itself in hostage to Soviet deterrent forces and seeking mutual deterrence is based on mirror-imaging, on ascribing US policy views to the Soviets. However, their words, their programmes and their actions indicate otherwise. The present foundation for US strategic doctrine may thus be as deceiving—and as dangerous—as quicksand.

[11] "Brezhnev termed Detente a Ruse, 1973 Report Said." by William Beecher, *Boston Globe*, 11 Feb. 1977.

[12] Douglass and Hoeber, op. cit. p. x.

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The Pattern of Blundering

US Negotiations with the USSR

David Floyd

THIS lengthy (573-page) brown paper-backed government document * is in effect a history of Soviet–American relations over the last half-century with the stress laid on the actual machinery and manner of negotiation. Despite its unprepossessing appearance and often obscure American-scholar language, it is a highly topical publication which reveals, perhaps unwittingly, how good the Russians are, if not at diplomacy, then at international negotiating, and how bad the Americans can be at it. It is an essential part of the sad and embarrassing story of how, from behind a smokescreen of *détente*, the Russians emerged with a substantial edge on the Americans in strategic weapons and so delivered us all into what Dr Henry Kissinger has called a " period of maximum peril."

The story begins back in 1933, when President Roosevelt decided to take the initiative with a view to establishing relations with the Soviet Union, with which the Americans decided they had a " convergence of interests." They went into the negotiations believing that the Soviet government was eager to have diplomatic relations with America so as to obtain much-needed credits, and that the question of credits could therefore be used as a " lever " in the negotiations. Their negotiating tactic was to insist on a settlement of the Russian debt to America as a condition for American recognition of the Soviet regime. But the Russians, represented by their foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, did not see things that way. They simply reversed the order: they demanded recognition first, after which they would be prepared to talk about the debt.

Surely the Russians had to give way? Litvinov represented a vast but undeveloped country still suffering from the devastation of war, civil war and revolution and in dire need of economic aid. America was rich and in no pressing need of relations with Russia. Litvinov might well have been sent back to Stalin with his tail between his legs.

Not so, however. President Roosevelt shared the illusions of so many statesmen. " If I could only, myself, talk to one man representing the Russians I could straighten out the whole question," he said. And so he and Litvinov met together without advisers and without record-takers, Roosevelt practising the " Roosevelt touch " and Litvinov displaying " his most affable and winning manner."

* *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy*. A special study prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

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And what happened? Did Roosevelt charm Litvinov, or was it the other way round? What happened was that Litvinov made "concessions" over the questions of religious freedom in Russia and Soviet propaganda activities in the United States. But on the important issue of the debt he refused to budge. So Roosevelt gave in and agreed to draw up a "declaration of intent in principle" to settle the debt question *after recognition.* In the words of the compiler of this study, Dr Joseph G. Whelan: "Thus the United States abandoned its initial negotiating strategy of recognition as a lever for settlement." In that way the Soviet leaders won their first major negotiating encounter with the Americans.

"FOR American negotiators the diplomacy of recognition had important lessons, none perhaps more significant than what to expect from their Soviet counterparts in the future," Dr Whelan comments. In the words of Cordel Hull, Secretary of State at the time: "Negotiating with Russia, therefore, was not like negotiating with other great powers." But the subsequent story of Soviet-American relations does not suggest that the lesson was properly learnt: the Americans (and not the Americans alone) seem determined *not* to understand that the Soviet regime *is* different and in what it is different. On the contrary, this study reflects throughout a persistent belief, or just an act of faith, that the Soviet regime is now settling down and reverting to "traditional norms" in its international behaviour. Dr Whelan sums this attitude up in these words:

> In sum, the decade and a half of solidifying peaceful coexistence under Brezhnev occurred within the context of a changing structure of international relations; a perceptible improvement in the Soviet diplomatic establishment; the beginning of a transfer of power to a new generation; the emergence of *détente;* and the building of a negotiating process in SALT that may in the long term be compared to the impact of the Congress of Vienna on the peace of nineteenth century Europe. Thus in facing the 1980s the Russians and the Americans seem to be entering a new era of international relations where diplomacy and negotiations could take on a new meaning and become a new force.

Or again:

> Diplomacy offers the possibility of bringing the Soviet Union into an acceptable international system, a development that could have a moderating influence on Soviet policy. The imperatives of international relations in the modern age (notably the need to avoid nuclear war) act as a magnetic force pulling the Soviets into this system and toward a diplomacy of common purpose.

The period of Soviet-American relations when the two governments could reasonably be said to have had a "common purpose" was during the second world war. Not only did they share the aim of

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defeating Nazi Germany; the Russians needed American economic and military aid and the Americans were eager to provide it. It should have been a period of maximum cooperation and Soviet goodwill. But it was not.

General Deane, of whom Dr Whelan rightly says: "Few Americans have probably ever been so deeply involved in the negotiating process with the Russians," left Russia at the end of 1945 a very disappointed man. "We had barely scratched the surface of the possibilities that existed for a full Soviet-American partnership in the prosecution of the war," he said. Though sceptical of the prospects for future cooperation, Deane set out some rules for dealing with the Kremlin which retain all their validity today:

> We can get along with the present Russian leaders if we recognize them for what they are. We can, if we are stronger, smarter and at least as certain of our objectives as they are of theirs. We must appreciate that we are dealing with individuals who are motivated by realism and not by sentiment. We must be shrewd enough to get value received for concessions we make.

Deane drew attention to many of the Russians' negotiating devices, many of which they continue to employ today. There was, for example, the acceptance of agreement "in principle" which served as a means of avoiding negotiation on an issue that did not suit the Russians. Such agreements, Deane said, meant "exactly nothing." Another device was for the Russians to leave the initiation of any negotiation to the other side and never to put forward proposals themselves. They continued to make good use of this in the SALT talks.

Once the war was over and Stalin had settled down to grabbing the spoils of war there was little left of the illusion of "common purpose." In the course of the post-war conferences which decided the shape of the world the Americans realized that they were up against tough opponents. More lessons were learned, but Stalin got most of what he wanted, despite the Americans' overwhelming superiority in almost every field. For the Russians there was only one important lesson: that they must achieve military superiority themselves, and that became their main purpose over the next decades.

AND so they came eventually to the SALT talks—"one of the most significant continuous negotiations in the history of Soviet–American relations, perhaps even in modern history," in Dr Whelan's view. Yet the account of the talks given in this study reveals some extraordinary parallels with those earlier Soviet–American encounters in 1933, during the war and in the post-war period.

There was, for example, the same tendency on the part of the Americans to attribute to the Russians a major objective for which

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they had in fact no reliable evidence. Following the initial confidential exchanges between Washington and Moscow in 1968 it was accepted that certain "common objectives" had been clarified. They are summarized by Dr Whelan as follows:

> It was agreed implicitly that the main objective of the negotiations would be to achieve and maintain a stable strategic deterrent through limitations on the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons;
>
> It was agreed implicitly that strategic parity should be accepted and maintained that a balance through arms limitations should exist giving neither side any military advantage, and that equal security would be assured for both sides. . . .

Raymond Garthoff, who played an important part in the negotiations, said that "both the United States and the Soviet Union were agreed on the existence of, and the need to preserve, *parity, mutual deterrence* and *strategic stability*."

But had the Russians really accepted parity and mutual deterrence as their aim? Had the Americans any good reason to believe that the Russians had abandoned the hope of achieving superiority? What does it mean to say that the Russians had "agreed implicitly" to something? Did it mean anything more than the Americans *assumed* that the Russians were aiming at strategic parity and stability? In the light of what we now know about Soviet strategic armoury and nuclear weapons programmes, we can say with reasonable certainty that, if the Soviet negotiators led the Americans to believe they had "common objectives" with them, their real objectives were very different.

When we come to actual negotiating techniques we find again that the Americans had learnt very little from past negotiations. For example, the Russians were always very reluctant to agree to any precise definition of a key concept or actual object, though such definitions were obviously essential to effective agreements about military weapons. The lack of precise definitions left the Russians free to interpret the small print, and sometimes the larger print, as they pleased. For example, their refusal to define what constituted a "heavy" ICBM enabled them to install the SS-19 missile in existing silos and so outstrip the Americans in the nuclear race. Why did the Americans give in?

Or take that other Soviet negotiating device: always leaving it to the Americans to take the initiative. This meant that the Americans had to reveal at least part of their hand before the Russians showed anything of theirs. The Russians were able to chip away at the American proposal and force the Americans to revise and revise again, until there was a danger, as one of the American negotiators pointed out, of the Americans being left "negotiating with themselves."

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Then there is the question of secrecy. It stands to reason that talks about nuclear weapons were bound to involve a great deal of highly secret information which neither superpower wished to spread around the world. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how serious negotiations could take place without each party to the talks revealing to the other some basic facts about the state of its armoury. In practice, however, in the course of the SALT talks the Russians refused to disclose any information about the number and types of their own nuclear weapons, insisting instead on negotiating on the basis of American intelligence estimates of Soviet weapon strength—" estimates which the Soviets never confirmed." (The Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov even protested strongly when the Americans released to Soviet civilian delegates information gathered by American intelligence but regarded as classified in the Soviet Union!) So once again the Americans were in effect left " negotiating with themselves." What is more, as Dr Whelan says, " the integrity of Soviet figures on nuclear arms and delivery systems has remained protected and secure." And that means, given the Soviet capacity for deliberate deception and concealment, and the inaccuracy of American intelligence estimates, that agreements reached with the Russians are largely meaningless.

The most striking success that the Russians had with their negotiating technique was over the question of replacements for the SS-9 missiles in existing silos. They agreed that the restriction on " significantly increasing " the silo dimensions meant that the increase would not be more than 10 to 15 per cent. It was, as one authority commented, " a bit vague." In the event the Russians succeeded in placing missiles 50 to 60 per cent larger and with five or six times the throw-weight of the SS-9 in the adapted silos. What is more, the Americans meekly accepted what the Russians later claimed as a major victory for themselves in SALT I.

DR WHELAN had presumably completed this compilation on the Russians' " negotiating behaviour " before one of the leading Soviet analysts, Rostislav Tumkovsky, writing in *Problems of History* had summed up Soviet performance in the SALT talks in the following terms:

> In essence the signing of the Interim Agreement confirmed the effectiveness of the Soviet Union's measures to strengthen its defences and deter imperialist nuclear aggression.
>
> The political significance of this victory by the Soviet Union in the arms race, like the Vladivostok agreement of 1974 [the basis of SALT II], marked the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy.

No talk here about the achievement of " common objectives " or of agreement about strategic parity. Tumkovsky makes it clear that

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the Russians went into the SALT talks with the aim of winning. They regarded the whole "process" as a bitter battle in which no holds were barred, not as a friendly encounter aimed at stabilizing the world situation. What is more, Tumkovsky claims that the Russians *won* the battle: it was their victory and an American defeat.

Since in negotiating they see themselves as fighting a battle with their partners, the Russians throw in everything they have at their disposal to achieve victory. Summing up his considerable experience of dealing with the Soviets as Dr Kissinger's adviser on Soviet affairs, Helmut Sonnenfeldt said that for the Russians negotiating means: "Manoeuvring for position, and achieving certain adjustments, by one means or another, including the threat of force, or agitation, or bribery, or inducements, or any number of things." The Soviets, Sonnenfeldt said, were less concerned about reaching agreement than about promoting their own interests—hardly surprising, when you come to think about it. "So I think they have to be treated as serious negotiators," he concluded. What is surprising in this statement is the hint that the Russians had *not* been treated as "serious" negotiators in the past.

Yet it is not primarily a question of seriousness or the lack of it. If the Russians are indeed serious in their conduct of international negotiations it is surely because they believe they know where they are going: they have a sense of direction, a long-term strategy. And it is the duty of Western negotiators to understand what those Soviet long-term aims are. This is not so difficult to do, even without the benefit of spy satellites (perhaps better without them). For example, there is abundant evidence that the Soviet leaders do not make the achievement of a stable peace their central objective. There is nothing in their public or less-public pronouncements to suggest that they have abandoned their messianic, expansionist aims. Diplomacy, international negotiations, "peaceful coexistence," "*détente*," summit meetings, personal charm and collective deception are all part of the business of "promoting their own interests." Yet, for all his admirable objectivity, Dr Whelan sees *détente* as a factor for "bringing the Soviets into the international system." He believes, with the late Charles Bohlen, that the Soviet Union is beginning "to act like a country instead of a cause." There is, of course, no reason why it should not do both.

At the same time there are plenty of hints that the Russians may see things differently from the way Washington sees them. The crucial test of the supposed change in Soviet behaviour is, Dr Whelan says, Soviet policy towards the Third World.

> For Soviet aspirations and activities in the Third World, as in the case of Angola, the Horn of Africa, and now Afghanistan, suggest a country exploiting instability for its own political purposes rather than one seeking to establish a harmony of interests that would ensure both regional and world peace.

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And again:

> Some critics are especially concerned about the new Soviet "heavy" missiles which, augmented by an effective civil defence, may give them a "war-winning" capability. Accordingly, believing that nuclear war is "thinkable," they contend that in a few years the Soviets could destroy virtually all land-based US missiles in a single strike. They are, moreover, uneasy about the problem of verification.

THIS study was completed some time before Malcolm Toon, an American diplomat with long experience of negotiating with the Russians, completed his three years as US ambassador in Moscow and retired from the American diplomatic service. It is to be hoped that his views will be included in any future editions of Dr Whelan's study. He gave his views on Soviet long-term strategy in an interview on the BBC in April 1980. Asked whether the Russians subscribed to the MAD theory—"mutually assured destruction"—he said he was sure they did not. "They feel strongly that if in fact nuclear war comes they must be prepared to win it, and that means that they have a totally different attitude towards the prospects of nuclear war." He did not think the Russians were going for a "first-strike capability," although "they would do so if they felt they could get away with it."

Toon was then asked what advantage he thought the Soviet leaders would take of the imminent "period of maximum peril." He replied:

> I think frankly if we know for example that the Minuteman missile will become vulnerable in the mid-80s or the late 80s, depending on whose advice you take, they clearly know this too. And if in fact we do not do something to offset the vulnerability of the Minuteman missile then they will take advantage of the situation in order to achieve certain basic political aims.

That sounds much more like the reality behind the Soviet "negotiating behaviour" than all the recent talk of the Russians seeking a stable international situation. It is quite extraordinary how after each Soviet advance new illusions were produced in the West which facilitated such further advances. It is not Soviet strength, but Western weakness which accounts for them. Looking back at almost 50 years of the US negotiating experience with the Soviet Union, one cannot help thinking about the melancholy prospect for American diplomacy when in future negotiations the United States may not only have lost their military preponderance over their adversaries; they may not even have parity.

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Whitewashing the White House

Edward J. Rozek

IN 1962 I was driving Henry Kissinger from the University of Colorado in Boulder, where he had delivered a lecture, to the airport in Denver. We had known each other since 1949. After reminiscing about mutual friends and about our undergraduate and graduate years at Harvard, Henry proceeded to talk about the latest developments in Washington and told me the following: "Jack (Kennedy) offered me the job of being assistant to McGeorge (Bundy). I decided not to accept it. Washington is a terrible place. Everybody cuts everybody else's throat. Only a son of a bitch can succeed." Then, with a mischievous smile, he said: "I could succeed if I wanted to." That turned out to be a confession and a prophetic vision.

Succeed he did! I followed his meteoric rise with interest and his global acrobatics with amusement. His ability to blow out one soap bubble after another in front of the credulous Americans, who were in awe of him, was mind numbing. When Henry decided to ignore the pattern of all previous Secretaries of State and write his memoirs as soon as he left office without time for reflection, I looked forward eagerly to reading that magnum opus. The first volume is entitled *White House Years.**

The book covers the period from January 1969 to January 1973. Kissinger vigorously presents his account of the events which took place during those four years. As Assistant for National Security to Richard Nixon, he discusses the summit meeting in Moscow, SALT I, his courting of the Chinese communists, the developments in Chile, the Paris meetings which led to the Paris Accords and, of course, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

In the final analysis, however, *White House Years* is a 1,521-page apologia for his and Nixon's failure to meet the communist challenge. Kissinger provided the leadership and clever rationalizations for America's retreat. Dean Acheson made an observation which is applicable to Kissinger's memoirs. He said: "I have never read a report of an argument in which the author comes out second best." Kissinger himself says in the preface of his book: "By a selective presentation of documentation, one can prove almost anything."

In his book Henry Kissinger is the central figure. Everybody else is merely putty to be moulded. The book is interesting reading, not only for what it includes but also for what it omits. Kissinger skims for himself the cream of glory and power, conveniently leaving out things which are not complimentary to himself.

* Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979).

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PRIOR to Nelson Rockefeller's defeat by Richard Nixon at the Republican Convention in Miami in 1968, he observed: "If Nixon receives the nomination, it will be a disaster for the United States." After Nixon won the nomination, he was crushed by the defeat of his patron. It did not take him long, however, to begin jockeying for a position in the Nixon Administration.

In *White House Years* Kissinger gives the following explanation of how he was tapped for the appointment:

> Some months after that depressing day—with Richard Nixon now President-elect—I was having lunch with Governor Rockefeller and a group of his advisers in New York City. We were discussing what attitude Rockefeller should take toward a possible offer to join the Nixon Cabinet. We were interrupted by a telephone call. It was a poignant reminder of Rockefeller's frustrating career in national politics that the caller was Nixon's appointments secretary, Dwight Chapin, who was interrupting Rockefeller's strategy meeting *to ask me—not Rockefeller*—to meet with his chief. . . . No one at the lunch conceived that the purpose of the call could be to offer me a major position in the new Administration.

From the above, it appears that Nixon was chasing Kissinger. In fact, the circumstances were a little more complicated.

A week before his lunch with Nelson Rockefeller, he was frantically trying to reach Nixon. First, he managed to obtain the private telephone number of William F. Buckley Jr, editor of *National Review,* in California where he was on vacation. Upon contacting Buckley, Kissinger informed him that he had just heard from his friends in the Pentagon that a plan was underway to assassinate the President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu. Henry appeared to be very concerned about this and said to Buckley: "If this plan is implemented and Thieu is assassinated so soon after the assassination of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem, the word will go around the world that it might be dangerous to be an enemy of America, but it is fatal to be a friend of the United States." Kissinger suggested that Buckley use his influence to pass this information to President-elect Nixon in order to forestall such a calamity. After checking with several friends who were in a position to verify Kissinger's allegation, I am convinced that there was no truth in it.

Buckley thought that Kissinger should meet Nixon. Accordingly, he called his friend, Frank Shakespeare, senior vice president of CBS, who was about to be appointed director of the United States Information Agency. He relayed the essence of Kissinger's "scoop" and suggested that arrangements be made for a meeting between Kissinger and Nixon. Frank Shakespeare, like Bill Buckley, considered the matter to be of sufficient importance to call John Mitchell, who in turn talked to Nixon and made an appointment for Kissinger to see Nixon at 10 a.m. on 25 November 1968 in the Pierre Hotel

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in New York. The outcome of that meeting was that Kissinger was appointed Assistant for National Security instead of Richard V. Allen, who had advised Nixon on foreign policy throughout his successful 1968 campaign for the Presidency.

There is little doubt that it was Nixon who was responsible for catapulting Kissinger into the centre of power in Washington. One would expect him to be grateful or, if he could not say anything flattering about Nixon, then at least to remain silent. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger flays Nixon with sly remarks, innuendos and derogatory statements.

KISSINGER has always had a reverence for the powerful and the rich. As he says in his book: "Power increasingly gravitates to those who have an almost obsessive desire to win." That was more than true of Henry. But he never understood that the fundamental purpose of communist diplomacy is to extract from the enemy states, a step at a time, "fatal concessions" which otherwise would have to be won on the battlefield. For them negotiation is war by diplomacy; a treaty constitutes a temporary arrangement on the road to final victory. For Kissinger, negotiation with Soviet and Chinese officials was an opportunity to be the centre of attraction on the world stage with cameras and journalists recording every move, every smirk, every gesture and every word. That bizarre kind of diplomacy did not solve any problems in favour of the United States or its allies, but provided useful propaganda for Nixon's re-election in 1972. The diplomacy conducted by Kissinger was reminiscent of a Roman circus in which the audience wanted to be amused and was anxious to see action. Kissinger's admirers did not look at the long-range consequences of his diplomatic spectaculars.

None of his predecessors ever made such extraordinary use of the media as did Kissinger. The journalists who were assigned to cover the White House or later the State Department knew that they could not criticize Kissinger if they wanted to receive confidential briefings (from "high government officials") or travel with Kissinger on the same plane. He was the master of public relations vis à vis the media. They saw only what Kissinger wanted them to see and reported only what Kissinger wanted them to report. There were very few exceptions. As Kissinger said in his book: "The journalist . . . must woo and flatter the official because without his goodwill he will be deprived of information."

A careful reading of his memoirs indicates that Kissinger never consulted any leading scholars on Soviet affairs in the United States or abroad, but only sought advice from those whom he could manipulate. His chief amanuensis in this respect was Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who appeared to be ready to hand Eastern Europe over for good to the Soviet Union. Before he entered office, Kissinger had never studied communism or Soviet strategy seriously. At Harvard he concentrated

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on the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 and indulged in very general political theory. Nevertheless, after he entered office, he became an instant "expert" on communism and Soviet strategy. The result was the disastrous strategic retreat of the United States, cleverly covered up by Kissinger's rationalizations and rhetoric.

A leading scholar on Soviet affairs, Bertram D. Wolfe, wrote a letter to President Nixon on 16 April 1973 in which he appealed to Nixon not to grant a lower tariff to communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, because

> it is impossible to secure peace at the expense of the helpless and voiceless captives that the Soviet government is holding for pirate's ransom or denying the right of emigration even at that price. . . . I beg of you, Sir, to send a fresh message to Congress, making it clear that you are not going to bargain away the rights of these people for a trade advantage.

Several months later (on 28 December 1973) Kissinger sent a perfunctory reply in which he stated that, if Wolfe came to Washington, he could see Kissinger's assistant, Mr John Armitage. Nixon and Kissinger could not care less about the captives of the Kremlin's tyranny. They were intoxicated with what they considered to be power politics.

Kissinger apparently convinced Nixon that he could reverse the trends of history by ignoring its lessons. As the late American labour leader, George Meany, observed: "We live at a time when a man, whose whole political career was built on rabid anti-communism, can become President and overnight be transformed into the chief advocate of unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union."

It was under Kissinger that the map of the world changed drastically in favour of the Soviet Union. Yet he somehow succeeded in creating for himself a reputation as the most brilliant diplomat since Jefferson. Kissinger has the capacity to whitewash defeats and make them appear to be great victories.

KISSINGER's propensity for wishful thinking and his refusal to admit a mistake or a failure made him glorify SALT I which, as far as the United States was concerned, was a Munich type of disaster. What a difference between Kissinger and Edouard Daladier, the French Premier who participated in that shameful agreement of 1938! When Daladier returned to Paris, he tried to avoid the crowds at Orly Airport, but he did not succeed. The crowds applauded him and he was given a bouquet of roses. Daladier was puzzled and, turning to one of his associates, exclaimed: "But they don't understand what we have done!" No such candour from Kissinger. Unlike Daladier, Kissinger in his memoirs has projected himself as the hero of his Munichs.

When Kissinger was in command of American foreign policy, the

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communists captured power in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. About his mission to end the war in Indochina Kissinger says: " It seemed to me important for America not to be humiliated, not to be shattered, but to leave Vietnam in a manner that even the protesters might later see as reflecting an American choice made with dignity and self-respect." On the contrary, his policy led to the first defeat of American armed forces in history. The last contingent of Americans escaped by helicopter from the roof of the American Embassy in Saigon, abandoning loyal supporters to the mercies of the communists. The American defeat in Vietnam was facilitated by the Kissinger-engineered Paris Accords when he and Le Duc Tho, after protracted negotiations, succeeded in agreeing to a cease-fire. When the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the latter refused to accept the award, arguing that as yet there was no peace. Kissinger, on the other hand, readily accepted the award. That prompted George Meany to say: " Only one of the two was an honest man."

While Kissinger was in office, the military balance began to shift dangerously in favour of the Soviet Union and acquired even greater momentum when he became Secretary of State. Kissinger's policy of *détente,* SALT I and the transfer of technology facilitated the Soviets' rapid military build up. When Kissinger took office in January 1969, the United States had 1,054 ICBMs, while the Soviet Union had approximately 600. The United States had 41 submarines with 650 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles, while the Soviets had 13 creaky submarines. The United States had 500 Navy ships; the Soviets had less than half that number. The United States had a formidable array of surface-to-air missiles, interceptor planes and radar installations, far superior to anything the Soviets had. In the period covered by *White House Years,* our defensive installations fell catastrophically. SALT I did not stop or limit Soviet strategic armament. On the contrary, it gave the Soviets the opportunity to double their strategic power while Kissinger was in office.

KISSINGER takes credit for all the allegedly good things which happened during his term of office and blames Nixon or Congress for all the setbacks. In fact, Kissinger did not hesitate to drain the cup of appeasement to the bitter dregs. He surpassed even Chamberlain who had inherited from Stanley Baldwin an almost disarmed England and who thought that he had to pursue a policy of appeasement for the time being in order to gain time to re-arm Great Britain. Kissinger, on the other hand, started with a United States which was militarily superior to the Soviet Union in land- and sea-based missiles, number of warheads, megatonnage and accuracy of weapons. At the end of Kissinger's years in the White House, the Soviet Union led the United States in all these fields.

Kissinger was the architect of SALT I, the agreement which froze

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the United States in a position leading to a strategic inferiority and enabled the Soviet Union to surpass the United States. During the meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, Kissinger toasted with champagne the signing of SALT I which gave the Soviet Union all the military advantages. The reader of *White House Years* is shocked to read the description of how the Soviet leaders humiliated the American leaders both in Moscow and in Washington. Nixon's and Kissinger's preoccupation with reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union must have been known to the Soviet leaders in advance. Consider the treatment accorded to Nixon and Kissinger in Moscow in 1972:

> We would sometimes be kept waiting for hours while the Soviet leaders caucused, attended Politburo sessions, or simply disappeared. One could never be sure of the time, place, or subject of a meeting, regardless of what had been agreed in advance. . . . It was never clear whether the numerous delays and the constant switching of topics were a form of psychological warfare or simply reflected the Soviet working style. In any case, the procedure never varied throughout my dealings with top Soviet leaders. When Brezhnev visited the United States in 1973, he sat on his verandah at Camp David in full view of Nixon's cabin, talking with his advisers right through a scheduled meeting with the President whom he kept waiting for two hours without explanation or apology.

No other American President would have tolerated such vulgarity and breach of diplomatic protocol. Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to suffer that humiliation in order to come home with a piece of paper signed by Brezhnev so as to get re-elected in 1972.

When they returned from Moscow in 1972 after signing SALT I, Nixon addressed a joint session of Congress and read a speech (prepared by Kissinger), boasting that he "had changed confrontation into negotiation." How could Kissinger in the circumstances blame Congress for not appropriating enough money for military purposes? Why should United States lawmakers vote for outlandish military expenditures when they had been assured of this extraordinary transformation of the Bear into the Lamb?

Kissinger succeeded in tranquillizing many American Senators and Representatives as well as the general public into a feeling of euphoria. He did not, however, succeed in confusing George Meany. Referring to Kissinger's foreign policy, Meany said:

> We are not building lasting structures of peace. We are building castles of sand on the watery foundations of petty greed, wishful thinking, irresponsibility and plain old ignorance. The inability to face the world as it is, and to understand clearly the nature of freedom's enemies, everywhere, is really the greatest threat to peace today. That threat is nowhere more clearly posed than in the delusion we call *détente*.

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Kissinger and Nixon implied that to the Soviets *détente* meant the suspension of the Kremlin's aggressiveness. But to Brezhnev it meant the suspension of America's response to his international adventures. While *détente* paralysed the West, the Soviets had no intention of interrupting their expansionist drive. They were actively involved in the Yom Kippur War. They violated the Paris Accords. They supported the North Vietnamese in their aggression against South Vietnam.

There was no retaliation on the part of the United States against the Soviet Union. It continued to supply the USSR with technology, industrial plants and computers. In 1972 Kissinger allowed the Soviets to purchase 165 Centalign-B precision grinding machines used in the production of miniature ball bearings. Without those bearings the Soviets would not have been able to develop missile guidance systems and the greater accuracy of their ICBMs so soon. Although the US defence community was against the sale of this highly sophisticated technology, Kissinger overruled all objections. The result is that, since then, the Soviets have been able to produce over 7,000 MIRV warheads. Nor does Kissinger mention that, while SALT I was in effect, the Soviet Union deployed 308 monster supermissiles, the SS-18, an updated version of five other types of missiles and the SS-20, the mobile missile. There were no protests about this from the United States government.

KISSINGER, the *Realpolitiker*, has not learned the fundamental lesson of history—that force can be stopped only by force and that there cannot be disarmament without removing the causes which led to armament. While he was tranquillizing Americans and boasting of the success of his foreign policy, his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, proudly stated in an address to the 24th Party Congress in 1971 (the third year of the White House years): "Today there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it."

In spite of the fact that the Soviets have both expressed confidence in the ultimate victory of communism and have stated that nuclear war is not only thinkable but winnable, Kissinger persisted in the kind of thinking which led to the present imbalance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. When responsible Americans pointed out the rapid increase of Soviet strategic power and Soviet superiority, an angry Kissinger responded: "What in God's name is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?" Only when out of office, was Kissinger ready to admit: "I have now come to the view, which is different from the view I used to write about in the 1960s, that for one side to have counterforce capability and the other side not to have (especially if that side is also inferior in forces for local intervention) must tempt a political disaster." Only after he was out of office, Kissinger explained the shortcomings of SALT I:

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"The Soviets were insistent on negotiating an agreement for the limitation of defensive armaments *only* in which we had a potential advantage." Why then should he have accepted a restriction which was so crippling to the United States?

In 1979, the erstwhile promoter of *détente* and SALT I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the military balance." He talked of the grave peril posed by the current military imbalance and went on to say: "The SALT process is a lunacy and you can count on me to straighten it out." What an irony! The architect of appeasement laments the consequences of appeasement. Should the correction of such lunacy be left to the architect of the lunacy?

Kissinger recently said:

> I think it is generally recognized that by some time in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union will have the capacity to destroy with a reasonable degree of confidence most of our land-based ICBMs. In the same period of time we will not be able to destroy the Soviet ICBM forces.

But in his book he declares: "In the face of the Soviet Union's ambiguous challenge, the West paralysed itself, moreover, not only by excesses of conciliation, but by excesses of truculence." This is sheer nonsense. What kind of truculence does Kissinger have in mind? When did the West act in such a manner vis à vis the Soviet Union? Firm actions were taken by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, but only in response to Soviet aggression.

His observation stands in striking contrast to Kissinger's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was given at approximately the same time as the book was published. He cannot have it both ways. His own policies facilitated a series of Soviet aggressions. He should have remembered all along Arnold Toynbee's observation: "It isn't very wise for a sheep to declare itself a vegetarian when a wolf maintains a different opinion."

THE first obligation of any government is to provide for the security of its people. If a nation does not have security, then everything else will go down the drain. Kissinger and Nixon led the United States down the primrose path to a position of vulnerability and insecurity. They have left America weakened, discredited and suspect, with very few friends remaining.

In his book Kissinger states: "Coexistence on the basis of balance of forces should therefore be within our grasp—provided the nature of the challenge is correctly understood." It is paradoxical that Kissinger calls for an understanding of the nature of the challenge only when out of office. Undoubtedly the Soviets were delighted to have him in the White House and subsequently in the State Department. During

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that period of time, they had greater success in expanding their power than in any comparable period in the history of the USSR.

The irony of it all is that he succeeded in quietly hijacking American foreign policy. The crew of the vessel was dazzled by his fireworks and, together with the complacent passengers, did not even bother to learn how Kissinger had altered the direction and destination of American foreign policy.

Characteristically, Kissinger and Nixon, who brought America to its present pass, are now whitewashing their "White House Years" and engaging in celebrations of the tragedy, as if there was something to be proud of in their disastrous policies. What distinguishes both their memoirs of these years is the aplomb with which minuscule achievements are depicted as monumental triumphs and monumental blunders and defeats as non-existent or the machinations of others. These self-serving attempts deserve no better a fate than that accorded to Watergate.

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False Dilemmas, Real Alternatives

The Politics of Survival

Leopold Labedz

" A big cloud and such a small shadow. Strange."
Stanislaw J. Lec

FAILURES in Afghanistan and in Poland surely indicated Soviet imperial weaknesses. Yet at the same time they provided a demonstration of the growing impotence of the West, which was later underlined when the war between Iraq and Iran threatened its oil supplies. Whatever satisfaction could be derived from the evidence of Soviet difficulties was marred by the lengthening shadow of Soviet military might.

One can, of course, always find a silver lining. " The Russians are not ten feet tall ": their imperial expansion creates for them additional political/military problems and underscores the weaknesses of their economy; they do not achieve all their objectives; they do meet with reverses. But all this does not change the fact that the West is increasingly divided, worried about its deficiencies, and uneasy about the future. History since the second world war testifies to the West's failure to prevent the rise of the Soviet empire.

We hear little about Containment but much about the Soviet " window of opportunity " in the 1980s. Whatever the growing Soviet burdens of Empire and the long-term prospects of the eventual imperial collapse, complacent or naïve expectation of its imminence is (to put it mildly) over-optimistic. The West faces growing dangers; its very survival is at stake, and the period before the fateful Orwellian year of 1984 may be critical in this respect. Can it be that the future of Western civilization and of the " great globe itself " may well depend on the new American administration?

Before going on to assess the assumptions and arguments which underlie different Western attitudes to the problem, let me quote a relatively candid Soviet assertion about the present international situation (*Kommunist*, August 1980):

> These long summer days, filled with the important events which have been taking place this year, will long be remembered by all observers of political life on this planet. We are witnesses of and participants in developments on whose outcome the future of humanity largely depends. For a long time there was no such clear and obvious contrast between the opposing courses along which the socialist world and the capitalist world are moving. . . . Great

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changes which have taken place in the last decade are now involving the whole globe.

The capitalist world is trying desperately to stop these developments. Its leaders, in the first place those of the USA who do not want to take into account the changed correlation of forces and who stubbornly aim at world domination, are more and more actively moving into a counter attack against all the conquests which the peoples won in the 1970s. . . . This counter attack developed on a wide front. It included a frantic rearmament of the NATO member states, the speeding-up of political and military cooperation with China, and increased intervention in Asia and Africa. As a result new areas of conflict have emerged. China attacked Vietnam, a dangerous situation arose around Iran, and an undeclared war against Afghanistan began. With it came an attempt to rally the NATO allies around the USA and to drag them into a crusade against communism. . . .

But today the times are no longer what they were in the 1940s and '50s. . . . Many international and bilateral meetings, in particular those of comrade Brezhnev with the French President Giscard d'Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, have confirmed that *détente*, however much Washington politicians may try to destroy it, has taken deep roots and that there is a real possibility of safeguarding and strengthening this positive process.

This is understandable. After all, *détente* is a natural result of the new world correlation of forces which has emerged in the last decades. The military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world is an achievement of fundamental historic significance. . . . To achieve and maintain such military-strategic balance has certainly not been easy. It demanded great efforts on the part of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries. But it was well worth while.

Never mind the standard Soviet mendacity. The "undeclared war against Afghanistan" does not refer here to the Soviet invasion, but to some alleged American-Chinese-Pakistani incursion. Like "South Korea's attack on North Korea" in 1950, this is the usual Orwellian reversal in Soviet *Newspeak*; anybody who reads the Soviet press regularly is used to such routine inversions. But what is striking here is the emphasis on Soviet military prowess and its world-political significance.

On this one point there is general agreement, whatever differing political conclusions be drawn from it. As Richard Lowenthal puts it (in his article "The Shattered Balance," *Encounter*, November 1980), there is a common consensus that the West found itself at the end of the 1970s "in a position of relative weakness. . . ."

This was certainly not because the Soviet Union was "a secret wrapped in mystery inside an enigma." For decades it was one of the least inscrutable of political systems. The real enigma is why the West so persistently refuses to face its totalitarian and expansionist character,

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to learn the obvious lessons of experience, to understand the clear and present danger. Why is there such a big cloud, such a small shadow?

THE essential reason why the West is entering the 1980s as a dangerous decade is its constant tendency to try to escape reality. Wishful thinking is, in my view, the factor underlying the lack of decisions which could assure its survival, underlying indeed its lack of political will to counter the threat effectively, and its recurring self-deceptions about Soviet intentions and strategy. We are dealing with varying combinations of complacency and fear—political emotions which are present in different proportions at different times in all the Western countries, whatever form their specific national neuroses may take. As economic welfare falters and geopolitical threats mount, one can trace this tendency in all the *corsi e ricorsi* of easy tranquillity and belated anxiety in Western foreign and defence policies. Euphoria is followed by distress; and then the growing awareness of historic danger is once again blurred by yet another turn to anodyne political hope. Sporadic efforts to confront the situation realistically are succeeded by new illusions, while Soviet expansionism continues unabated with no attempt made to exploit its weaknesses.

One can also see these *corsi e ricorsi* through a declining spiral of Western fortunes in the changes of political climate on the Western scene. First "optimism" then "disappointment" marks the cycle of Western perceptions of Soviet political developments. The Western "experts" proceed to change their analysis accordingly, and we can look back on a plethora of rationalizations. Two are most persistent. First, we can do little because we are presumed to be caught in a cruel dilemma (*pace* George F. Kennan) between political morality versus *Realpolitik*; and then we can do even less because, after all, we are all part of a clash of "mere self-interest" among modern nation states. But historically these have proved themselves to be false dilemmas. European leaders have often sacrificed *both* political morality *and* their basic state interests on the altar of shortsighted considerations which, however they may be rationalized at any given moment, contributed neither to morality nor to the essential self-interest of the state, nor in general to the survival of Western liberal societies.

Recall the illusions of Yalta about post-war harmonies, and how the brave new world of the "United Nations" was belatedly followed by a grudging realization of "Good Uncle Joe's" ambitions. In the wake of such broken illusions came the Containment doctrine of NATO. From the Prague February 1948 coup until the death of Stalin five years later, Soviet expansionism did encounter genuine Western resistance. Together with the temporary weakening of the Soviet Union such resistance made for an end to the Korean war, and indeed for a small Soviet withdrawal as arranged in 1955 in the Austrian neutrality treaty.

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But soon the post-Stalin USSR resumed its momentum (marked dramatically by the Shepilov 1955 Cairo arms deal).

By that time the predominant Western hopefulness had focused optimistically on the forthcoming " liberalization " and " democratization " of the Soviet Union, a simple-mindedness assiduously popularized by such Sovietological experts as Isaac Deutscher among others. After the end of a short-lived " de-Stalinization," these illusions were more difficult to sustain under Brezhnev. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis did provide a shock, but it was wholly absorbed in the complacency generated by exaggerated interpretations of the " humiliating defeat " of the Soviet Union, forced " to face down " from the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. Both President Eisenhower's earlier decision to rely increasingly on (relatively cheap) nuclear weapons and Robert McNamara's decision to freeze the production of new missiles in the 1960s in the belief that the Russians themselves would not build them (a miscalculation which issued in the grotesquely absurd idea that a " peace process " would only begin when an insecure Kremlin finally achieved parity!) reflected the American unwillingness to be realistic about new aspects of the Soviet threat. And who in all the NATO countries was eager to underwrite the high budgetary costs of resistance? The American electorate, after the experience of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, became increasingly weary of bearing alone the sacrifices involved.

I am afraid that Western politicians displayed here the same myopic opportunism in their failure of leadership as their predecessors before Hitler's war. The 1960s echoed the follies of the 1930s. The Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine led to a further round of illusions: viz. SALT's alleged " arms control process " of the 1970s. Earlier self-deceptions about that Soviet " liberalization," which never really took place as far as institution are concerned, were followed by the self-deceptions of *détente*. The Nixon-Kissinger doctrine postulated a " structure of peace " based on Soviet acceptance of the status quo through " new incentives." Soviet evolution in this hoped-for direction was to be encouraged by economic credits, by technology transfers, and by " Basket Three " of the Helsinki agreement.

I think it is unnecessary to stress how utterly foolish all these political figments appear in the 1980s. I am alarmed, however, that still these illusory expectations linger on; the reality of the present danger is not yet generally acknowledged.[1]

As long as the causes are not realistically diagnosed no effective therapy can be applied. As a new wave of somewhat sophisticated rationalizations replaces the old illusions, clarity seems to recede even further. The best way to assess the value of these new rationalizations

[1] See the eloquent pamphlet of Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger* (Simon & Schuster, 1980), and also the incisive analysis of Robert Conquest, *Present Danger* (Blackwell, 1979).

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is, I suggest, to look at the record to examine the *past* expectations of all those who are now producing new foreign policy recommendations.

MEN are reluctant to remember, and "memory retrieval" is necessary for assessing the premises of policies which have led to such grievous disappointments in the past—despite so many warning voices. These included such figures as Senator Henry Jackson, Eugene V. Rostow, James Schlesinger and Paul H. Nitze, as well as analysts such as Richard Pipes, Robert Conquest, Albert Wohlstetter, Theodore Draper, Leonard Schapiro, and myself. They were all branded as "hawks," and were generally dismissed as panic-mongers (and sometimes even war-mongers).

In my own articles, and in the testimony I was invited to present to the US Senate. I put the following arguments:

> The policy of *détente* provides an outlet for Western wishful thinking which is never far from the surface. It is unfashionable to mention risks, much less to insist that unless they are faced they may sooner or later turn into positive dangers. . . . *Détente* is by definition a transitional period and the question of what follows it is of cardinal importance. . . . Security in Europe is gradually redefined as anything that conforms to Soviet imperial goals. *Détente* is a matter of "peaceful coexistence" in which the attacks on "imperialism" are to be permitted as "ideological struggle," while criticism of Soviet actions is to be banished as "a return to the spirit of the Cold War."
>
> "The Soviet Union and Western Europe."
> *Survey*, Summer 1973.

And in Washington before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seven lean years ago:

> After the 1972 Moscow agreement on "The Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the USSR" the Soviet press explained:
>
> > *The strategic course of US policy is now changing before our very eyes from "Pax Americana"—the Americanized formula of world domination—to a definite form of necessity for peaceful coexistence. But we must clearly understand that it is a forced change and that it is the actual power—social, economic and, ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries—that compels the American ruling circles to make an agonising reappraisal. . . .*
>
> It is not surprising that when Mr Brezhnev was faced with a direct question during his Washington visit—"how he reconciled the [Soviet military] build-up with his 'peace policy'"—he laughed it all off as being an aberration of intelligence services of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. . . . Soviet economic and "peace" offensives have been invariably greeted with sympathy, if not

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> enthusiasm, in the West. Somehow or other they have been seen by sympathizers and "realists" alike as signifying the Great Post-Revolutionary Turning Point when the Manichean perspective is given up by the Soviet leaders and "live-and-let-live" becomes the new rule. . . . It is true that revolutions and empires do not last forever and that one day there will be a Great Turning Point in the Soviet Union; but that day has not yet come. The diagnosis which might fit the Roman Empire under Emperor Nerva does not fit it under Augustus. . . . Concessions to and "accommodations" of the expanding Soviet empire would not make its leaders more "realistic" in accepting the *status quo* as a *modus vivendi*. . . . The idea that the risks and dangers inherent in the present *détente* policy of the Soviet Union may be avoided through the creation of economic interdependence ("intermeshing" of vested interests) is an illusion. It is based on the usual fallacy of projecting Western categories on the Soviet scene—the familiar mirror-image misperception.
>
> Testimony to the US Senate, July 1973

I concluded towards the end of "the Kissinger era," concerning the results of Dr K's "conceptual breakthroughs" and diplomatic prestidigitation, that:

> The effects of this policy are there for all to see. The United States faces a situation in which its credibility is undermined, its political prestige lower than ever, its alliances shaken, its influence in Asia and Africa is waning, its friends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe feel betrayed, and its own public is thoroughly confused.
>
> This is not just the result of some "objective process." The policy was from the beginning based on a monumental piece of fatuous misjudgment. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could take seriously the premise of its two fundamental documents—the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the US and the USSR, signed in Moscow—which solemnly proclaimed that neither of the two powers would "try to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other." To present such surrealistic hopes about Soviet foreign policy behaviour as any kind of *Realpolitik* was a unique feat, indeed worthy to be included in the *Guinness Book of Records*. . . .
>
> *Survey*, Winter 1976

Finally:

> Kissinger and Nixon proclaimed that "the era of confrontation is over," and although Kissinger is perfectly aware of the character of Soviet policies, he has nevertheless chosen to confuse the public by the whole tenor of his *détente* arguments. . . . The formula "there is no alternative to *détente*" follows the need to accommodate Soviet demands unilaterally, if necessary. This is a case of what I would call the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," for it is clearly a substitute—and a poor substitute at that—for a rigorous analysis of current Soviet policies against the background of history, and specifically Soviet history.
>
> "Rival Perspectives," in *Détente* (ed. George Urban), 1976

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HAVE the lessons of the past, recent and more remote really been absorbed? Even after the Soviet military build-up and expansionism under Brezhnev, the new American administration under President Carter continued with the same illusory premises in its foreign policy, naïvely hoping that it could turn over some new leaf, fondly imagining that giving up what the President called " the inordinate fear of communism " (and the related diplomacy from " a position of strength ") would somehow induce the Soviet Union to reciprocate. But the " Utgoff Principle "—named after a National Security adviser who advanced the proposition that the use of American power is immoral and dangerous—only brought further Soviet exploitation of Western weakness, especially in the continued drive towards the Persian Gulf. It took " Afghanistan " to make President Carter acknowledge how mistaken such an attitude was. But at the end of his four-year presidential term, the old voices of appeasement and confusion were still influential; and they include many who knew better in the past, but who have somehow managed to unlearn from experience.

Some, like Richard Lowenthal, believe that there was nothing basically wrong with the policies pursued by the West during the period of so-called " *détente.*" He claims, that since it was inaugurated by Nixon and Kissinger " the American world position was largely restored and looked incomparably better by 1973 than it had in 1968. . . ." But if this is so, where did the " shattered balance " come from?

" The success of *détente* . . . was not based on illusions," Lowenthal argues—but " it was in the past accompanied by a *propaganda* of illusions." Can it be that President Nixon and Dr Kissinger did not actually believe in the prospect of the " stable structure of peace " which they proclaimed with such fanfare when they launched the doctrine underlying their policy of *détente*? Now that Dr Kissinger has practically admitted that the basic military premises of his strategy was quite wrong, Professor Lowenthal finds himself in the curious position of defending Kissinger-in-power against Kissinger-out-of-power. Dr K himself has been obfuscating his past record while currently propagating a contrary position. This somersault is only matched by the similarly self-serving pronouncements of Richard M. Nixon who in his latest book, *The Real War* (1979), advocates the diametrically opposite policies to those he pursued as President—and claims that the *détente* policy of his administration was " misunderstood." But what is the worth of policies which, however rationalized, result in " a shattered balance "? If the policies were so good why was their outcome so bad? Kissinger and Nixon may make their political turns—not for the first time—but sober commentators should not get caught up in that intellectual vertigo.

The American world position was not " largely restored by 1973," a high point of the illusions of *détente.* On the contrary, Uncle Sam looked more and more like a helpless giant. The 1969–73 period only led to a further erosion of US power by disarming America politically and by

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generating its relative military weakness vis-à-vis the USSR. It was this peculiar paralysis of political will which permitted Soviet expansion in the 1970s. Lowenthal admits that "the ending of the Vietnam war was pursued with least consistency and success." But was "the effort to create a balance of power between American and Soviet strength" (which Lowenthal defines as "the essence of the other elements of *détente*") any more successful? To believe that it could have been achieved through *détente* is a delusion. There was, in my view, a long-term price in "selling" *détente* whether or not it was a way towards ending the Vietnam conflict. To attempt now to divorce *détente* from its "selling" is a weak analytical ploy. There was simply no way of "relaxing" without piling on illusions about the virtues of easy relaxation. It was all based on rosy exaggerations and optimistic slogans, lacking any basis in realistic analysis. It was by no means merely a Machiavellian device designed by Dr Kissinger to camouflage the retreat from Vietnam; nor was it abandoned when this end was achieved. In any case, should not those analysts who are now re-rationalizing the premises of that policy while deploring its erstwhile "overselling" have been critical of such "overselling" at the time? A great deal could (and should) have been said "to preserve the electorate's willingness to maintain the balance of strength" between the US and the USSR. But since it was not, the argument is nothing more than a *post hoc* apologia.

In practice, there was a very necessary connection between the illusions of *détente* and its effects on "a clear sense of priorities and a readiness to make the efforts and sacrifices required, in Congress and public opinion. . . ." It is unrealistic to believe that it was possible to have the latter while providing people with the former. It confuses the matter to imply that it was possible to have one without the other, or that those who criticize the premises of the policy are "against negotiations" in general. Negotiations from a position of self-induced weakness, based on illusory expectations and lack of stamina, are clearly worse than nothing; and the experience of the 1970s has demonstrated this. A phase of decline cannot be regarnished and served up as a period of recovery; it is foolish to try now to separate the premises of a mistaken policy from its natural consequences.

What of the argument about "the limits of American power"? There are no doubt such shifting limits, and they are always relevant for political strategy. But why should America's limits be considered greater than those of the Soviet Union? The disastrous change that has occurred in the balance of power is not just a result of "disregarding" such limits, but of a political attitude inside the USA which contributed to their shrinking.

ALL this is, I believe, vitally relevant to any set of policy recommendations to the new American administration. The starting point for Western policy must be the redress of what Richard Lowenthal calls "the shattered balance."

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At the minimum this implies a change of attitude towards Soviet expansionism, and a renewed recognition of the necessity to contain it. But this cannot be done without an appropriate redress of the frame of mind which shattered the balance in the first place. Old truths—"Only power checks power"; "Expansionism cannot be stopped without resistance"—were grotesquely forgotten. To point out that the Soviet Union was not uniformly successful in this period (that, for instance, it lost Somalia by switching to Ethiopia) is hardly a consolation. The realistic and relevant consideration is that, on balance, whatever the Kremlin's partial setbacks, it *has* advanced, while the West's position has been steadily eroded. It has been estimated that the economic potential of the USA, Western Europe, and Japan is no less than five times greater than that of the Soviet Union. But potential strength is not, alas, the same as actual strength. Similarly, although Soviet economic and political weaknesses are growing, the fundamental asymmetry between the East and the West continues—since only one side, it is all too clear, is ready and willing to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other.

Unless a salutary shift occurs and the Soviet Union encounters resistance, no genuine reciprocity, however reluctant or opportunistic, can be expected from it in any future negotiations. When Professor Lowenthal asserts the need "both for negotiation and for strength," he is knocking on open doors. The point is that during the period in question, the concern for strength in the field was sadly outstripped by the passion for negotiations at the diplomatic table. In the past, students of international affairs gave a name to this sort of attitude: appeasement. It is very small consolation when an Anglo-German observer now stresses that "since the inauguration of *Ostpolitik* the *Bundeswehr* . . . has not fallen back in its strength." For, as recent opinion polls indicate, during the same period over 40 per cent of the West Germans have become neutralist minded.

In spite of the shock of Afghanistan, the "relaxed" attitude of the sometime hawks who have undergone *détente* conversion (their friendship I cherish, but their views I deplore) has not benefited from a rigorous analysis of experience in the light of expectations. The State Department's "Soviet Adviser," Dr Marshall Shulman, whose diplomatic recommendations were so accommodating to the USSR during his tenure of office in the Carter administration, talks now of "a terminal case of myopia" of *both* US and Soviet positions (*International Herald Tribune*, 1 September 1980). This is a bogus symmetry: it reflects a failure in perception after a failure in policy. Another convert, now increasingly less "dove-ish," Professor William F. Griffith, who is deeply versed in the study of world politics, writes (*Survival*, July/August 1980) that:

> one of the principal lessons of Afghanistan is that *détente* is only one part of American foreign policy, as it is of Soviet foreign policy. Competition is, and will remain the larger part. . . .

The emphasis is as different as in the well known conflicts between the

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State Department and the National Security Council; but the statement overlooks the significance of *détente* as a continuing element in the political strategy of the Soviet leaders. Can anybody seriously doubt that they know what they are doing, and that on the whole they have come out rather well in this phase of their long Cold War against the West?

YET another type of rationalization is provided by the Italian commentator, Arrigo Levi. After the Gdansk upheaval, he argued (*The Times*, London, 11 September 1980) that this was " a textbook example of what *détente* policy of 1970 was supposed to achieve. . . ." He then approvingly cited the author of " the Sonnenfeldt doctrine " which was concerned precisely with the prevention of such events!

Illusions persist, simple-minded expectations die hard. President Carter addressed himself to the Soviet leaders (in his last State of the Union speech) as follows:

> The Soviet Union must answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a stable international environment in which its own legitimate peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its legitimate security needs, using that power for colonial conquests?

Displaying similar " uncertainty," Secretary Muskie commented (*Time*, 16 June 1980) that the Soviet " tendency to take advantage of targets of opportunity . . . raises questions . . . about the USSR's commitment to *détente*" and about " whether they really [*sic*] share our perceptions about the world, whether they believe in domination or coexistence." He also stated that " the invasion of Afghanistan is . . . a significant departure from the Russian norm in its international behaviour. . . ." Mr Muskie's predecessor, Cyrus Vance, actually affirmed that " President Carter and President Brezhnev share similar dreams and aspirations on all the important issues." If they were all born yesterday, they surely all need to be " born again."

In historical perspective, my strictures apply not only to Democrats but also to Republicans. President Carter assures us that he has, at long last, finally understood the world-political problem posed by the Soviet Union, but he has (as of this writing) abandoned neither his ambiguities and confusions, nor his diplomatic personnel who are committed to the old disastrous course. The new Republican platform was, at least, based on a clear-cut diagnosis (though it discreetly omitted any reference to the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations):

> The premier challenge facing the United States, its allies and the entire globe is to check the Soviet Union's global ambitions. This challenge must be met, for the present danger is greater than ever before in the 200-year history of the United States. The Soviet Union is still accelerating its drive for military superiority and is intensifying its military pressure and its ideological combat against the

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> industrial democracies and the vulnerable developing nations of the world.
>
> Republicans believe that the United States can only negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of unquestioned principle and unquestioned strength. Unlike Mr Carter we see nothing "inordinate" in our nation's historic judgment about the goals, tactics and dangers of Soviet communism. Unlike the Carter administration, we were not surprised by the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or by other Soviet violations of major international agreements regulating international behaviour, human rights, and the use of military force. And, unlike the Carter Administration, we will not base our policies toward the Soviet Union on naïve expectations, unilateral concessions, futile rhetoric and insignificant manoeuvres. . . .

The general intellectual attitude behind a foreign policy is important, but no less important are its specific formulations—and in particular the power-political context in which they are to operate. What, then, is the global situation which the new American administration faces? What can it do to redress "the shattered balance"?

IF the old historical problem is at long last recognized (or, rather, rediscovered), none of the previous foreign-policy formulas will be of much use. They not only reflected but have contributed to the decline of the West.

1. The old "containment" was certainly based on a true perception of the danger; but it suffered from the neglect of the political side of the struggle which was perceived almost exclusively in military terms and therefore could not form a basis for a rational strategy to "contain" advances in the Kremlin's long Cold War against the West.

2. The Kissinger-Nixon doctrine was based on the assumption that one could achieve a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union by inducing Secretary Brezhnev to behave like Tsar Alexander at the time of the Vienna Congress in 1815 (the young Dr Kissinger described it well in his early book on *A World Restored*). This wild idea disregarded the fact that a totalitarian state based on revolutionary legitimacy was simply not going to be a partner in a "concert of powers" for the preservation of the international *status quo.*

3. The formula used by the Carter administration—"limited adversary relationship"—has been little more than a verbal smokescreen, covering up the lack of any clear orientation. It permitted incompatible attitudes to be reflected in a schizophrenic policy, and its emptiness could be clearly seen in the contrasting interpretations given to it by intellectual spokesmen of the US State Department and the National Security Council. For Dr Marshall Shulman it was one in which the adversary elements were disappearing, or at least diminishing. For Professor William Griffith, echoing the views of Zbigniew Brzezinski, such hopes were chimerical:

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> Because only Moscow can destroy the United States and only the US and/or the USSR can destroy the world, the US still shares with the Soviet Union a general interest in arms control and in limiting third-world competition. These are what *détente* is about and all that it *can* be about. The rest has all been American illusions and wishful thinking.

Future historians should have no difficulty in realizing that the blame for the sorry state of the "shattered" balance of power in which the West has found itself in the 1980s cannot be put at the door of one administration alone, but is a result of a cumulative process in which US failures of leadership were matched only by the betrayal of the alliance's solidarity by its NATO allies. The continuing interaction of these two factors aggravates the situation still further, and enhances the tendency towards neutralism in Europe and towards isolationism in America.

One element was common to the strategic formulas used since the second world war; another distinguishes the "Containment" period from its aftermath under Nixon, Ford, and Carter. (*1*) The common element was the continuing unwillingness to face consistently the problem of the nature of the Soviet state. Even before *détente*, this resulted in the reduction of "Containment" to a military dimension (from their opposite positions both George Kennan and James Burnham criticized its lack of political perspective). (*2*) There was also a fundamental difference between the two periods. Whatever its inadequacies as a grand strategy guide, "Containment" represented a spirit of resistance to Soviet expansionism, while "*détente*" and "limited adversary relationship" represented a spirit of accommodation, often indistinguishable from appeasement. This mood of resistance (now so often recalled in admiring references to the courage of President Truman) was abandoned in the course of the 1960s when indeed the "revisionist" historians began to blame Truman himself, rather than Stalin, for the Cold War.

"Experts" were as always available to provide rationalizations. The alleged change in the character of the Soviet state and society demanded the banishment of the dangerous idea of totalitarianism ("a Cold War concept"). Merle Fainsod's classic textbook, *How the Soviet Union is Ruled,* has now been replaced by a travesty presented by Jerry Hough under the title *How the Soviet Union is Governed,* in which the author actually contends that the Soviet system of government is one of "institutional pluralism" and that:

> The Brezhnev era would be best understood if we attribute to the General Secretary the type of motivation that we attribute to most politicians in the West.

That this kind of "expert" pseudo-academic drivel can at present be

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taught at American universities is a direct result of a decade of self-imposed obtuseness conceived as " the spirit of *détente*."[2]

Another consequence of the same " spirit " was the Western credits to the Soviet bloc (which now amount to 77 billion dollars). Instead of the Kissingerian " *web of mutual interests* " we have a situation in which Western bankers are now ready even to offer new loans to make eventual repayments possible (as currently exemplified by Poland). Such " recycling," to keep the great game going, hardly amounts to the kind of " intermeshing " of interests which was supposed to produce " a structure of peace." [3]

Yet another extraordinary example of the same " spirit " was the selling (" over-selling " of *détente*?) to the Soviet Union and its satellites of technologies which could only strengthen their military potential.

The Kama River truck plant, the largest in the world (and run by IBM computers), was built with the help of American, European, and Japanese firms. It is supposed to produce only civilian vehicles; but it can just as well turn out military trucks and tank engines. In 1972 the United States sold to the Soviet Union " Centalign-B " precision-grinding machines which produce miniature ball-bearings, necessary for missile-guidance systems (which made possible the MIRV-ing of the Soviet ICBMs). In 1978 Dresser Industries (with the exception of a small French firm, the only concern in the world to produce deep-well oil hard-drilling equipment) sold a 144-million-dollar plant to the Soviet Union which will have a capacity far in excess of its domestic requirements.

During the *détente* decade, the State Department and the US Depart-

[2] Other academic revisionism in the spirit of *détente* included such gems as the officially sponsored 1977 " US-Soviet project " in which Soviet and American historians (led by Professor Howard D. Mehrlinger of Indiana University) were supposed to clean up " distortions " in each other's textbooks. One can imagine the effects of such co-operation with the " experts " from the Soviet Ministry of Education (i.e. the Orwellian Ministry of Truth) on American textbooks. But would the Soviet *Agitprop* stop its rewriting of history under pressure from Professor Mehrlinger? After all, its basic principle is still that " who controls the past controls the future." For a general critique, see the essay in *Encounter*, June 1980, " The View from East of Eden " by the French scholar, Alain Besançon.

[3] In my July 1973 testimony to the US Senate I said: " It requires an extraordinary act of faith, an act of faith going against all usual historical experience, past and contemporary, to make oneself dependent on the good will of a regime 10 years (or if Mr Brezhnev has his way 20 or 30 years) hence, by granting long-term credits and technological know-how to a country which continuously proclaims that it is engaged in a historical contest with capitalism and its mainstay, the United States. . . . Who can tell now what will happen to the long-term investment in Soviet Russia which is somewhat less attached to the idea of private property? And who can tell what the price of oil will be then? And what will be the effect of inflation? And, last but not least, what the attitude of the Soviet government will be then if the balance of power shifts in its favour? One thing, however, is not unlikely: it will be less dependent on the groups with vested interests lobbying the Senators, than on the US government.

" To invest 10 to 20 billion dollars in the Soviet oil industry and become dependent on the good will of the Soviet government in 10 or 20 years' time, instead of using such sums to develop alternative sources of energy supply in the United States itself, seems to me neither rational, nor far-sighted, nor statesmanlike."

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ment of Commerce became very lax in granting approval for such deals (COCOM, the body which is supposed to control the export of strategically sensitive goods from NATO to Warsaw Pact countries, has practically lost its function). The sale of the third-generation type of computer—CYBER 76—by the Control Data Corporation (a firm which like IBM, supplies the sophisticated American computing machines to the Soviet Union) was stopped at the last moment only because of Senatorial intervention.

It is not surprising that the Executive Vice-President of the Control Data Corporation (and the President of the "American Committee on East-West Accord"), Robert D. Schmidt, stressed the "need to build an environment that will make a trade relationship possible with the USSR." No less unsurprising are the following remarks (made by him at the 28 April 1980 conference at Harvard University) on the subject "Is Détente Dead?—After Afghanistan What?":

> Many of the headlines in the United States have proclaimed that "*Détente Is Dead.*" If it is, we are all facing the prospects of war which means ultimately a nuclear holocaust.
>
> I don't believe "*Détente* is dead." The headlines are a gross exaggeration that the US media, politicians, and even the general public seem to be fond of these days. No, *détente* is not dead, but the Soviet leaders made a terrible mistake, aided and abetted by our own non-policy toward Afghanistan.
>
> There is a definite need for both sides to reject imperialism; this will help to repair the damage to *détente.*

Some US academics and businessmen just cannot help seeing such spurious symmetries. For them "both sides" equally need to refrain from falsifying history and from invading other countries. In their perspective the question of the nature of the Soviet system does not even arise. Even a highly sophisticated commentator like Richard Lowenthal, who has produced some of the most perceptive analyses of the Leninist "Party of the new type," talks of:

> the long-standing controversy on whether the practice of negotiating with the adversary, and more particularly the effort to limit the arms race by agreements, are a principal source of Western weakness or a necessary means to control a conflict that could blow up the earth. . . .

The controversy, however, is not about *whether* to negotiate, but about *when* and *how.* In the past, the only negotiations which have had a chance to preserve the balance of power are those from "a position of strength." It is all very fine to say that one is both for negotiations and for strength, but the type of negotiations which are being commended have so far only undermined this balance; they have limited the American, but not the Soviet, effort in the arms race.[4]

[4] The cat is out of the bag when we note Lowenthal's approval of Brezhnev's proposal that "the negotiatons must also include the already existing 'Forward Based Systems'." Surely he knows that Brezhnev has agreed not to include them in the Vladivostok

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IT has also become a " progressive " axiom that alternative policies would only bring about nuclear war. But is it not perfectly rational to argue that the opposite is true? One could mention that the weakening of the West increases such a danger; that appeasement produces a situation which reduces the US choice to a nuclear exchange or to capitulation; and that, in any case, pacifistic subservience would not at all eliminate the spectre of a nuclear war in a world of many nuclear powers. Yet the empty cliché that there is no alternative to *détente* is still echoing, although it is now generally agreed that it was one-sided at best and that the West as a whole has scarcely benefited from it. This is not seriously disputed, and the fact of America's decline in this period has become a commonplace. Even Dr Kissinger has virtually acknowledged its failure. This does not, however, prevent Richard Lowenthal from concluding that a different policy " might well destroy the alliance —even before it contributes to destroying our world. . . ."

As for the recent American reaction to political failures of the past, he calls it " a chauvinistic wave " which is " hollow " because:

> there are no signs of a broad-based willingness to accept the draft; or taxes big enough to finance massive increase in armaments all-round; or serious energy-saving measures.

If such measures are desirable, why does he reject a policy which alone would make them possible? The fact that they are difficult to achieve is no reason for replacing them by proposing that the USA should become a mere adjunct to the local necessities of Chancellor Schmidt's *Ostpolitik*. I am sure that in the 1930s Richard Lowenthal, then a socialist refugee in Paris (and later in London), did not condemn the opposition to Chamberlain's appeasement as " chauvinistic," or such opposition as " hollow," because Oxford students declared that they would not fight " for King and Country." It is very rare to hear anybody in the USA jingoistically whooping, " We've got the ships, we've got the money too." There was very little jingoism observable in the recent reaction to the provocative demonstrations by Iranian students. I cannot follow the notion that a patriotic reassertion of national dignity in the face of such humiliations as the holding of the American hostages should be termed " chauvinism "? If anything, this reassertion is so modest that any nineteenth-century liberal statesman (and not just General Chauvin) would have found it astonishing, if not incomprehensible.

Support of bankrupt policies (minus their " overselling ") is not compatible with a desire to restore a " shattered balance." This can be done

Agreement as a quid pro quo for American concessions, so that in effect this proposal represents an attempt to press Soviet strategic advantage still further, beyond SALT II. If, as a result of the introduction of the SS-20s, the Soviet Union achieves a new " compromise " on medium-range missiles which would also include the withdrawal of the Forward Based Systems, this would represent another shift in the balance of power in its favour in " theatre weapons." It would represent another step towards disengaging America from Europe, and another factor favouring a European drift towards neutralism.

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only by awakening to the true lessons of past failures, by abandoning the attitudes and policy-premises which contributed to them, and, last but not least, by re-introducing in the West, a spirit of resistance to Soviet expansionism. An attempt to combine appeasement and resistance can only result in a slide in the direction of unabashed appeasement (as the story of George Kennan, among others, illustrates).[5]

Not unlike Chancellor Schmidt, Richard Lowenthal would like to have both the local benefits of *Ostpolitik* and a credible American security umbrella to preserve peace. But a more likely practical outcome of his policy recommendations would be an American drift towards isolationism and a German drift towards "self-Finlandisation." In the American context this type of attitude inexorably leads to isolationism. The political logic of this was spelt out in an article in the "liberal" journal *Foreign Policy* by Earl C. Ravenal:

> The United States must adjust policies to events, not events to policies. . . . In the aftermath of Afghanistan, the comfortable middle options have dropped away. The only alternative now to the official strategy of resuscitated military interventionism is an isolationist foreign policy.

Such a policy explicitly accepts the exclusion of the Middle East and of Western Europe "from America's security perimeter," which effectively means their surrender to the Soviet sphere of influence. Is there no alternative to such a splendid prospect? Is there no formula which the new administration could employ as a basis for a policy of resistance?

THOSE who are still afraid even "to damage *détente*," after all the knocks it has received from the Soviet aggresive actions in the 1970s, could not be expected ever to admit that it is "dead." Concede a few failures; opine that it has never really been tried. Such spirits are evidently not frightened at the prospect of further Soviet ascendancy in the 1980s. What they find fearful is what they call "a return to the Cold War" or "a new Cold War." Yet what is in a name?

Whatever the new period is called, the real problem is how to avoid successful Soviet exploitation of "the shattered balance." Unless this is done by launching "a politics of survival," what lurks behind the false dilemmas of the "middle-option" illusionists is a Soviet strategic breakthrough in the present decade. The end result as far as Europe is concerned will not be different from the one advocated by Mr Ravenal (but quite different from what he so fondly imagines as a secure isolationist "Fortress America"). This end result would be no less certain should the European countries think that they can pursue independent appeasement initiatives but still expect the full security of a transatlantic defence cover.

[5] See the previous discussion of all these matters in the "Kennan debate" (*Encounter*, March, April, July, September and December 1978), in which both Lowenthal and I participated. See also *Encounters with Kennan* (Frank Cass, 1979).

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" The politics of survival " of what used to be rightly called " the free world " involves, in the first place, rebuilding the alliance on the basis of a sober appraisal of the threat it is facing and on serious measures to resist it. This initiative can only come from the new American administration. Considering how greatly the power and the unity of the alliance have been eroded, the process of Western recovery can only be slow, and if it is approached realistically must stretch well beyond 1984.

It cannot be merely a return to the old indiscriminate " Containment doctrine." The military balance is now so much more unfavourable that, in order to resist Soviet expansion, the West must be much more aware of the need for strategic and political priorities. If the new administration is even to start to redress the present unfavourable balance of power it must, to begin with, increase military expenditure to frustrate the Soviet effort to achieve strategic superiority. I cannot see any earthly reason why this should not be possible in an economy twice as productive as the Soviet Union's. In 1954 the USA spent 14 per cent of GNP on defence; in 1978 less than 6 per cent. The trends in US opinion polls now favour a change. In 1974 32 per cent of Americans thought that it was spending " too much " and 13 per cent that it was " too little." In 1978 the corresponding figures were 15 per cent and 32 per cent. The polls also indicate that the main opposition to re-armament comes from the educated elite, not from the mass of the people. Additional expenditure could, of course, aggravate inflation; but it could also reduce unemployment. In any case, the estimated Soviet military expenditure of 13–16 per cent of GNP (possibly more) will remain higher than the postulated 8–10 per cent of the US GNP needed to correct the imbalance before the decade is out. It is estimated that at present Soviet military effort is 50 per cent larger than the American The argument that the Soviet Union can increase its military build-up is unrealistic: its economy is already overstretched; its rate of growth is falling; it cannot risk depressing consumption even further.

I am convinced that reintroduction of conscription will be necessary, both as a means of responding to the Soviet Union at an appropriate level and as an indication of the serious character of the new resistance policy. The much-advertised new " Rapid Deployment Force " is, as Dr James Schlesinger (the former US Defence Secretary) remarked, not new, rapid, or very much of a force.

It would have been unrealistic to hope for a platform-proposal about this during an election time. It may still be unrealistic afterwards unless the American public sees it as a decision which is also implemented by those other NATO members who must eventually face a choice of sharing equitably the military burdens necessary for the survival of the alliance, or leave it altogether and face the tender mercies of the Soviet leadership. The risk that this may push some of them into some form of neutralism is less than that of accepting their drift towards neutralism inside the alliance—a drift which is increasingly undermining its unity

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and creating what Irving Kristol termed "the allies of inconvenience." A similar concern must be applied to Japan.

At this point I would like to enter two caveats about the question of redressing American military weakness. One is, as General Maxwell D. Taylor pointed out in *The Washington Post* (12 September 1980) that the exclusive focus on "the number fallacy" may prevent a rational allocation of resources according to appropriate priorities, and could vitiate the creation of a sensible force-structure capable of facing real threats at different levels. The second is that total preoccupation with the military balance, important as it is, may once again lead to neglect of the political dimension in the power balance. This is an absolutely necessary ingredient of any strategy which is to have any hopes of reversing the geopolitical trends of the 1970s. It is even more important now that America finds itself in a much more disadvantageous military predicament. This political awareness alone can provide coherence for an overall strategy and a focus for choosing priorities; it is vital for expressing and clarifying needs and values of Western civilization. Without a favourable climate of opinion, decisions necessary for survival may just not be feasible. In the "ideological struggle" Western weapons can be used much more effectively now that communism has been so discredited. In this respect, broadcasting, for instance, is no less important than military hardware, and the money spent on one or two F-14s may be better spent on transmitters.

IT is generally acknowledged that the unity of the alliance and the coherence of its strategy depends not only on the existence of US leadership but also on the credibility of the American deterrent. Increasing doubts about it are a major factor in the centrifugal tendencies undermining NATO.

This is not the place to discuss nuclear strategy and the different positions on problems of deterrence and defence. But one thing should be clear: European defeatism, and the neutralistic temptation lurking behind the idea that "*détente* is divisible" which Mr Brezhnev tries to foster and exploit, are to some extent the result of the official American attitude in the SALT negotiations. It divorced the USA from European strategic interests. It defined "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons from a purely American point of view. European fears about the USA's military commitment to its defence may be exaggerated, since US forces in Europe are a guarantee that the USA would be involved from the first shot. But, in the surrealistic logic of military scenarios on a nuclear chessboard, nothing will overcome such fears short of a demonstration of American total involvement in a nuclear *Schicksalgemeinschaft* (community of destiny) with Europe. The restoration of the unity of NATO and of the transatlantic military perspective depends on such a demonstration. The credibility of the US deterrent depends not only on the shift in American strategy embodied in Presidential Directive 59,

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but on a perspective which would restore the feeling that "we are all in it together" by re-coupling "strategic" and "theatre" weapons in any future negotiations with the Soviet Union. Only such a political—as distinct from military—premise can prevent further deterioration in the fulfilment of military obligations by the European members of the Alliance. Henry Kissinger remarked recently:

> Almost everything we are thinking about global strategy was developed in the 1950s and almost everything we are trying to implement in arms control dates from the early '60s. We haven't had a new idea in either subject for nearly two decades.

This is certainly true, even though Dr Kissinger himself has not always contributed in the past to sound thought on the subject. What is needed now is a kind of thinking which is not based on the nostalgic ideas of a "World Restored," but which can help to produce an "Alliance Restored." A realistic step in this direction would be an American initiative which would renew European belief in the *Schicksalgemeinschaft* of the transatlantic partnership.

I HAVE no doubts about how difficult it will be to implement such political initiatives. But before they are dismissed as "unrealistic," one should consider the outcome of not attempting to pursue such goals: for if difficult decisions are avoided, the situation can only deteriorate, and soon it may be too late. One already hears the usual whining from those who, in the first place, denied the existence of danger, only to switch to an argument that because of the shift in the balance (to which they themselves contributed), it is now too late to do anything about it . . . except, of course, to engage in appeasing the expanding power. In the past it was Nazi Germany, at present it is Soviet Russia.

Too much time has already been lost. But it is, I maintain, not at all unrealistic to assume that it is still possible to reverse the trend. If only the neurotic fear of the Soviet Union, amounting almost to psychological paralysis, could be exorcised! And it is not just the fear of a nuclear holocaust; many of those who admit the need for defence are also frightened of the draft which, on *their* premises, they should support. It is simply not true, as Lowenthal argues, that "the most upsetting military changes have *not* taken place in the field of *strategic* nuclear weapons." Perhaps it may not have been "most upsetting" from the local point of view of *Ostpolitik* but it was the main factor upsetting the central strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. As Eugene V. Rostow put it (in *Foreign Policy*):

> Soviet expansion cannot be contained unless the United States restores its second-strike nuclear capability and leads a grand coalition to keep the peace.

Rostow added that "The potential for such a coalition still exists, although it will not exist much longer. . . ." Perhaps the best indication

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of the time lost is that all the warnings by the so-called "hawks" during the last decade—about Western slippage, about the Soviet pattern of behaviour—have been confirmed. The relevant facts are now generally admitted in the "liberal" (in the American sense of the word) press. A dozen Ph.D. theses could be written comparing the contradictory writings in *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, *Time* and *Newsweek*, *Le Monde* and *Die Zeit* at the beginning of the 1970s and of the '80s. But no credit is ever given to those who issued such warnings, no apologies are made—in, say, the recent *New York Times* front-page series on the alarming decline of the US armed forces—to those who pointed out the worrisome signs earlier. They are, of course, still denounced as "hawks."

A group of British scholars and writers addressed (in January 1977) a private letter to President Carter on his inauguration. The text of the letter included the following remarks:

> Our aim is to offer you a few of our reflections on the main direction which the policy of the free world should, in our view, follow in its relations with the communist world. . . . We hope that these reflections may prove of some value to you in formulating the decisions which you will be called upon in the future to make.
>
> Let us at once make our fundamental position clear: we are as strong advocates of a real *détente* with the Soviet Union as we are opponents of the present form of *détente*, which on the Soviet side seems to us to be little more than the continuation of the cold war under another name. . . .
>
> The first question to ask is: what is the motive of the Soviet Union in pursuing, if only by verbal assertion, the policy of *détente*? The motive usually declared by the Soviet Union itself is the avoidance of nuclear conflict. But this is palpably untrue. The avoidance of nuclear conflict with the United States had been recognized by the USSR as a principle of policy long before the agreements which officially inaugurated *détente*. The real motives for *détente* on the Soviet side, in our view, are different. The Soviet leaders hope to achieve their expansionist aims, not just by politically disarming the West through this policy, but also through economic benefits accruing from it. . . . If the Soviet authorities are led to believe that they can get what they want from the West without paying the price for it in the form of modifying their political intransigence, they will have no incentive for modifying it. . . . This entails Soviet abandonment of the "ideological struggle," forgoing support for "wars of liberation," and desisting from the persistent effort, by means of growing military build-up, to secure the expansion of Soviet political influence and ultimate domination, in the first instance over Western Europe, if not the military conquest of the Western world. . . .
>
> Military balance is a necessary condition for preventing further Soviet expansion, and it is the only basis for a policy through which the United States of America could eventually achieve the general

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> strategic aim of inducing the Soviet Union to accept a genuine *détente*. . . .
>
> If we meet the Soviet "ideological struggle" on its own ground, asserting our own ideas and ideals without being apologetic or inhibited about them, we cannot but enhance our morale and improve our world-political standing. If we fail to do so, we will continue our retreat, sacrificing, at one and the same time, morality *and* jeopardizing our position in the world in terms of *Realpolitik*.

The letter was read by the President and duly acknowledged. Shortly thereafter he delivered his celebrated speech about "the inordinate fear of communism." Three years later, after Afghanistan, he delivered another speech in which he announced that he had, at long last, finally understood the world political problem posed by the Soviet Union . . . having learned in three weeks more than in the previous three years.

HOW likely is a reversal towards politics of survival—the realistic alternative to capitulation by historical instalments—under a new administration? In spite of the growing need, greater awareness and a more favourable political attitude among the American public, the ready-made answer which comes to mind is still that of Eliza Doolittle.

It is certainly "not bloody likely" in Europe where the tendency towards neutralism is rampant as evidenced in the shift to the left and to unilateral disarmament in the British Labour Party, the attachment of the German electorate to Chancellor Schmidt's *Ostpolitik*, and the continuing Soviet flirtations of President Giscard d'Estaing. De Gaulle's *folie de grandeur* is no longer much in evidence: the prospect now is more that of a Europe from the Urals to La Manche rather than vice versa. The French neutron bomb (and the rest of its independent "deterrent") is no more likely to play the intended role than the Maginot line did. It is *political morale* that counts, and in the present context it is Marshal Pétain who is more apposite than General Cambronne. As for the Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Danish scene, it is full of "Eastern promise" as far as defence is concerned.

This sorry state of affairs is a cumulative result of many individual causes; but it has obviously been powerfully affected by the chronically hesitant policies of the United States which is increasingly perceived in Europe (and elsewhere) as an irresolute leader in the field of defence. The negative consequences extend to other fields. For instance, the more limited instruments of pressure like "strategic trade" and "credit sanctions" cannot be effective without being applied by other committed countries; when the coalition is as ramshackle as it is now, the results can only be derisory. Such weapons can achieve their purpose only if the alliance is repaired; only then can they be applied multilaterally.

Obviously, the best strategy is of no use if the means to implement it are not available. It is embarrassing to need to repeat such truisms, but the fact is that at the moment the United States has neither means nor

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ends. The widespread fear that an attempt to correct this may provoke a Soviet arms build-up has something bizarre about it—for it is a matter of offsetting what the Soviet Union has been accomplishing for a long time now. As the US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, himself admitted, the Soviet Union has " been substantially insensitive to changes in the magnitude of US and allied programmes for more than a decade ":

> As our defence budgets have risen, the Soviets have increased their defence budgets. As our defence budgets have gone down, their defence budgets have increased again. . . .

Without the United States squarely facing the primary question of military balance, no hope of a restoration of alliance solidarity can be realistically entertained.

The hope that Soviet difficulties will somehow make up for it—that the burdens of the bloated empire will be an effectively restraining factor—are surely illusory in the short run.

SUCH hopes have been inspired recently by the events in Poland. Their importance as a potential factor undermining the Soviet political dynamic is unquestionable. They are relevant for the future not only of Poland, but also of the whole Soviet bloc. They can be seen as one of the important stages in the undermining of the communist totalitarian state and of Soviet imperial domination in Eastern Europe, in the mass refusal to accept the system and its legitimacy. To be sure, this process has been going on for a long time. It was marked by the workers' uprising of 17 June 1953 in East Berlin, the " Polish October " of 1956, the Hungarian revolution of the same year, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the activities of the dissidents in all the communist countries including the USSR. They may be temporarily crushed, but phoenix-like they arise in search of freedom.

If, as a result of the victory of the Gdansk workers, the Independent Trade Unions are permitted to survive and develop, they will be a permanent source of contagion. In the long run a " demonstration effect " of the successful action by the workers against the state which claims to be the historical embodiment of their interests is bound to undermine the legitimacy of power in other communist countries. Montesquieu once remarked that political state authority begins to be eroded from the moment its principles of legitimacy begin to be questioned; he had in mind the divine right of kings. What we are witnessing now is the process of erosion of the divine right of communist rulers.

In my view, the most important consideration which inhibits the Soviet leaders is the fact that a decision to intervene militarily may ruin their present policy which aims at undermining the Atlantic alliance by dividing Europe from America and exploiting the differences between them. This is the major goal of a policy which yet another Red Army

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intervention would make more difficult. The West European arguments about "*détente*" being "divisible" would become less credible and the perceived need to reinforce NATO would become more urgent. To be sure, a decisive Soviet action might have the opposite effect. Like the invasion of Czechoslovakia which, contrary to Soviet fears, did not kill their *détente* policy but actually facilitated it, a brutal intervention in Poland could so frighten the West Europeans that they would be propelled towards "self-Finlandisation." But the Soviet leaders cannot be sure of that. Historically, they always preferred a more cautious strategy ("salami slicing") to one fraught with consequences difficult to predict.

The war between Iraq and Iran may now deflect their attention; but in the event of military intervention, Poland, ruled directly from the Kremlin, would become a special political and economic burden. In the logic of events, this would be an additional incentive for the USSR to press even harder for the neutralization of Western Europe; this would be the only perspective to deprive the Poles and other East Europeans of any political hopes. Therefore it is, I am convinced, in the West's vital interest that Soviet military intervention in Poland should be avoided, and that the evolution towards greater political pluralism be permitted to proceed apace.

The war between Iraq and Iran can only hurt Western interests and provide the Soviet Union with fresh opportunities for a further expansion towards the Persian Gulf. Should it get control of the oil, Western Europe and Japan would be at Soviet mercy (Polish hopes would also in this case be effectively killed and there would be no need for military intervention).

The situation the West now faces is a direct result of its false hopes and one-sided concessions in the seventies.

1. *Détente* brought new dangers rather than a relaxation of tension.
2. The "SALT process" resulted in American military decline rather than in "arms control."
3. The Helsinki Accord brought no greater freedom or improvement in the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Polish events cannot seriously be attributed to it).
4. *Ostpolitik* received a rude jolt from East Germany the moment the West German elections were over.

No proper re-examination of Western Policies can be made without taking these facts into account. Facing these realities, the inescapable conclusion can only be that the timid attitude of Western self-abnegation should be abandoned.

Reciprocity in exploiting vulnerabilities—instead of the Soviet Union taking unilateral advantages of Western weaknesses, as has been the case so far—becomes more important now that, paradoxically, the West is getting weaker and the Soviet Union more vulnerable.

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I KNOW full well that historical parallels are always of limited relevance. Discussing one such parallel, the Turkish expansion in Europe, George Urban observed:

> The Turks did not have a powerful Moslem pressure group or fifth column in Rome or Paris, whereas the Soviets arguably have. . . .

To which Leszek Kolakowski replied:

> True, but neither did Christendom have *its* co-religionists in Constantinople as a powerful force—as we have our "fifth column" (if you like) in the shape of the whole population of Eastern Europe.

It may be added, however, that *1.* Francois I and Louis XIV had their flirtations with the Ottomans which facilitated the Eastern drive in Europe in 1529 and 1683 when they reached the gates of Vienna; and *2.* that, even earlier, the Poles and Hungarians lost the battle of Varna in 1444 when the bankers of Genoa helped to finance the transport of the Turkish army from Asia to Europe! Soon after (in 1453) Byzantium fell and Constantinople's Hagia Sophia became a mosque. Could there be some lessons in all this for Western bankers and, perhaps, President Giscard d'Estaing?

Since Thucydides and the story of the alliance of the democratic republic of Syracuse with Sparta against Athenian democracy, we know that "long-term considerations" are not exactly a strong point of the foreign policies of free countries. But a constant repetition of this Tocquevillean truism strikes me as something akin to self-fulfilling defeatism. Instead of Spenglerian determinism of doom-and-gloom we need a positive effort to achieve an enlightened policy, to attempt to get away from the paralysis of fear, to restore the balance. As Richard Pipes formulated the long-term aim.

> The ultimate purpose of Western counter-strategy should be to compel the Soviet Union to turn inward—from conquest to reform. Only by blunting its external drive can the Soviet regime be made to confront its citizenry and to give an account of its policies. It is a well-known fact of modern Russian history that whenever Russian governments suffered serious set-backs abroad—in the Crimean war, in the 1904–05 war with Japan, and in World War I—they were compelled by internal pressure to grant the citizenry political rights. We should help the population of the Soviet Union bring its government under control. A more democratic Russia would be less expansionist and certainly easier to live with. . . .

This prospect may be difficult to visualize; but a policy directed towards such a goal is urgently needed. With an appropriate long perspective, it can be made operational and pragmatically implemented.

The alternative is to read Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophiae.* He certainly had no illusions about barbarians and the fate the Roman world could expect from them, writing as he was not for his contem-

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poraries but for posterity. He knew that it was too late for recovery under Theodoric, King of the East Goths (even though this barbarian chieftain admired Roman laws and institutions). The world which produced Athens and Rome had waxed and waned.

It took a thousand years for Boethius's testimony (which survived, copied by the monks) to be rediscovered at the time of the Renaissance. The poor cousins of Rome, the Dalmatians and the Aquitanians, had continued the struggle to preserve the cultural legacy. But for the Romans it was too late to do anything but find consolation in philosophy.

Western civilization revived after a long night of barbarism. As Hugh Trevor-Roper has pointed out, it has in its subsequent history faced mortal dangers from outside on a number of other occasions: and unlike Athens and Rome, in its new incarnation Western civilization survived these perils.

We are now facing again such an historic danger. No outcome in history is predetermined. I have only tried to argue that the moment of truth is here, and that the choice is ours.

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US-Soviet Trade: The Question of Leverage *

Gary Bertsch

ALTHOUGH US policy over the last decade has either flirted with the idea or openly attempted to use trade with the Soviet Union as a bargaining tool or lever, the assumptions, logic and probable outcomes of such a policy remain open to question. As is the case with most important policy matters in the US, there is a variety of different perspectives on the feasibility of employing trade as an instrument to bring about a more desirable Soviet policy. While personal attitudes and policies do not always fit into one category or another, there are two basic groups that include most actors with opinions on the subject. These two groups—the " Bargainers " and the " Non-Bargainers "—can each be divided into two additional groups. The first includes " comprehensive bargainers " who would use trade to bargain with the Soviet Union across the board, that is, on all aspects of their foreign and domestic policy. Another group, which might be called the " selective bargainers," are more discriminating in linking trade selectively to certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The Non-Bargainers, however, include two very different groups. The first, the " pro-traders," is in favour of trade with no political strings attached. The second, the " anti-traders," opposes trade with the Soviets under any conditions or circumstances. The perspectives of each of these groups are based on a complex array of assumptions, logic and policy options and consequences bearing upon security, political and economic costs and benefits involving US–Soviet trade. The typical perspectives are illustrated below with examples from recent history.

The Comprenhensive Bargaining Perspective. This view, perhaps most closely associated with the Carter administration and described as " economic diplomacy " by Samuel Huntington, a former National Security Council official, seems to be based upon three basic assumptions: (1) US–Soviet relations are characterized by both conflict and cooperation; (2) due to deficiencies and shortcomings in their economic and agricultural system, the Soviets are dependent in significant ways on trade with the US; (3) if properly managed, trade can

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be used as an instrument (or lever) to influence Soviet foreign and domestic policy. While not all members of the Carter administration can be associated with this first group, it is fair to contend that many, including the President, take positions that correspond with the basic assumptions and logic of this point of view. In his June 1978 Annapolis speech, President Carter proclaimed that while competition and confrontation are involved, US–Soviet relations could move toward increasing cooperation. And the report of 31 December 1978 on US policy towards the Soviet Union, approved by President Carter and transmitted to Congress by Secretary Vance, noted:

> Thus, Soviet–American relations will continue to be characterized by both competition and cooperation. The challenge for American foreign policy is to respond effectively to the former and encourage the latter, seeking to foster attitudes of restraint and respect for Western interests among the Kremlin leaders. The process is a long-term one since it involves the gradual modification of deeply ingrained political attitudes, overlaid by dogmatic ideology and a highly authoritarian government.[1]

Involved in the logic are a number of important assumptions concerning the Soviet leaders, their interests, objectives, and decision-making style. Emphasizing the common interests of strategic arms limitations, peace and international stability, proponents of this first point of view see Soviet leaders as open, at least potentially, to reason and negotiation.[2] Perceived less as the dogmatic ideologues of the Stalinist period, or the impulsive, ideological Khrushchev, the comprehensive bargainers view the Brezhnev Politburo as more conservative, less ideologically committed, less revolutionary, more pragmatic, and more susceptible to influence. Hoping not to jeopardize profitable trade relations, Soviet leaders are expected to be willing to refrain from policies offensive to the US and avoid unnecessary political confrontation if they receive sufficient economic benefits in return.

Adherents of this comprehensive bargaining perspective feel that while Soviet achievements and advances in some fields have been notable, particularly in the military sector, they still lag considerably behind the US and the West in agricultural, economic and technological developments. This lag apparently stems from defects in their economic system and involves problems in planning, production and marketing. These are viewed as problems that apparently will not easily be overcome. As Huntington argues, "It is fairly clear that the nature of the Soviet political system prevents the Soviets from correcting their economic deficiencies."[3] Soviet leaders are perceived

[1] "US Policy Toward the Soviet Union," *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 1979, p. 2.

[2] As President Carter indicated in January 1980, his views may have changed substantially as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, "Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 32, Fall 1978, p. 79.

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as unwilling to make the necessary changes within their own system and are seen as preferring to get what they need (computers, oil and gas extraction technology, grain and so forth) from the US and the West. An important perception in the bargaining perspective is this belief that the Soviet system is unable to produce effectively certain necessary technologies, equipment and commodities and therefore must turn to the West to secure them. Moreover, as indicated in a study prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency for the President, some comprehensive bargainers believe that Soviet needs may go beyond the economic realm: " The Soviets needed Western trade, capital and technology—notably advanced US technology—not only for economic reasons. They value economic strength largely for its contribution to Soviet political and military power." [4]

Therefore, because of Soviet dependence, the comprehensive bargainers contend that the US can use trade to fulfill its foreign policy goals, curb Soviet expansion and influence Soviet domestic policy behaviour. According to Carter's Presidential Directive No. 18, a document that laid out policy guidelines in August 1977, the United States should take advantage of its economic strength and technological superiority to encourage Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts, reducing tensions and achieving adequately verifiable arms agreements.[5] The document went on to say that trade, together with other means if necessary, should be used to counterbalance adverse Soviet influence in key areas of the world and to promote human rights and national independence. In Huntington's words, " In short, economic capabilities and economic relations must serve the basic US foreign policy objectives of encouraging East–West cooperation, containing Soviet expansion, and promoting American values." [6] The assumption is that since the Soviets need US computers, oil drilling technology and equipment, and American grains, they will, if confronted properly, show restraint in Africa, Cuba, and southwest Asia, treat their dissidents with greater respect, and allow a freer flow of Jewish emigrants.

In order to manage this lever properly, Huntington feels a number of policy changes are necessary. First, the executive branch must be given more effective centralized control over East–West economic relations.[7] In summer 1978, the NSC moved to assume greater control and set off a fury of opposition within the governmental East–West trade bureaucracy. Secondly, Huntington argued that it was necessary to review the export control lists and add those items for which the Soviets have a critical need and are dependent on the US. Again in the summer of 1978, oil and gas extraction technology and equip-

[4] Quoted by Miles Costick, " The Strategic Dimensions of US Computer Exports to the USSR," *New Guard*, Jan. 1978, p. 14.

[5] It should be noted that the issue of SALT was " delinked " from other issues soon after by the Carter administration.

[6] Huntington, p. 65.

[7] Ibid. p. 75.

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ment were added to the US Commodity Control List (CCL), touching off another angry reaction in the US government and business communities.[8] It is interesting to note that while these items were added to the export control list in 1978, no export license applications were denied for these items until the new Presidential directives of January 1980.

Huntington also argued that more flexible credit arrangements must be established to allow US decision-makers to employ their economic advantages.[9] Before US trade can really be used as an effective lever, there must be an expansion in US–Soviet trade which requires a greater availability of credits. Then, to use credits effectively, Huntington argued that the executive branch must be given more flexibility in turning them on and off. Finally, Huntington pointed out that we must do more to get our allies to go along with our policies.[10] Economic diplomacy will not work as effectively as it could if our OECD allies fail to cooperate. Huntington cautioned that developing the institutional means to implement a policy of conditioned flexibility will not be easy, but it can be done. In his words, "The central need is to provide the president with the means to engage in creative and flexible economic diplomacy with the Soviets."[11] In the past, according to Huntington, we "denied ourselves both the carrot and the stick."[12] Given the apparent failure of the carrot, the President moved swiftly on 4 January 1980 to utilize the "stick."

In the 1976–79 period prior to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the Carter administration oscillated between a comprehensive bargaining position and the more selective perspective outlined below. Huntington and some other members of the NSC, it is reported, advocated implementation of the broad-scale bargaining strategy. Secretary Vance and his Soviet affairs advisor Marshall Shulman, on the other hand, supported a more selective approach. Others in the East–West trade bureaucracy, particularly in the Department of Commerce, wanted trade more fully "delinked" from politics. These deep-seated differences accounted for some of the obvious uncertainties the Carter administration exhibited in US–Soviet policy prior to the Afghanistan crisis.

Theoretically, if economic diplomacy and comprehensive bargaining works properly, the interests of both states will be served. Conceivably, both Soviet economic and technological needs and US foreign policy interests could be met. Increased cooperation in the future—for example, US involvement in the development and sharing of Soviet energy resources—could even serve future US economic interests. Ideally, economic diplomacy is intended to develop a

[8] Ibid. p. 76.
[9] Ibid. p. 77.
[10] Ibid. p. 78.
[11] Ibid. p. 79.
[12] Ibid. p. 71.

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reciprocal, symmetrical relationship serving the high priority interests of both states. If it fails, it can lead to a cessation of economic relations and considerable political, strategic and economic costs to both states.

The Selective Bargaining Perspective. The assumptions, logic, and policy of the selective bargainers show many similarities with the more comprehensive position, but they also display some important differences. There are three basic assumptions in this perspective: (1) while the Soviet challenge is constant, US–Soviet relations can move from confrontation to increasing cooperation; (2) the USSR is dependent on the US economy and American technolgy; (3) Soviet foreign policy (but not necessarily domestic policy) can be influenced by carefully linking US–Soviet political relations and trade. While the comprehensive bargainers are more inclined to use the full slate of trade levers to influence *both* domestic and foreign policy, the selective bargainers are inclined towards a more subtle linking of trade to Soviet foreign policy alone.

Henry Kissinger viewed the Soviet leadership as being confronted by conflicting forces; some worked to encourage better US–Soviet relations while others tended to discourage them.[13] The challenge of American policy is to take advantage of Soviet needs to build what Kissinger called "a web of constructive relationships." Opportunities result from, among other forces, the poor performance of the Soviet economy. Kissinger writes, "One of the curiosities of communism is that an ideology founded on the inexorable influence of economics should do so poorly in delivering the goods."[14] In view of the many deficiencies and the obvious shortcomings, Kissinger notes that it is small wonder that the Soviet Union has since the late 1950s "sought to expand trade with the West as a shortcut to modern technology and capital."[15] Similarly to the comprehensive bargainers, the selective bargainers view Soviet economic and technological needs as a key to the bargaining relationship.

Some other important perceptions of the USSR affect the relationship. Kissinger views the Soviet leaders as patient and pragmatic. "The Soviet practice, confident of the flow of history, is to promote the attrition of adversaries by gradual increments, not to stake everything on a single throw of the dice."[16] Soviet policy is based on their assessments of the "objective correlation of forces" and their strategy is viewed as one of "ruthless opportunism."[17] The challenge to American leaders is to foreclose Soviet opportunities, and to define the limits of Soviet aims.[18] The basic strategy for doing so is one of linkage.

[13] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979), p. 127.
[14] Ibid. p. 150.
[15] Ibid. p. 151.
[16] Ibid. p. 118.
[17] Ibid. p. 119.
[18] Ibid. p. 119.

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Linkage politics raises the basic question of what comes first, improved political relations or increased trade? Kissinger approvingly quotes Nixon: "I do not accept the philosophy that increased trade results in improved political relations. In fact just the converse is true. Better political relations lead to improved trade." [19] This quotation draws attention to other aspects of the selective bargaining policy. In contrast to the fullscale bargainers, the more subtle selective bargainers use more "carrot" and less "stick." Some of its proponents even prefer not to call it bargaining. Yet, the message is clear. If you want trade, then it is necessary to establish better political relations. Finally, there is the question of what to link. Unlike the Carter administration, the selective bargainers tend to link trade to selected foreign policy issues and avoid the entanglements of Soviet domestic affairs. Interestingly, some in the US Congress criticized the Nixon administration for not linking trade more aggressively to Soviet domestic policy. Taking matters into their own hands, Congress did precisely that through the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to the 1974 Trade Bill.

The selective bargainers likewise recognize the desirability of centralized control of trade policy and executive flexibility permitting it to be linked with Soviet policy. To Kissinger's dismay the eventual inability of the Nixon administration to provide Most Favoured Nation status and expanded, long-term credits to the Soviet Union was a critical set-back to their policy. Why should the Soviets be more accommodating politically if American leaders could not deliver the economic goods? A basic flaw in the Nixon-Kissinger approach involved the failure to provide the institutional underpinnings to allow the implementation of a finely tuned policy. This of course resulted from the unanticipated confrontation between the "Imperial Presidency" and an assertive Congress in the Watergate period.

The selective bargainers view effective implementation of linkage politics as having important benefits. By expanding US–Soviet economic relations, it will give Soviet leaders a greater stake in peaceful, stable relations; it will strengthen the role of moderates in the leadership by proving the benefits of economic cooperation with the West; finally, it will expand the influence of American and Western values in Soviet society. Like the comprehensive bargainers, the selective group recognizes the importance of assessing the security and political costs and benefits of trade. In Kissinger's words: "If well-designed it forges links whose cumulative effect can reinforce restraints against Soviet aggressiveness; but it can also add to the sinews of Soviet power." [20] Unlike the perspectives to be discussed below, neither bargaining perspective places much importance on

[19] Ibid. p. 154.
[20] Ibid. p. 155.

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the economic costs and benefits of US–Soviet trade. The emphasis of the bargaining groups is clearly on the strategic and political.

In contrast to the Carter approach, the Nixon-Kissinger policy seemed more predictable in its selectivity. While the Carter strategy was inclined to link trade to various aspects of Soviet behaviour, and did so on numerous occasions even prior to January 1980,[21] the Nixon-Kissinger approach more clearly defined the limits of linkage. Foreign policy was open to linkage; domestic Soviet affairs were not.

The Non-Bargaining, Pro-Trade Perspective. There is a body of opinion, concentrated in the business community but found elsewhere as well, that strongly supports a resumption and expansion of US–Soviet trade and opposes the use of trade as a bargaining tool. Two basic assumptions underlie this point of view. First, trade should be based on economic criteria alone, can be separated from, and should not be tied to politics. Secondly, if pursued in this way, trade with the USSR will have significant economic and political benefits.

Proponents of this point of view look to the historical record to make their argument. They contend that trade has seldom (some would say never) been an effective instrument in influencing the political behaviour of communist states. Using trade as a lever, threatening communist leaders that there will be no trade, or only tightly restricted trade, unless certain political conditions are met, is viewed as both ineffective and counter-productive. The effect often hardens communist intentions and makes them even more difficult to deal with. According to the pro-traders, the bargainers go about it backwards. Instead of demanding that improved political relations precede trade, they should recognize that increasing trade will improve political relations.

The pro-traders cite the West European and Japanese examples and argue that the US, like its competitors, ought to decouple trade and politics. Our OECD allies have expanded trade with the USSR with considerable economic benefits. With a shrinking US portion of the East-West market, these allied benefits are seen as US losses. Finally, the non-bargaining, pro-trade perspective puts considerable weight on the political consequences of expanded trade. Through interdependence and increased economic relationships, we will get to know one another better and improve the chances for peace. Kissinger outlines some of the logic in describing the views of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Under Secretary of State:

> Trade meant freer choices for Soviet consumers and managers, which was the beginning of a freer society, and a more sophisti-

[21] Notable examples of linkage during the first three years of the Carter administration were the denial in 1978 of a Sperry-Univac computer to Tass due to Soviet treatment of a group of dissidents, the addition of oil and gas extraction technology and equipment to the export control list (CCL) in 1978 in reaction to both Soviet foreign and domestic policy, and denial of a Control Data Corporation sale in 1979 for similar reasons.

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> cated Soviet economy would undercut Soviet ideology and stimulate dissent. Maintaining the restrictions for political reasons was denounced as self-denying economically, as futile politically, and as playing into the hands of Stalinist hard-liners.[22]

A number of important policy changes are desired by the pro-traders. William Verity, Chairman of the Board of Armco Inc. and Co-chairman of the US–USSR Trade and Economic Council, has called for major revisions in the US trade laws to allow expanded trade with the Soviets.[23] According to Verity, the US should: (1) remove the linkage between politics and economics, (2) eliminate or restrict Presidential authority to control exports for foreign policy reasons, (3) examine, modernize, and rationalize US export controls, (4) repeal or modify the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and (5) repeal sections of the 1974 Trade Agreement and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 which restrict or prevent Eximbank from participating in the financing of exports to the USSR.

The non-bargaining, pro-traders believe that the economic and political consequences resulting from such policy changes would be highly desirable. Robert D. Schmidt, Executive Vice-President of Control Data Corporation and President of the Committee on East–West Accord, notes that the "one reality we should all recognize is there is no advantage in not doing business. . . . Trade provides an opportunity not only to improve relations but to provide benefits to both economies."[24] And, since our allies are unwilling to place the same restrictions on their own exports to the USSR, they derive many of the economic benefits that could be coming to the United States. In calling attention to potential US economic benefits, Verity contends that during the next five years we could: (1) easily increase sales to $15 billion (compared to $8.6 billion for the last five years) and produce a balance of payments benefit of $10 billion; (2) create 100,000 to 125,000 new jobs; (3) bring about $1 billion in capital formation; and (4) have greater access to Soviet raw materials and energy supplies, among other things.[25] According to Verity, "It is time to act positively in our self-interest. The benefits of an intelligent trade policy with the Soviet Union can be accomplished with very little risk and with much mutual gain."[26] Citing more than economic benefits, Verity also argues that normal trade relations will have a moderating effect on the Soviet view of the outside world and may even contribute to a more stable world order.

The pro-traders argue that restrictions on trade such as the recent limits on grain exports hit the US exporter hardest. The outcry

[22] Kissinger, p. 152.
[23] William Verity, "Current Issues in US–Soviet Trade," p. 7, in Willard C. Matthias, *Commonsense in US–Soviet Trade* (American Committee on East-West Accord, Washington, 1979).
[24] Ibid. p. 2.
[25] Ibid. p. 7.
[26] Ibid. p. 7.

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of farmers and agricultural associations following President Carter's declaration on 4 January 1980 were indicative. According to the pro-traders, we need US–Soviet trade as much or even more than the Soviets.

In obvious contrast to the bargainers, the pro-traders feel that positive political consequences will naturally evolve with freer trade. Trade should not be used to demand political concessions, nor should it be withheld until a more positive political atmosphere arrives. Rather, if left to pure economic considerations, trade will flourish with definite political consequences. Also unlike the bargainers, the pro-traders pay less attention to strategic and security considerations. While recognizing that export controls on items of significant military application are reasonable, the pro-traders believe we go much too far in restricting exports often without accomplishing the intended effect. Schmidt contends: "The manner in which we have administered export controls has not only damaged our own economic interests, but it is also manifestly clear that we have failed, through our embargo on a wide range of exports, to prevent the Soviets from achieving their economic and military goals." [27]

The Non-Bargaining, Anti-Trade Perspective. Until recently few responsible actors or observers favoured a complete severing of trade relations with the USSR, although many have been critical of trade in the past. The anti-traders base their view on the following assumptions: (1) US–Soviet relations will remain competitive and conflict-ridden; (2) the USSR is dependent on the US for advanced technology, and important equipment and agricultural commodities; (3) US–Soviet trade contributes disproportionately to Soviet objectives at great cost to US economic and security interests.

The non-bargaining, anti-traders see the Soviet Union as an unchanging, uncompromising adversary of the US. According to this perspective, the Soviet's chief priority is to obtain high technology, equipment commodities that their inferior system is incapable of producing and that can make them more competitive and eventually dominant over the US. Temporary good behaviour on their part, as evidence by the policy of *détente*, was only designed to gain access to these critical technologies and commodities. The more recent events in south-west Asia are more representative of Soviet behaviour. Miles Costick cites Brezhnev's 1973 statement defining *détente* to members of the Soviet Politburo and leaders from Warsaw Pact countries: "We communists have got to string along the capitalists for a while. We need their credits their technology, and their agriculture." [28] The anti-traders argue that more recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan in 1980 indicate that they got what they needed and are now returning to more characteristic behaviour and policies.

[27] Ibid. p. 3.

[28] Costick, p. 14.

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The anti-traders also suggest that while the idea of trade bringing Soviet liberalization is not illogical, the leaders have effectively shut out these undesired effects.[29] Gershman argues that "If we have learned anything at this late date in our relations with the USSR it is that interaction with the West does not necessarily yield helpful results."[30] In fact, rather than leading to liberalization, trade contributes to totalitarianism by allowing the Soviets to put off internal political reforms that are necessary to improve their economic system.[31]

Nor does trade result in peace and a more desirable Soviet foreign policy. Gershman cites the events of the 1970s and concludes that while East–West trade was increasing, the Soviets were more inclined to intervene in others' political affairs and to expand their defence spending and military build-up.[32] The intervention in Afghanistan is seen as another example in a predetermined chain of events. Criticizing the logic of the bargainers, Gershman argues: "'Economic diplomacy' is no substitute for military deterrence, and common sense should dictate that anything the Soviets might want badly enough to forego opportunities for expansion is probably something they should not have in the first place."[33]

Even if trade were to have some political benefits, it comes at great economic and security costs to the US and at considerable gain to the USSR. The anti-traders argue that the amount of US–Soviet trade has always been small (less than 1 per cent of total US trade in

UNITED STATES–USSR TRADE: 1972–78

(Dollar amounts in millions)

Year	Trade turnover total	U.S. exports		U.S. imports total
		Total	Agricultural (percent)	
1972	$638	$542	79	$96
1973	1,415	1,195	77	220
1974	957	607	49	350
1975	2,087	1,833	62	254
1976	2,527	2,306	64	221
1977	1,857	1,623	64	234
1978 [1]	2,503	2,249	75	254

[1] Excludes gold bullion not previously included in trade data.

Source: Table prepared by Office of East–West Policy and Planning, Industry and Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce.

[29] A recent article provides a good example of the anti-trade perspective. See Carl Gersham, "Selling Them the Rope," *Commentary*, Apr. 1979, pp. 35–45.
[30] Ibid. p. 45.
[31] Ibid. p. 42.
[32] Ibid. p. 42.
[33] Ibid. p. 45.

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1977), will never be great, and will not result in the balance of payment, employment, and other economic benefits envisaged by the pro-traders. In addition, trade is costly not only to the US and Western countries but also to individual firms. By building turn-key factories and selling Western know-how, they are both contributing to future Soviet autarky and at the same time undermining their ability to compete with the Soviets in Eastern and Third World markets.

In contrast to US economic costs, the anti-traders see the Soviets as the primary beneficiaries as a result of their present economic deficiences and technological backwardness. Furthermore, due to the organization and structure of Soviet trade (state monopoly, secretive, and centralized), the Soviets are able to extract unfair economic advantages. Even though they lack hard currency, for example, they have been successful in establishing compensation agreements that have resulted in lopsided economic benefits.

Finally, US–Soviet trade results in continued Soviet strategic expansion and a further reduction in US and Western military superiority. Costick argues:

> At a time when the Carter Administration is supposedly working . . . to place a cap on further Soviet strategic expansion, it becomes obviously counterproductive to supply them with the most advanced strategic computers which will enable the Soviets to abridge the qualitative gap which exists between the United States and USSR.[34]

Because our export controls restricting the sale of strategic technologies and equipment are viewed as unreasonably lax and inefficient, and because much of the non-strategic, " civilian " exports have dual use (civilian and military) applications, the Soviet Union is able to build and improve its military capabilities through East–West trade. To the anti-traders, the recent revelation that US and Western technology exported to the USSR for the Kama River truck factory is now producing trucks for military purposes should come as no great surprise. According to this perspective, such Soviet behaviour is to be expected.

Supporting the President's January 1980 directives, the anti-traders have always argued that US and Western policy either should be changed to balance the benefits of East–West trade or trade ought to be substantially reduced or even halted altogether. Contributing Western technology, equipment, know-how and credit to build Soviet factories to produce trucks which may be used in Afghanistan is indefensible. At the very least, the anti-traders argue, we must shut off the flow of strategic technology. In addition, policy action must be taken, ideally on a multi-lateral basis, to revise Western credit policies, compensation arrangements and other financial issues that run counter to US and Western interests.

While it would be inaccurate to label Raymond Vernon an " anti-

[34] Costick, p. 14.

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trader" (although he is clearly anti-bargaining), he cautions that increased trade with the Soviet Union under the past conditions will strain still further relations among the Western nations and contribute disproportionate economic benefits to the East.[35] In a constructive, reasoned tone uncharacteristic of the anti-traders, Vernon calls for the West to develop a regime (structure) among the industrialized Western countries that would establish East–West trade principles for contributing more economic benefits to the West, that would multilateralize trade, and develop Western policies and joint demands. Underlining his "non-bargaining" posture, Vernon contends that this multilateral regime will be impossible to create "if the US insists on the right to use its trade with the USSR as a lever for the attainment of political conditions: in that case, other advanced industrialized countries would want to maintain considerable distance from US policy."[36]

RECURRENT responses to my enquiries in 1978–80 among US government and business officials concerning US East–West trade policy were: "What policy?" or "We don't have a policy." A coherent policy requires objectives and some level of common understanding and agreement on how you go about achieving them. US involvement in East–West trade has not always been blessed with these elements of rational, comprehensive policy.

It is fair to say that all of the perspectives considered—their assumptions, logic, policy requirements and expected consequences —are fraught with uncertainties at best and misunderstandings and basic flaws at worst. The nature of the questions surrounding US–Soviet trade, and incomplete information about the issues, make the testing and validation of one perspective or another difficult if not impossible. In reality, none of the perspectives is likely to be completely valid. As in so many other policy areas, judgments and policy decisions will often have to be made on the basis of incomplete information, faulty understanding and personal predispositions. However, more critical consideration of these perspectives—their shortcomings, flaws and uncertainties—may ultimately contribute to a better understanding and more rational policy. Accordingly, researchers should expand their studies of the questions surrounding the issue of leverage in East–West trade. There are several questions involving the assumptions, logic and policy of all of the perspectives that are worthy of further consideration.

Some of the assumptions of the bargainers, for instance, are open to question. Are the Soviets really so dependent on trade with the US? And, are Soviet perceptions of the benefits from trade really so great as to establish a bargaining relationship? Wolf contends,

[35] Raymond Vernon, "The Fragile Foundations of East–West Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1035.

[36] Ibid. p. 1049.

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> In short, we tend to overstate the relative benefits which the Soviets derive from trade with us. . . . This quite naturally leads us to be excessively optimistic about Soviet willingness to make concessions in non-economic areas—such as human rights—in order to preserve or obtain economic advantages.[37]

Kiser's recent study indicates that the Soviets may be far more technologically sophisticated than we have thought, and more inclined and capable to develop technologies or equipment that the US may decide to deny them.[38] Holzman and Portes are also sceptical of the bargaining power of technology: "There is little economic reason to believe that any threat of restricting technology transfer to the USSR and Eastern Europe could extract significant non-economic concessions from the East."[39] Whether or not this is true, there is sufficient reason to question the assumption concerning trade, at least in the technology area, as an effective lever, and the US ability to wield influence. Recent assessments of past efforts (e.g. the Jackson-Vanik amendment) to influence Soviet policy suggest that it is difficult to make a strong case for a positive effect.[40] Also, there is evidence that such pressure can have reverse effects on Soviet policy and unintended consequences on US exporters and consumers that may not be in the national interest.

EVEN if high-level US policy-makers agree to use trade as a lever, is it possible to implement this policy politically? The necessary centralization of East–West trade policy in the US setting of bureaucratic pluralism makes this highly unlikely. Furthermore, even if the US decision-makers were to gain centralized control of their own policy, there is little reason to expect the Western allies to cooperate. And without allied cooperation, US leverage would be nil. It is also questionable whether the intended consequences of the comprehensive bargainers could be achieved. There is reason to believe that such bargaining could result in a further deterioration in US–Soviet relations with more economic benefits going to the allies. And, the uncertainties of economic diplomacy on the already reluctant US export community may lead to increased lack of interest in foreign trade. US exporters are caught in the difficult position of having to apply for export licenses and sell their technology and

[37] For a thoughtful survey of the relevant research and an attempt to assess the costs and benefits, see Thomas A. Wolf, "The Distribution of Economic Costs and Benefits in US–Soviet Trade," in US Congress, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 2 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 317–41.

[38] See the study Kiser completed for the Department of State and National Science Foundation, *The Potential for Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the United States* (Welt International, Washington, D.C., 1977); also, John Kiser, "Soviet Technology: The Perception Gap," *Mechanical Engineering*, Apr. 1979, pp. 22–9.

[39] Franklyn Holzman and Richard Portes, "The Limits of Pressure," *Foreign Policy*, 32, Fall 1978, p. 80.

[40] US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and East–West Trade* (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 75–82.

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grain under the uncertainties of constantly changing international environment.

There are also, however, theoretical flaws and lack of empirical support for some of the claims of the non-bargaining, pro-traders. This perspective assumes that trade based on economic reasons alone will be in the economic and political interests of the US. Even with the commercial expansions of the 1970s, US–Soviet trade is small and, with the exception of the agricultural sector, is not an important factor in determining the overall health of the US economy. There are other reasons for questioning the position and assumptions of the pro-traders. For example, will expanded trade with no political strings attached really have a positive influence on Soviet foreign and domestic policy? So far, the record is mixed. There is certainly reason to question whether Soviet behaviour following past increases in East–West trade was sufficiently meritorious to recommend further promotion and support of expanded trade. Moreover, there is the issue of Presidential discretion in restricting trade on moral grounds or for reasons of principle regardless of leverage. While the pro-traders would like to foreclose Presidential options, there may be good reason to provide this discretion allowing the President to act as he did in response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Finally, the anti-trade perspective reasoned that US–Soviet trade should not be pursued since it is ineffective as a lever and runs counter to US security, political and economic interests. However, even while sharing the anti-traders hostile and critical view of the Soviet Union, one could argue that trade may become a useful instrument in moderating or at least influencing Soviet behaviour in the future and should not be totally dismissed. Also, as a result of strong beliefs and incomplete data, the anti-traders are prone to overestimate Soviet benefits and underestimate US benefits resulting from trade. As the research of Kiser, Wolf and others indicates, the security, political and economic cost/benefit ratio may be more equitable than previously believed, and far more equitable than the anti-traders would have it.[41] The sizeable loss of income resulting from the January 1980 restrictions on grain exports should indicate that the US also benefits from trade. And the economic and political consequences resulting from an embargo on US–Soviet trade, together with an expansion of OECD-Soviet trade, could be particularly damaging to the US over the longer term.

WHILE it would be preferable to conclude with hard and fast answers, the complex assumptions, logic, policy, and fragmentary evidence do not lend themselves to firm conclusions. After completing a research project and review of these issues, Wolf reports:

[41] Kiser's work calls attention to the potential for profitable East to West technology transfer (see note 38) and Wolf's study surveys the research weighing the economic costs and benefits of US–Soviet trade.

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> We tentatively conclude that while on balance the USSR probably derives greater economic gains than does the United States from mutual trade and technology transfer, whatever imbalance that does exist is not so obvious and not so large as to suggest an "inequitable" distribution nor a great potential for the use of economic leverage to obtain non-economic concessions from the Soviet Union.[42]

Interestingly, there is some basis for "hope" and continuing consideration of all of the perspectives. The bargainers can argue that the Soviets still have enough at stake to be influenced by a more finely-tuned system of economic diplomacy. The non-bargaining pro-traders might contend that since leverage is fraught with problems we ought to get on with trade and attempt to do more to tip the cost/benefit balance in favour of the US. The anti-traders might find the most support for their conclusion. Since Wolf concludes that the USSR apparently derives greater economic gains and since there is not great potential for economic leverage, the anti-traders can contend that the US may as well shift its business elsewhere. As Wolf cautions, however, the evidence is fragmentary and the conclusions must be provisional.

Although recent events and public debate may seem to help us to see the issues more clearly, the evidence will always be fragmentary and the conclusions always provisional. However, on the basis of extensive interviews in Washington, Europe and Moscow these past few years, I must conclude that there are indeed real limits to US leverage. First, it should be apparent that the Soviets are not easily pressured. If the possibility of a SALT II agreement was not enough to keep them out of Afghanistan, a computer for Tass or grain for their people are unlikely to be effective levers. Unfortunately, we continue to overestimate the Soviet benefits, or perhaps more accurately, Soviet perceptions of the benefits resulting from American trade. We obviously think they need US business more than they do. Irrespective of the validity of their perceptions, Soviet decision-makers think they can get along reasonably well without it.

Finally, there is the issue of the US ability to restrict exports effectively and pursue a policy of economic diplomacy. The role of the allies and the relative lack of cooperation they have exhibited in restricting technology exports is crucial. If the Soviets can get most of what they want from the Japanese or a West European country, the power of US restrictions becomes meaningless. And although allied cooperation in controlling agricultural exports may be easier to secure, US domestic political pressures raise questions about the long-term viability of the policy. When leaders decide to use trade as a political lever, they should be very clear about their objectives, how they can effectively pursue them, and what the likely consequences will be both to themselves and their perceived adversaries.

[42] Wolf, p. 338.

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East–West Strategic Trade Control: Crumbling Consensus?

John R. McIntyre
Richard T. Cupitt

IN a time of expanding East–West trade, the question has been raised whether it makes sense for the West to ban the sale of certain strategic commodities to communist destinations while, at the same time, making efforts to expand the sale of other commodities. The further question has been raised that if it does make sense to control technology transfer to the East, in view of recent events in Afghanistan, can agreement be secured among Western countries on the derivation of a common list of restricted commodities?

The policy problems raised by the transfer of technology from West to East are numerous, difficult to evaluate and subject to frequently contradictory interpretations. Nor are they by any means novel. Debates on the advantages and dangers of trade with Russia, according to George Kennan, were "a serious problem as early as the days of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy."[1] It is well to remember the declaration made in 1920 by Kamenev, then Deputy Chairman of the Soviet government, that "foreign capital will fulfill the role Marx predicted for it . . . capital will be digging its own grave."[2] The echo of this sentence has prompted many in the West to substitute the word "technology" for "capital" in the context of the period since the second world war. Lenin agreed with the remark and put it even more picturesquely, noting that capitalists would sell communists the ropes with which to hang themselves. Since Lenin uttered these words, the Soviets have not only considerably muted their tone and rhetoric but have made tremendous progress in the mastery of technology and its applications to strategic warfare.

By the time of the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 we find some clear indications that the sustained importation of foreign technology had become an acceptable part of Soviet industrial development strategy.[3] This approach to technology transfer differs markedly from that of the Stalinist period, characterized by massive, gap-closing, one time raids on world markets. Some experts contend that 1966 is truly a watershed since it marks both the formal Soviet endorsement of a conscious policy of technology transfer from the West and, at the

[1] Quoted in George F. Kennan, *Russia and West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1961), p. 187.

[2] Ibid. p. 187.

[3] *XXIII S"ezd KPSS, Stenografischeskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 2, see pp. 60–62.

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same time, the acceptance of a "Euro-centric" policy of *détente*.[4] The simultaneous occurrence of these two policies has significant implications. Technology transfer control policy is therefore not only a central issue of East–West trade relations but also of intra-Western alliance relations, as the West attempts to carve a proper response to the Eastern bloc based on some form of consensus.

In this article we give a retrospective view of the evolution and derivation of the Western international trade control list from its inception in 1949 up to the present list review. We provide a historical and an institutional perspective on Western multilateral technology transfer policy, highlighting some of the dynamics of the Coordinating Committee—the little-known mechanism designed to facilitate negotiation of the list—as Allied countries tangle with the problem of joint decision-making on a sensitive issue.

COCOM[5] (Coordinating Committee) is the informal, multilateral organization whereby the United States, its NATO allies (excepting Iceland), and Japan coordinate their national policies on the export of strategic items to the East.

COCOM does not deal directly with the exporters. It is an informal government-to-government mechanism, imbued with the norms of secrecy and strict confidentiality that characterize most intra-Western relations in matters of strategic importance. It has no strict legal basis in treaty law and is considered by some as non-binding. This unofficial status makes the COCOM forum particularly vulnerable to internal strains, occasioned by the differing perceptions and interests of its sovereign members. However, the informal agreements which have evolved over the years are regarded as international commitments. Its basic function is to coordinate the national export controls of its members, with the objective of parallel administration to ensure that no Western country undercuts the embargo policies of its allies by making the same strategic goods available to a potential enemy.

This objective is accomplished in three basic ways: (1) triannual negotiation of a detailed list defining items which all agree should be subject to control, pursuant to strategic criteria for inclusion or exclusion; (2) weekly review of proposed exceptions from this list through the use of precedents, interpretive notes, and factors for exceptions, and (3) consultation on enforcement, as the COCOM system is not binding and can only be enforced through the domestic legislations of the member countries.

Certain goods are restricted to most communist destinations, which is understood to include the USSR, Eastern Europe, the People's

[4] See, for example, Professor Peter Wiles, "On the Prevention of Technology Transfer," in NATO, Colloquium, *East–West Technological Cooperation* (NATO, Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, Mar. 1976), pp. 23–39.

[5] Generally, for sources on COCOM, see Department of State, *The Battle Act Reports*, 1950–73.

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Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, etc. However, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Vietnam are excluded. When COCOM began to operate on 1 January 1950, its original membership consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. In early 1950, Norway, Denmark, Canada and West Germany joined, soon to be followed by Portugal in 1952 and Japan, Greece and Turkey in 1953. Non-members in Western Europe include Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, Austria, Finland, Spain and Ireland which chose not to compromise their neutrality. It should therefore be noted that most COCOM members are also NATO members. Among the non-members, Sweden and Switzerland are recognized as major alternative channels for some COCOM controlled items and therefore represent a potential uncontrolled source of technology transfer to communist destinations, though these two countries are often bound by re-export controls imposed by the US.

AT the height of the Cold War, the United States and its allies subscribed to a policy of offensive economic warfare against the Soviet Union and its satellites, with the declared purpose of limiting communist countries' military and economic potential. Hence not only were military goods specifically embargoed but many basic industrial commodities also came under the ban on the theory that these would build the economic base of the communist war machine. But the United States gradually abandoned its economic warfare policy in favour of a "qualified free trade approach," [6] which no longer tried to restrict Soviet "resource-freeing" gains from East–West trade but was aimed at delaying Soviet "capability enhancement" [7] in advanced technology. The former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, noted that "a fact of the contemporary situation which is quite different from any previous period is that there is no necessary relationship between economic strength and military strength." [8] While a strong industrial base is essential in conventional wars, it might not necessarily be decisive in the context of a global atomic conflict. Preparedness for such a conflict rests largely on scientific research and only a few highly specialized branches of industry. Additionally, no reasonably industrialized country, like the USSR, conscious of the hostility of the rest of the industrialized world, would seriously base its defensive or offensive capability on supplies from a potential adversary. COCOM thus moved from a "qualified embargo" to a selective "control" approach.

It can be said that the current goal of export control policy is not

[6] G. K. Bertsch, "US Export Controls in the 1970s: Policy, Organization and Performance," *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1980.

[7] These two concepts are more fully developed in R. Klitgaard's *National Security and Export Controls*, Rand Report No. 189–1, pp. 32–35, and App. A, Apr. 1974.

[8] H. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper Brothers, New York, 1973), p. 2.

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to deny the Soviet bloc technology but rather to delay its acquisition so that the West will retain a "time lead" and the "technological gap" will continue to exist.[9] It is in particular the "technology of the factory" in which the West has a lead over the Soviet bloc. Thus, it is in the area of peak or advanced technology such as large computers, microprocessors, numerically controlled machines, etc., that controls are critical if the so-called technological (*qua* strategic) gap theory is going to be maximized.

The effectiveness of such a selective control policy is hard to evaluate. Clearly, the issues raised in attempting to assess the impact of East–West technology transfers on recipient countries are closely tied not only to the goals of a control system but also to its viability.[10] Three fundamental points should be underlined in this regard. First, the economic impact of technology transfer in recipient countries is difficult to assess. Too little is known for any comprehensive and probing statements to be made. Secondly, technology transfers must be assessed on their individual merits in the recipient country's particular economic sector. Thirdly, the economic effect on the recipient country depends primarily on its ability to absorb, diffuse and make productive use of the technology transferred. Each of these questions has yielded, in the literature, a variety of conflicting interpretations. To attempt to answer them, one must first agree on the meaning of technology. So far, no satisfactory all-purpose definition of technology, as distinct from products and science, can be applied to export controls in a realistic operational agreement among the COCOM partners. Moreover, agreements must be secured on the existence of gaps or blind spots in the country subject to controls. In the case of the Soviet Union, Kiser has noted that it may be ahead in many fields and that many perceived gaps may be illusory.[11]

Soviet researchers have admittedly made enormous strides in narrowing the scientific gaps with the West. In some cases, such as

[9] A more current, though conservative, view of the purpose of controls is expounded Samuel P. Huntington in "Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, in which the author makes a strong case for linkage of trade to diplomacy goals. F. Holzman and R. Portes in "The Limits of Pressure," and John W. Kiser in "What Gap? Which Gap?" *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, make the opposite argument and point out that the small amount of East–West trade does not allow its credible use for diplomatic leverage.

[10] On the broad question of technology transfer policy between West and East, see US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Issues in East–West Commercial Relations, A Compendium of Papers* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1979); Friedrick Levcik and J. Stankovsky, *Industrial Cooperation Between East–West* (M. E. Sharpe, White Plains, N.Y., 1979); John R. Thomas and Ursula Kruse-Vaucienne, Eds., *Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives* (George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1977); US Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, *The Technology Balance: US–USSR Advanced Technology Transfer*, Parts I and II (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1973); US Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Export Policy*, Part 7; "Oversight on US High Technology Exports" (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1978). See also, *Survey*, Special Issue on Soviet Science and Technology, Spring 1977–78, Vol. 23, No. 2.

[11] John Kiser, "Technology Gap?" *Mechanical Engineering*, Apr. 1979.

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physics of fusion, mathematics, etc., they may be ahead of the West. Considering that the USSR spends 3·4 per cent of its gross national product on research and development, compared with 2·2 per cent for the US, this is not a complete surprise. Still, the Soviet Union, by most accounts, is plagued by major problems, some of which are endemic to the very system of centralized planning, with science a national priority. Since most Soviet scientific research is done under military auspices, Western analysts can only guess about Soviet progress in controversial areas like lasers and electron beams, so essential to the creation of an anti-satellite satellite. However, in dual end-use technology, the record may be easier to assess.

Soviet interests in Western technology, as demonstrated by Communist Party pronouncements, by the KGB's First Chief Directorate's top external priority of gathering Western technology secrets to avoid costly parallel domestic research, and by the constant Soviet procurement efforts throughout the West imply that they have a long way to go.

Blind spots or technology gaps in which the West has significant leads are generally acknowledged to include: laboratory instrumentation, computer technology, pharmaceuticals, plastics and chemicals, transport and telecommunications, metal-working machinery as well as molecular biology and oil drilling technology. Still, some argue that the most effective embargo against the Soviets would be an embargo on wheat as opposed to technology.[12] The Soviets cannot produce wheat if there is a bad harvest, but they can always manufacture equipment, however primitive, even though central state planning and scientific discovery are not exactly compatible.

Disagreements on the effectiveness of the embargo within the Western Alliance are common. Two leading specialists, Adler-Karlsson and Sutton, argue, on the one hand, that the COCOM embargo is ineffective, though from radically different perspectives.[13] Sutton blames the system's laxity and underlines that the record of the last 50 years indicates that the Soviet Union has taken unfair advantage of Western technology. While Adler-Karlsson attacks the very policy itself, Carrick and Wiles, on the other hand, feel that the COCOM embargo has been relatively effective and successful.[14] This assessment is based on being able to distinguish the " economic warfare " type of embargo, aimed at denying outright as much trade as can conceivably be of any help to a potential adversary, from a policy of delaying the communist acquisition of strategic technology where a technology gap can be ascertained. Carrick and Wiles's sense of

[12] Marie Lavigne, *Les Relations Economiques Est-Ouest* (Paris, 1979), pp. 73–7.

[13] G. Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare, 1947–1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy* (Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1968) and Anthony Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917–1965* (3 vols; Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA., 1968–73).

[14] See R. J. Carrick, *East–West Technology Transfer in Perspective* (Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, CA., 1978), pp. 31–8, and P. Wiles, op. cit.

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effectiveness is thus a more modest one and perhaps more to the point than that of Sutton and others.

Using such an argument, one is compelled to recognize that the Soviet computer industry, for example, is indeed well behind that of the West and that, though the gap fluctuates, it does not narrow. In a recent paper, Amman summarizes the work of many researchers and concludes that in most of the technologies studied "there is no evidence of a substantial diminution of the technological gap between the USSR and the West in the past 15–20 years, either at the prototype/commercial application stages or in the diffusion of advanced technology." [15] Such findings are either indicative of the relative effectiveness of the West's control policy or of inadequate Soviet technological absorption, utilization and diffusion or possibly both.

The difficulties associated with evaluating the transfer policy is further compounded by the simple fact that no simple definition or criteria for a "strategic" commodity exists. The complexity of the concept is well illustrated in the Serpukhov computer case when a British request for an exception to the COCOM controls was first denied by the US bureaucracy, then as a result of high-level British political pressures the United States reconsidered, using a different concept of what "strategic" meant and authorized the sale.[16]

Barring certain single-use military goods, the concept of a "strategic good" is therefore somewhat arbitrary and subjective. Adler-Karlsson notes that one of the essential features in the making of Western export control policy has been "reduced to the search for a mutually acceptable compromise about what is, and what is not, a strategic commodity." [17] Thus, the list review process is a recurrent bargaining within an informal alliance of Western nations as to what is the smallest common denominator on the meaning of "strategic."

In list review negotiations the American position has predictably been far more exacting and has therefore tended to include a wider range of goods under the notion of "strategic," while the Western European and Japanese positions, for a multiplicity of reasons (both economic and political), have been far less stringent and far less inclusive. The development of the constantly evolving policy is reflected in list changes (additions, deletions, relaxations, and strengthening of items). It can be conceptualized into a movement along what has been called a S-NS axis (strategic–non-strategic): [18]

[15] R. Amann, "Soviet Technological Performance," *Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1977–78), p. 71, and also R. Amann et al., eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT., 1977), especially Chap. 2.

[16] See H. Margolis, *Technical Advice on Policy Issues* (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973), pp. 20–21. H. Meyer in "Helping the Soviet Union to Avoid an Energy Crisis," *Fortune*, 29 Jan. 1979, pp. 91–5, also illustrates the ubiquitous meaning of "strategic" by pointing out that denying the Soviets certain peak technology (i.e. oil drilling equipment) may be deleterious to US and Western interests.

[17] G. Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. p. 2; and see also Josef Wilczynski, "Does the Western Strategic Embargo Work?" *The American Review of East–West Trade*, July 1968.

[18] Ibid.

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

The axis assumes that we can array all the commodities from S to NS in accordance with decreasing importance. The commodities which all COCOM partners are agreed upon are likely to be located close to the S-extreme of the axis. Those which all agree to be of low strategic importance, like chewing gum, are likely to be at the NS end of the axis. It is items located toward the middle of the axis (dual-use goods) over which disagreements among COCOM partners are likely to occur.

An analysis of current attitudes of key COCOM partners (the UK, Japan, West Germany, France and the US) as regards the legitimacy of the US role in COCOM, their overall approach to East-West technology transfer and their perceived utility for the COCOM mechanism sheds much light on the differing perceptions, interests of the sovereign members and the difficulties they incur in reaching some form of policy consensus. The table overleaf systematizes research findings on these three subjects.

SINCE the COCOM list is confidential, if not secret, and since it can only be enforced vis-à-vis the exporters once embodied in a national instrument, it is useful to elucidate the interrelationships among the three major kinds of lists that have shaped the contours of Western export control policy: the international list (COCOM), the US and Western national lists and the Battle Act lists.

A. The COCOM Lists

The COCOM list is a series of three international lists agreed upon by COCOM members on the basis of unanimity. It is essentially made up of three basic lines of products which are broadly taken as indicating the communist bloc's vulnerability or technology gaps:

1. an atomic energy list which includes sources and fissionable materials, nuclear reactors and their components etc.;
2. a munitions list which includes items ranging from rifles to torpedos to aircraft; and
3. an industrial commercial list which is likely to include, in broad terms, the following commodity groups (each item is likely to cover a broad array of products and intensity of coverage is constantly changing): [19]

[19] This breakdown follows the 12 Apr. 1976 Revised US Battle Act Lists, EADAC, D-152/30, 5 Feb. 1977, issued by the Department of State, which is reputed to be substantially the same as the COCOM list itself. It is interesting to note that software technology in which the United States is said to have a substantial research and development lead is not COCOM controlled.

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An Analysis of US and Key Allies Views concerning COCOM and Technology Transfer to the East *

	US Role in COCOM	*General Approach to East–West Technology Transfer Trade*	*Utility of COCOM Mechanism*
US	The US views itself as a primary mover behind multilateral technology transfer policy. It finds itself in a dilemma: pleading for stricter controls in a time of expanding trade while having lost much of its traditional leverage with its Western trading partners.	A certain ambivalence characterizes US policy towards technology transfer to the East. The basic US approach, designed at the height of the cold war, emphasizes security considerations and underplays economic or commercial ones. It is a cumbersome, sometimes confusing, approach, reflecting internal conflicting interests between business and government and within the government. The US, unlike its Western partners, perceives many technology gaps between the West and the East.	COCOM is viewed as essential to seal off "foreign availability" without which the US internal control system is ineffective. There is also a perception that major COCOM allies are more liberal and that "unfair competition" takes place through the COCOM mechanism.
West Germany	Inconsistencies in US policies, as illustrated by changes of mind concerning the Sperry-Univac computer export licence, as well as delays in re-export licences have caused some unhappiness with the US.	The policy of *Osthandel* (trade with the East) favors a depoliticization of trade and eschews negative linkage (i.e. "punish the Soviet bloc"). It proffers a policy of positive linkage (i.e. better relations between the two Germanies and decreased tension in Berlin, etc.). The Eastern bloc is a natural and desirable market for German manufacturers, excepting the sales of military items. Imports from the USSR to West Germany, and the EEC, show a prevalence of fuel, oil and raw materials.	No one in Bonn questions the need to embargo exports of military technology. COCOM, however, must be reformed and made less cumbersome. Technological progress within the Eastern bloc must be reflected on the control list.

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France	The French feel that some hypocrisy may well prevail in COCOM in the form of commercial rivalries between members. They view US policy as a vestige of the cold war, "against the spirit of *détente*."	France's approach is determined by its overall foreign policy stance: a strong, independent policy free from "American hegemony." East–West trade must be depoliticized and support is given to increased trade with the communist bloc in almost all goods, by a broad range of means. France, like West Germany and other EEC countries, enters into "technology-for-outputs" deals with the Soviet bloc. A relationship based on complementarity of economic needs seems to be taking hold.	An overall negative attitude prevails as regards COCOM attempts to limit dual-use technology exports. However, COCOM's usefulness is acknowledged in checking weapons exports. The French would prefer to make COCOM a loosely structured framework to avoid case-by-case review.
Japan	Japan has historically been willing to adhere to COCOM and to follow the US lead. The importance of the American political and military umbrella to Japanese security has guaranteed this adherence. It is by no means certain Japan will continue to accept COCOM controls in its trade with the USSR and the PRC in the future.	Japan's economic recovery has generated new areas of competition between itself and the Western nations for communist bloc markets (e.g. large computers). The current Japanese policy framework stems more from commercial than strategic considerations (e.g. Japan's shipbuilding industry wants a liberalization of trade controls with the East). East–West technology transfer is not a public debate. The policy is set through ongoing, informal consultations between the Japanese government and business.	COCOM fits well with Japan's efforts at "even handedness" towards PRC and USSR. The unresolved Northern Territories dispute inclines the Japanese to be cautious in dealing with the Soviets. At this time, there is no effective domestic coalition pushing for the elimination of COCOM.
UK	UK values its membership in NATO and prizes its close relationship with the US. As a result the UK is not adverse to cooperating with US initiatives in COCOM. This special relationship sometimes conflicts with UK economic interests in expanding trade with the East.	The British approach to technology transfer with communist nations more closely resembles the West German approach. The British share the French view that trade and politics are often separable. Exports of clear military or strategic use should be banned. Britain, however, has pushed ahead with certain military exports to the PRC.	As in Bonn, everyone in London agrees on the need for a multilateral mechanism to coordinate Western technology transfers to the East. The proper scope of coverage of the mechanism, however, is viewed somewhat more leniently than in Washington.

* This table is based on information assembled by the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment on the attitudes of Western European and Japanese business and government officials concerning East–West trade and COCOM. See US Congress, OTA, *Technology and East–West Trade* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1979), pp. 160–6.

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(a) metal working machinery (i.e. numerically controlled machines);
(b) chemical and petroleum equipment;
(c) electrical and power-generating equipment;
(d) general industrial equipment;
(e) transportation equipment;
(f) electronic and precision instruments;
(g) metals, minerals and their manufactures; and
(h) chemicals and metalloids.

The industrial/commercial list is by far the most controversial and the most subject to periodic changes during the list reviews since many industrial-commercial commodities can be said to have a dual end-use with both military and civilian application (e.g. air traffic control equipment, jet engines, computers) while the other two lists' items have clear and generally recognized military uses and are thus not subject to much debate on their strategic importance. In addition to these three substantive lists, there are various levels of enforcement. From 1950 to 1957 a separate embargo list, known as the CHINCOM (China Committee) list was kept for China. In 1957 the "China differential" was eliminated and the same controls now apply to both the Soviet Union and the PRC.

B. The National Lists

1. *US Lists.*[20] The first control lists were the national ones. In the late 1940s, when the United States decided to include trade restrictions in its arsenal of Cold War weaponry, it used what was known as the American Positive List (positive, in the sense that it specified embargoed commodities.) This list is now known as the US Commodity Control List (CCL).[21] The CCL includes all of the industrial and commercial entries of the international COCOM list(s) and, in addition, it includes what have become known in US practice as "unilateral controls," which are commodities controlled only by virtue of domestic legislation and rule-making. Several CCL items are controlled for foreign policy purposes rather than for pure strategic reasons, such as crime control and detection equipment. American businesses feel that Western competitors may profit commercially from the US restrictive policy by securing orders that might otherwise have gone to US-based firms.

The American CCL, as of 1 September 1978, contained a total of 207 entries, of which 123 were COCOM controlled and the balance, to all intents and purposes, was unilaterally controlled by the United

[20] For a thorough and succinct general review of US legislation on unilateral export controls, see G. Holliday and J. Hardt, *Export Controls*, Issue Brief Number IB 75003 (The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1978).

[21] The Commodity Control List is published and updated regularly and can be found at 15 C.F.R. Parts 399.1–2. The regulations governing its application are found at 15 C.F.R. 368–98. The list is promulgated administratively in pursuance of the Export Administration Act of 1979.

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States.[22] In addition, the CCL restricts underlying technology embodied in an end product or technical data. Multilateral entries must obtain both the clearance of the US government and of COCOM.

2. *Other COCOM Members Lists.* COCOM countries also have their own individual national embargo lists. These lists have taken two main forms, either an open list specifying which goods require a license [23] or an inverse list, including goods which are presumably free for exportation. Such an approach, compounded by translation problems, has the effect of making cross comparisons of national lists for enforcement difficult. Negative lists also afford certain Western governments the advantage of concealing what items are really controlled.

It can be assumed that all 15 negative or positive national lists are adjusted in accordance with the COCOM's international list review and modifications. This process of national adjustment is subject to the domestic policies of each COCOM partner. COCOM is not appreciated equally among the partners. In fact, the very name of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Controls) was even considered confidential in the early stages and some officials in Western Europe for a long time denied the very existence of such an arrangement. The reasons for this state of affairs is two-fold: (a) political opposition in countries like Italy or France might become strident if the COCOM arrangements were divulged in any detail and brought to the attention of the press; (b) in addition, the internal constitutional and legal regimes of some of the participating countries may well be incompatible with the COCOM controls.[24]

C. The U.S. Battle Act Lists

The Battle Act, now a part of the overhauled US Export Administration Act of 1979, is the major legislative basis for the coordination of US export control policy with the policies of its Western allies. The Battle Act has been considered by many as the symbolic teeth

[22] Interview with Mr Charles Swanson, former head of the Operations Division of the Office of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, in Dec. 1978.

[23] For example, see for the British list " Consolidated List of Goods Subject to Security Export Control," *British Board of Trade and Industry Journal*, 30 Apr. 1976, pp. 301–27, which is handled by the Commercial Relations and Export Division (CRE4) of the Department of Trade at Dean Bradley House, 52 Horseferry Road, London, SW1P 2AG, United Kingdom. For the French list, see " Avis aux importateurs relatif aux marchandises soumises au controle de la destination finale," *Journal Officiel*, 31 Dec. 1961, pp. 12516 ff., and also *Journal Officiel* of 14 July 1977. In the case of Canada, authority for controls is derived from the Export and Import Permits Act of 1 June 1954, as amended on 7 May 1974. Controls are administered by the Export and Import Permits Division, Office of Special Import Policy, Canadian Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa.

[24] See G. Adler-Karlsson, " International Economic Power: The US Strategic Embargo " (1972) 6 *Journal of World Trade Law* 501. Adler-Karlsson notes that a Japanese court forced the issue of COCOM controls into a public parliamentary debate by challenging COCOM's legality. See p. 504.

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for indirect enforcement of the informal COCOM arrangement. The Act provides that all US military, economic, or financial assistance be denied to any nation that knowingly permits shipment of goods to the communist bloc which appear in the Battle Act Lists. Category B exports can be exempted from the termination-of-aid clause by presidential determination. Category A exports usually mean automatic termination of US aid, though no US aid has ever been terminated because of the Act. The US Congress probably intended the Battle Act lists to be tailored on the American CCL, but the Administrator of the Act chose to base it mainly on the COCOM lists thus avoiding many disputes with Western European governments.

A test of the Act came in July 1952 when Denmark delivered an oil tanker to the USSR listed under Category B. The President chose to exercise his right of exemption and from that point on many are of the opinion that "the threat to deny aid under the Battle Act ceased to operate." [25] As most of the COCOM member governments no longer receive US aid, the US Battle Act has lost its practical significance.

THERE are three major foci of decision-making for the international list review process. They are sequentially related as the review process involves a synchronization of each of the COCOM partner's proposals for list changes (which usually emanate from their domestic bureaucracies) with the more encompassing process of government-to-government bargaining in the informal alliance forum provided by COCOM.

A. The United States

It should first be stressed that the US government decision-making process regarding the general field of export control decision-making is highly intricate. The process for arriving at US positions for COCOM list review purposes involves cumbersome and time-consuming interagency coordination within the bureaucracy as well as consultation with technical experts both in the private and public sectors.

Under the Battle Act, responsibility for US participation in COCOM is vested in the Secretary of State who is designated the Battle Act Administrator. This responsibility is specifically delegated to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. Many government agencies participate and inter-agency coordination is effected through what is known as the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC). It is chaired by the State Department and includes representatives of the Departments of Commerce, Defense,

[25] D. Abshire and R. Allen, eds., *National Security, Political Military and Economic Strategy in the Decade Ahead* (Praeger, New York, 1963), p. 661.

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and Energy and the CIA, among others. Bureaucratic disagreements are known to take place.

B. Other COCOM Partners

The decision-making process of each of the COCOM partners is different from that of the United States in a number of senses: [26] (a) the secrecy of proposals is far greater and fewer officials participate; (b) little public information is available in these countries on the mechanism used or the governmental or industry participants involved; (c) by and large, industry there has tended to be a much more central participant in the process than in the United States; (d) the role of Foreign Trade Ministries is emphasized while the role of Defence Ministries is underplayed as against the United States where the Department of Defense plays a central role, though the British Ministry of Defence regularly participates; (e) few bureaucrats are delegated to handle COCOM problems, unlike the United States where there is a large and specialized export control bureaucracy; and (f) the level of expertise is not as sophisticated in terms of exploring all the strategic implications of controlling and of decontrolling.

The basic difference, however, between the COCOM partners and the United States relates to the attitudes regarding list extensions. It is the perception of other "COCOM partners that the United States is the more conservative of the members at the table in striking the balance between national security and trade interests." [27] While the COCOM partners' attitude is characterized by a "broad negative view towards all extensions and a positive view towards all reductions of these lists." [28]

C. Within COCOM

The organizational framework for COCOM was established on 22 November 1949 when an international embargo list was first agreed upon. It started functioning in 1950 and is still active today in spite of many internal and external challenges to the arrangement. Early on it became known as CG-COCOM—the Consultative Group at a high level and its operational Coordinating Committee. Meetings are held in Paris and the Coordinating Committee meets once a week, while the CG has not met since 1958 and should be considered as

[26] This part of the paper draws from S. D. Cohen, "Chapter VIII: Comparative International Economic Policy Making," *The Making of US International Economic Policy* (Praeger, New York, 1977) and R. Starr, ed., *East-West Business Transactions* (Praeger, New York, 1974) as well as from "Trade Controls of CoCom Countries," in House Hearings, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, "Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review," 11, 15, 24, 30 Mar. 1976 (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 261–72.

[27] Statement by William Barraclough, Department of State, in House Hearings, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, "Export Licensing: CoCom List Review Proposals of the US," 14, 26 June 1978 (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 111.

[28] Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. 1968, p. 62.

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no longer in existence. Members are usually permanently assigned to the Paris Embassy of their respective countries. Americans send foreign service officers, while most other COCOM members have trade-oriented members. When a list review is under way, the membership is increased and technical experts participate, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the particular topic. It is doubtful that any written document establishing the organizational framework exists. The structure has gradually evolved and has largely taken the form of a "gentleman's agreement" which may explain the general wonder that it is still active today.

The voting rule governing deliberations is one of unanimity. Some participants would prefer majority voting. However, no decision is made without obtaining a consensus of all the member states present. In general, a core of five "participating" members is present at all meetings. The others attend irregularly. This rule is necessary for a number of reasons: (a) for multilateral controls to be effective, as many of the states possessing the embargoed commodities as possible must participate in the implementation of the policy; (b) since no treaty mechanism specifies decision rules as for the UN charter or the charter of many international or regional organizations, it becomes essential not to antagonize any of the participating states lest they might leave; and (c) the consensus rule guarantees that disagreements will not be circulated outside of COCOM.

Generally speaking, major revisions of the lists in the last few years have occurred every three years. They used to be far more frequent in the 1960s. This, however, does not exclude ad hoc reviews which also concern definitional problems such as parameters or characteristics of a particular list item. As a technology frontier changes and is pushed up and, for example, in the area of computer hardware, the evolution is constant, new parameters must be approved.

Trade exception requests to the list are considered every week and also require the unanimous consent of all present COCOM partners. In many a case the member's exception request must be referred to the COCOM home governments for final review, though COCOM representatives have a certain amount of delegation for certain commodity lines. Final disposition lies with COCOM and only the submitting government can implement the decision by issuing or denying the license.

The procedures for the list review consist of a series of original proposals made by members, counter proposals filed by interested members, revised proposals and proposals for consistency if there is a lack of consistency between two or more proposals.[29] Strict timetables govern the making of these proposals.

The last list review began on 2 October 1978 and was completed in the spring of 1980. The review process is divided up in two rounds

[29] In House Hearings, op. cit. 1978, pp. 85–6.

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and overall time for the rounds should not exceed 10 months of negotiations. However, the last list review was extended for another 10 months. This is an indication of the range of issues considered and of the difficulty to reach agreement.

The revised list becomes effective for COCOM purposes 60 days after a draft of the recorded item changes is circulated. It is then up to each member country to make the relevant changes in its national list.

Three sets of issues arise during the list review in determining which items ought to be controlled or decontrolled. First, the strategic nature of the item and its military applications as we saw earlier are the subject of much contention. These issues relate to the underlying approach and political constraints of each member.

Secondly, agreement as to the existence or non-existence of foreign availability sources outside the COCOM system which are not subject to any form of export controls is also critical in determining what to include in the list. Clearly, if the Soviets can procure an item from Sweden or Switzerland, which are not in the COCOM system, then it becomes rather self-defeating for COCOM to control the item. Substantial disagreements occur between the United States and other COCOM members regarding this issue.

Thirdly, since the publication of the US Defense Science Board Report in February 1976 (otherwise known as the Bucy Report) [30] there has been a controversy as to whether products should be controlled on the basis of their end-use or on the basis of the underlying, embodied technologies contained therein. The Bucy Report stated that certain technologies are revolutionary [31] and as such should be controlled. The US Defense Department has attempted to devise a list of critical technologies,[32] without as yet any great success. The general view among the allies probably is that one cannot separate technology from product, without an agreed definition, and that attempting to switch from end product to technology control will aggravate COCOM's problems.

Finally, countries of destination within the Soviet bloc are also subject to a review process of sorts, though it has never been a major area for COCOM debate. The policies have prescribed a limited differential treatment on certain commodity lines for Poland and Rumania, as is the case for credit and most favoured nations trading policies with the East. The implicit theory behind such a differential

[30] Prepared statement of J. Fred Bucy, Chairman, Texas Instruments, in Task Force on Export of US Technology, Defense Science Board, " Highlights of the Final Report on Export of US Technology," House Hearings, op. cit. 1976, pp. 220–31.

[31] See House Hearings, op. cit. 1976, pp. 216–19, for an explanation of concept.

[32] See " Interim DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of United States Technology," a 26 Aug. 1977 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense and " List of Critical Technologies for Export Control," a 29 Sept. 1977 memorandum from Dr R. M. Davis, Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Research and Advanced Technology), Department of Defense.

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treatment is a three-fold attempt to break down the monolithic COMECON trading system, to establish bilateral economic dependencies, and to encourage foreign policies independent of that of the USSR.

AS COCOM attempts to restrict advanced technology transfers to the East, the primary activity of the group centres on defining which technology is covered by the term "strategic." Three alternative propositions describe the dynamics of the international control list changes which can be viewed as the primary output of the system over time.

These three alternative propositions, though not necessarily incompatible, are as follows:

1. The perceived level of general political East–West tension interacts with the overall economic conditions and might therefore account for list changes. In other words, the movement from the cold war mentality characterized by the McCarthy era to a general relaxation of relations brought about under the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of the early 1970s should be reflected in a reduction of controlled items. The lesser the international level of tension, the shorter the list. This proposition addresses the concerns of deterrence scholars like Russett and Fink who hold that the viability of an economic relationship often rests on a concommitant political or strategic relationship and that any change in one should be mirrored in the other.[33]

2. Adler-Karlsson proposes that the general political-economic relationship may not be as influential in determining the coverage of the control list. Rather, he postulates a "Machiavellian hypothesis" where "the greater the laxity of implementation, the less the reluctance to agree to long embargo lists for those who were against the regulations but, at the same time, heavily pressed at least formally to agree to them."[34] Indeed, this logic, devoid of its sinister implications, simply holds that as long as the Japanese and the Western Europeans can find mechanisms (i.e. trade exception requests and "leakage") to "circumvent" the control list, they will not expend energy to change US COCOM proposals or challenge the need for COCOM.

3. Another possible explanation holds that changes in the list simply mirror changes in the technology frontier of commodity lines. Some items lose their strategic importance and are dropped while new ones acquire a new strategic relevance and are added. The process is therefore purely technological and negates explanation 1 or 2 as above stated. For example, Klitgaard indicates that with the advent of

[33] See, for example, Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence" (1963) 7 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 97–109 and Clinton F. Fink, "More Calculations of Deterrence" (1965) 9 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54–65.

[34] Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. p. 56.

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so-called "smart weapons," certain commodity lines like microprocessors and computers gain a special strategic relevance.[35]

TO assess the relative value of our three contending explanations requires the identification of what specific changes have occurred in COCOM controls and their application. This can be done in three ways: by tracing the evolution of the number of items on the embargo list itself, by indicating the degree of flexibility of the list through the number and volume of exception requests, and by assessing the extent of "leakage," either overt or covert. All three approaches present enormous quantification and data access problems.

A. Scope of Control Lists

Confidentiality prevents an exhaustive analysis of the changes that the list has undergone during each of its reviews (i.e. additions, deletions, strengthenings, relaxations). This effectively precludes testing proposition three which would require access to the minutes of deliberations containing the technological rationale used for removal or addition. The specific contents of the COCOM list is generally considered classified and confidential by member countries. But it is often virtually identical to the national lists. A variety of reasons is adduced to justify this secrecy. Some feel that the list can be used by the Soviets to target their R & D development efforts and to focus their industrial espionage efforts more accurately.

A crude measure, at best, of the variation in the list can be inferred from simply counting the number of items added or deleted. Table I represents the evolution of the list based on 15 observations over the past 30 years or so.

Four significant watersheds occur in Table I. The first two, between 1949–51 and in 1954, mark the beginning and the end of the Korean War, as well as the death of Stalin, heralding some changes in East–West relations. It has been suggested that both changes resulted not only from the relaxation of tension but also from increased pressures by the European members of COCOM to decrease the definition of strategic goods to the barest minimum, though the United States wished to retain a far more restrictive control policy, as indicated by its stricter unilateral embargo controls.[36]

The third break in the data occurs between the period 1958–64 and masks many significant moments in East–West relations: the launching of *sputnik*, the Berlin Wall and Cuban missile crises, the subsequent strengthening of US unilateral controls in 1962 and the first of the major wheat deals in 1963. However, the missing data for the period discourages the drawing of conclusions.

[35] Robert E. Klitgaard, "Limiting Exports on National Security Grounds," App. K, Vol. 4, *Report of the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., June 1975), p. 464.

[36] Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. pp. 89–99.

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Table I

Number of Items on the COCOM Embargo List

List as of:	*No. of Items*	*Added*	*Deleted*	*Strengthened*	*Relaxed*
Nov. 49	86				
Nov. 51	270				
Jan. 52	285				
Mar. 54	266				
Aug. 54	170				
Mar. 58	181	(elimination of the China Differential, 1957)			
Apr. 61		3?	6		
July 62		5?	5?	17	22
June 64	150?	8	4	5	
Aug. 65	161			25*	36
Mar. 67				2	8
Sept. 69	156			37	67
Sept. 72	151				
Mar. 76	149	2	4	—	—
June 80	—	7	7	—	—

* 16 of these items were also relaxed.

Sources: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the US Senate, Mar. 1956; Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947–1967*; Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 1976; US Department of State, *Battle Act Reports*, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970; *US Federal Register*, 25 June 1980, p. 43011.

Perhaps the most damaging criticism against using the number of items as an indicator of restrictiveness is that the scope of an item varies, depending on the technological state of the art at the time of the review. Klitgaard has described the COCOM list as being reduced by 40 per cent in 1968–69, and by another 30 per cent in 1971–72.[37] The change in the number of items on the list clearly does not reflect this reduction, but the great number of items subject to relaxed restrictions occurs in the fourth major break in 1969 and hints at such a movement. The Battle Act Report of 1972 also notes that more changes were made to relax coverage than to strengthen it in the 1971–72 list review.[38] According to a US Administration statement, since the late 1960s " changes in list reviews are now seldom dramatic," and most of the changes are focused on " modernizing the technical descriptions to reflect technological progress." [39]

Another feature of the alteration of the COCOM control list involves the general shift in the type of commodities included. The most discernible trend is towards computers and electronic techno-

[37] Klitgaard, op. cit. p. 446.

[38] US Department of State, *The Battle Act Report 1972*, 25th Report to Congress (USGPO, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1973), p. 1.

[39] See US Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, *Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 53.

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logy. By 1962, the majority of review actions taken or discussed affected electronic instruments.[40] The many list proposals of the United States for the 1979 review in the field of computers, semiconductors and numerically controlled machine tools suggest an abiding interest in controlling electronic technology.[41] The second round of negotiations ended in spring 1980. Many technical revisions were effected but did not result in either a significant increase or decrease of coverage either in scope or item number, according to a well-informed US government source. Computer items were left unchanged, subject to further negotiations in autumn 1980.

To give some perspective to list coverage, the US Secretary of the Treasury in 1964, Douglas Dillon, remarked that the COCOM list "amounts to about 10 per cent of the total goods that move in international trade." [42] However, COCOM trade with the East makes up a very small percentage of world trade, as it has since the inception of the controls.[43]

B. Exception Requests

The growth in the use of computers and computer-related equipment in the past two decades has not only become a concern to COCOM because of the strategic uses of computer systems, but it has also shackled COCOM with a particularly tricky definitional problem. The problem of dual use technology requires a very sophisticated approach to establishing cut-off points and implementing end-user controls.

The exporter, faced with a restrictive definition of "strategic," can attempt to obtain an exception. Thus, another indicator of the restrictiveness of the embargo list involves the ebb and flow of exception requests. As indicated by Tables II and III, the dollar value of exception cases approved has dramatically risen in recent years. Further, the few exception requests disapproved, withdrawn or pending suggest a strong motivation to accommodate the changing business conditions. The argument is sometimes made in Western Europe that this COCOM procedure constitutes a form of intra-Western commercial espionage by providing market opportunity information to potential competitors. The cumbersome and time consuming machinery in the US for approving re-export licenses and foreign governments' exception requests may have prompted this heretofore unsubstantiated and somewhat harsh opinion. Still, both Americans and Europeans may view exception requests as somewhat hypocritical. The US resents the laxity of COCOM members' national export control systems

[40] US Department of State, *The Battle Act Report*, 16th Report to Congress USGPO, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1963), p. 3.
[41] House Hearings, op. cit. 1978, pp. 92–7.
[42] Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. p. 142.
[43] See *The Battle Act Reports* generally and *International Economic Report of the President* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., Mar. 1976), p. 56.

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while the Allies resent the US for submitting the greatest number of exception requests. Two important past cases have raised much concern in Western Europe over the real motivation of the US in refusing approval of exception requests and the US role in COCOM.[44]

Table II Approved Exception Requests, 1967–77

Year	*Millions of Dollars*
1967	11
1968	8
1969	19
1970	62
1971	56
1972	124
1973	106
1974	119
1975	185
1976	162
1977	214

Source: " Special Report on Multilateral Export Controls by the President," *Report to the Congress*, 10 July 1978, p. 6.

Table III Disposition of COCOM Exception Cases *

By Number

Year	*Approved*	*Disapproved*	*Withdrawn*	*Pending*	*Total*
1974	1243 (–)	12 (0)	16 (–)	109 (–)	1380 (567)
1975	1646 (–)	22 (0)	36 (–)	94 (–)	1798 (798)
1976	884 (432)	36 (0)	36 (7)	101 (18)	1057 (457)
1977	836 (358)	31 (1)	44 (5)	176 (55)	1087 (419)
		By Value ($ Millions)			
1976	162 (71)	24 (0)	187 (1)	73 (7)	446 (79)
1977	214 (55·2)	19 (0·03)	9 (0·03)	74 (20·5)	317 (76)

* US Cases are in brackets.

Sources: " Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 11, 15, 24 and 30 Mar. 1976, pp. 70 and 74; and letter dated 23 Jan. 1979 from William A. Root, Director, Office of East–West Trade, Department of State (Enclosure 2).

[44] US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and East–West Trade* (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 168. See also Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, " Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaftlichen Ost–West Beziehungen also Problem der Westeuropaeschen und Atlantischen Gemeinschaft," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (Ebenhausen, 1975), p. 70.

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US objections to the sale of large-diameter steel pipe to the USSR in 1962 and to a West German project for the construction of a nuclear powerplant in Kaliningrad in 1973 caused the Allies to doubt whether American motivations were in fact security-oriented rather than commercially oriented.

In part, this stems from the possibility of high level political intervention to back an exception request. France has even threatened to withdraw from COCOM in response to a possible denial of an exception request. Furthermore, it is alleged that " some COCOM members have recently adopted the strategy of holding US exception requests hostage for US approval of their own exception requests." [45] Nonetheless, the value of exception requests averages less than 1 per cent of the total East-West trade.[46]

Table IV hints that the controls on computers have been loosened enough to encourage increased trade, but there still remain difficult problems. For example, (in 1977) of the 30 cases denied in COCOM by US objection (out of 31 total denials) most " objections were directed at relatively small-value cases involving advanced integrated circuits, precision electronic testing equipment, or sophisticated computer peripherals." [47]

A well-informed US government source has indicated that since the Afghanistan events few, if any, exception requests to the USSR have been granted. However, in the face of a negative COCOM exception request decision, a member country can always avail itself of " national interest exceptions." These have been used infrequently—12 times over a 30-year period, according to the same government source.

Table IV Computer Requests

Year	*Value* (*$ Millions*)	*Per cent of Total*
1971	21	23
1972	66	39
1973	80	50*
1974	120	66*
1975	147	64*
1976	123	52
1977	168	63

* Omitting two exceptionally high value cases in 1973 and one each in 1974 and 1975 which would distort the figures. None of these four high-value proposed exports actually took place.

Source: " Special Report on Multilateral Export Controls," *Report to the Congress*, 10 July 1978, p. 7.

[45] House Hearings, op. cit. 1978, p. 15.

[46] " Special Report on Multilateral Export Controls," *Report to the Congress*, The White House, 10 July 1978, p. 2.

[47] Ibid.

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C. Leakage

A more politically sensitive issue than exceptions, leakage of controlled commodities pertains both to the overt inconsistencies in the differing national interpretations of COCOM controls and to the covert flouting of the controls. A systematic comparison of the use of Import Certificate and Delivery Verification (IC/DV), Transit Authorization Certificate (TAC) procedures, other national licence requirements and transit controls, as well as penalties and enforcement procedures would still not cover the problem of differing interpretations of the descriptions of the international list items. Nonetheless, certain figures indicate that some leakage must be taking place. If the United States has only a 15 per cent share of the socialist country imports of high-technology products and if the United States represents only some 50 per cent of COCOM exception requests, obviously the other 85 per cent of the business is being done in some simple manner, but not through COCOM.

A prime example of the differential interpretation of the COCOM list is the Cyril Bath Company case. This case indicates that the French government authorized the sale of stretch forming presses (which can be used for airplane frames) to the Soviet Union. The US government's reaction was to question the French interpretation of the stretch forming presses controls. The US reaction was particularly bitter as it was in the United States that the presses were first developed. Thus, we find a US company denied a trading opportunity by the stringent interpretation of controls by its domestic government while another Western firm captured the market with the tacit approval of its own government.[48] Another example is the sale of French semiconductor technology to Poland which has probably benefited the Soviet manufacturing efforts in this area.

In contrast, the British sale of Spey engines manufactured by Rolls Royce Ltd. and Harrier Jets to the People's Republic of China was allegedly made without reference to COCOM, so that the British firm and government simply ignored the process.[49] This procedure is not uncommon when a government determines there is no need to submit a request because it prefers to deal at the highest political levels with other member governments. Indeed, four nations—Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy and France—apparently issue temporary licenses for sales exhibitions in the full knowledge that any resulting sale might not be approved unanimously by their COCOM partners.[50]

[48] See " Export Licensing: Foreign Availability of Stretch Forming Presses," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Session, Part 1, 4 Nov. 1977 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 19.

[49] " Rolls Royce Deal: Its Political and Military Meaning," *Business China*, 6 Feb. 1976.

[50] House Hearings, op. cit. 1976, p. 122.

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A possible avenue of research to assess leakage would be to assess comparatively national enforcement procedures for COCOM members.[51] While some primitive attempts have been made to assess the comparative penalties imposed by COCOM countries against export control violators, it should be noted that for a number of reasons the United States may have many more potential enforcement cases than the other COCOM partners since it has a larger control list.[52]

Leakage is a difficult concept to measure for a number of reasons. First, nations which may condone it are naturally unwilling to admit its existence. Secondly, firms that are successful in evading the national controls of their respective countries ensure that this information is misrepresented in trade statistics or customs data. Thirdly, it is rather a sensitive issue to claim that a sovereign nation is not living up to its commitments—all the more so when such commitments are confidential.

THE alterations in the lists act as a safety valve which reduces intra-COCOM tension when it reaches boiling point and threatens the fragile gentlemen's agreement binding the 15 partners. Thus, the long-term viability of COCOM is largely dependent on the ability of the COCOM partners to reach a consensus on the contents of the list. An analysis of the three alternative proposals examined above may explain list changes:

The following facts mitigate in favour of the " Machiavellian hypothesis ": (1) the recent growth in overall exception requests (number and volume) suggests that this mechanism is useful in easing the possible intentional over-control of the list and is perceived in this light; (2) the alleged extensive COCOM leakage also indicates that some COCOM partners, through their firms, are willing to circumvent the list rather than use their political energies to whittle the list to a more acceptable minimum; and (3) the list has stabilized to approximately 150 items (discounting for variations in actual item coverage) which may further indicate that the above-mentioned mechanisms (e.g. trade exception, etc.) are effective and that the list is seen as a minor impediment.

The " Machiavellian " explanation is particularly relevant for the last 20 years of COCOM history. However, for the first 10 years of COCOM's existence (1949–58) a cursory examination of the world political climate provides a far better explanation for list variations.

[51] Ibid. p. 85.

[52] It can be further argued that as East–West trade increases, the United States, as the most stringent COCOM partner, and therefore most likely to have its exception requests approved, processes all its exception requests through COCOM, thus causing an overall increase in such requests, while the COCOM members bypass the mechanism when approval is doubtful.

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Variations in that 10 year period can be attributed to a common perception of changes in the global political climate.[53] Still, it cannot be said that the advent of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of linkage caused drastic COCOM list reductions, since the COCOM list coverage had by then already started to decline from its level in the mid-1960s. Since the late 1960s, however, these common perceptions of global climate between the US and its allies have become eroded. Consequently, such an explanation is not directly relevant any more.

The technological explanation for list changes, as noted previously, cannot be tested without access to the internal minutes of COCOM deliberations. It is no doubt the preferred explanation of government officials. This explanation is not without appeal, especially in the area of certain fast-changing sophisticated electronic equipment lines. All three explanatory propositions seem to be operating at one time or another. The "Machiavellian" proposition, however, seems to be currently more applicable than the other two.

A NUMBER of trends in East-West relations have emerged in the last decade. They provide the essential background against which the state of future relations between the Allies within the COCOM framework must be understood. These trends also shed some light on the differences we noted earlier between the US and its COCOM partners not only as reflected in the evolution of the strategic control list but also as seen in their divergent West-East technology transfer policies.

West Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan and Italy are all far more heavily dependent on foreign trade than the US. While their trade with the Soviet bloc remains small, it does provide economic benefits of greater relative importance to these countries than it does to the US. The need of Europe and Japan for energy resources and primary commodities, together with the Soviet need for manufactured and advanced technology, create conditions of fairly high "complementarity" which do not exist to the same degree between the American and Soviet economies.

While the value of such exports is not large, it does provide support for certain key economic sectors. Trade is thus not viewed in Western Europe as a zero-sum security game but rather is perceived as profitable to both sides. The Chairman of Fiat, Agnelli, estimates that some 300,000 Western European jobs depend on Eastern bloc trade.[54] The estimate for the US in 1976, a high point in its East-West trade, is put at 30,000 jobs from non-agricultural exports to the USSR. European businessmen seem convinced that the very size of the Soviet market justifies intense intra-Western competition for deals

[53] Adler-Karlsson, op. cit. p. 142.

[54] Giovanni Agnelli, "East–West Trade: A European View," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980.

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that often result in the construction of huge factories and push European R & D efforts forward at the same time. The Togliattigrad car factory is often cited as the prototype example of a success story. Some Americans, on the other hand, seem less impressed by the prospects of such a market and cite the recent example of the Kama River truck factory where substantial diversion of production went into the manufacturing of military transports used in the Red Army operations in Afghanistan.[55] Additionally, it is felt by many, particularly in labour circles in the United States and elsewhere, that "turnkey" technology transfers could end up producing Soviet-made goods in direct competition with the rest of the Western world.

Western Europeans and Japanese tend to separate economic interests from conflicting political considerations and base their East–West technology transfer policies primarily on economic and commercial considerations. Even in the US, Armco Chairman William Verity has sounded the alarm, warning that East–West trade cannot unfold in an environment "dependent upon the perception of a few people of the political situation at any given time."[56] Such *cris de coeur* on the part of American industry have prompted some European observers to note that:

> *Le CoCom est bien gênant! Voire. Si d'un seul coup il disparaissait, quel magnifique champ d'action pour les entreprises américaines exportant des technologies de pointe! Heureusement que le moralisme politique de M. Carter protège la competivité des industries européennes.*[57]

Indeed, former US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, noted that US firms are "trying to race for foreign markets wearing infantry boots and full packs while competitors are wearing track shoes and shorts."[58] The former Secretary emphasized, in the same breath, that looking upon trade as a "favour" is a luxury the United States can no longer afford, given its large present trade deficit. These stern warnings may well have fallen on deaf ears if one considers the increasing use made of trade as a weapon for foreign policy reasons by the US.

To the extent that trade is used for linkage in Western Europe or Japan, it is in a positive vein to gain trade-related concessions (i.e. trade is used as an inducement not a weapon). It is noted that such a positive approach is worthy of serious consideration as the USSR is

[55] Bureau of National Affairs, *ITEX*, No. 300, 25 Mar. 1980, p. A–8.

[56] Statement of C. William Verity Jr, Hearings, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Use of Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy Purposes*, Oct. 1978, p. 59.

[57] Marie Lavigne, "Le role d'un organisme très discret," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Sept. 1978, p. 3.

[58] Statement of the Honourable Dean Rusk, in Hearings, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Use of Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy Purposes*, Oct. 1978, p. 145.

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the world's largest petroleum producer and possesses some 35 per cent of the world's natural gas reserves. Helping the USSR develop these natural resources can only alleviate world shortages. Agnelli disagrees with US fears that such an approach may result in the "Finlandization" of Western Europe; that "Europe, at least, is more interested in East-West trade than the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet leaders are in a position to demand from Western European nations their own form of 'political good behaviour.'" [59] While Japan's economic and geostrategic circumstances are different from those of Western Europe, Japan's increasing reliance on raw materials and energy imports from the USSR and the PRC as well as its increasing market shifts from consumer goods to technological ones encourage it to trade and transfer technology with the East.

The national export control systems used in Western Europe and Japan operate on the fairly clear presumption that all exports should be authorized, except when their military value is clear-cut, while in the US the presumption favours security considerations and therefore denial. This trend is evidenced in the existence of US unilateral controls on a range of items.

The US has lost much of the leverage with its Western trading partners and, consequently, it is unable to impose a unified trading posture within the Western trading bloc vis à vis the East. This situation has led the former Japanese Foreign Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, to underline the special "need for Americans to acknowledge the plurality of interests of the allies and accept its consequences." [60] Furthermore, the US is no longer the sole or even the principal source of high-technology products or know-how. This situation has heightened the prevailing climate of commercial rivalry among the chief technology producers in the West, possibly to the detriment of commonly shared security goals.

The existence of such a plurality of interests is reinforced by the Western European trend, following in the wake of Gaullist France, to assert an unprecedented degree of independence in matters of foreign policy generally and in relations with the Soviet bloc in particular, within the overall Atlantic Alliance framework.

Even in the face of recent Soviet moves in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Europeans have been "reluctant to junk *détente*" though they have grudgingly followed suit with the US in not replacing the denied American grain and in tightening controls on military-related items.[61] Much less agreement exists, however, in the area of technology-bearing exports where the Western Europeans are less sure than the US that a relationship exists between what is often seen as an "illusory technology gap" and recent increases in Soviet conventional

[59] Quoted in Agnelli, op. cit. p. 1029.
[60] Ibid. p. 1016.
[61] Stephen Milligan, "Such Good Friends?" *Europe*, Mar./Apr. 1980, p. 9

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and strategic power. A recent US Senate hearing indicates that "COCOM member countries do not want to cooperate with the unilaterally imposed US export restrictions against the USSR, particularly after the US Administration failed to seek multilateral agreement among its allies prior to the decision." Practically speaking, this should be understood to mean that the COCOM allies will not go along with broad changes which would be beyond the control list's current scope. The resulting disagreements within the Atlantic Alliance, in the wake of the Afghan crisis, has prompted some to claim that Moscow is "assiduously seeking to drive a wedge between the US and western Europe over the question of trade relations with the USSR." [62] They point also to the recent US–French differences over the Warsaw meeting of French President Giscard d'Estaing and Soviet leader Brezhnev as conclusive evidence of such a trend. Such divergences of approach within the Alliance should not however mask certain shared Western judgments concerning the threat posed by the Soviet bloc to the West.

IN sum, so long as there is substantial agreement among the allies that the Soviet bloc presents some threat to Western security—and there is no doubt such a perception prevails, in different degrees, among all the allies—there will be a general consensus in Western Europe and Japan about the need for some form of embargo of direct military technology. This consensus, however, is likely to become eroded, if not crumble completely, in the face of mounting commercial rivalries as regards dual end-use technology. In this connexion, the question of the ultimate contribution of such technologies to communist military and strategic capabilities will no doubt test the mettle of the COCOM system. The slow and incremental changes in list reviews in the last decade hint at the difficulty of reaching agreement on list changes and impasse that may have already been reached.

Clearly, the cost and benefit assessments of transferring dual use technology to the Soviet bloc are likely to yield increasingly dissimilar results for America and its allies as the traditional concept of the Atlantic Alliance is reshaped in the years to come and in the light of the Allies' "plurality of interests." While the Europeans and Japanese may consider, unlike the US, that the "safety limits" of trading with the Eastern bloc have not been reached, most "feel the urgent need for a multilateral body capable of determining when these safety limits may be dangerously close." [63] COCOM still remains the proper forum, given present constraints, for making such determinations, even though current opinions on its viability vary

[62] *Soviet World Outlook*, Vol. 5, No. 6, 15 June 1980, p. 1.
[63] Agnelli, op. cit. p. 1032.

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widely. Some see COCOM as "collapsing of its own weight"[64] while others assert that it must "be maintained as a viable agreement."[65]

To maximize COCOM's flexibility and make it as effective as feasible, the list should be adjusted to reflect the shared concerns of a preponderance of the allies. The challenge for Western multilateral policy in the years to come will surely be to develop a system able to reconcile legitimate commercial rivalries within the Western bloc with a unified vision of security needs.

[64] See the statement by Graham Allison in House Hearings, op. cit. 1976, p. 46; "The Multilateral Aspect," by Arthur T. Downey, in *Integrating National Security and Trade Policy: The United States and the Soviet Union*, The Senior Conference Final Report (US Military Academy, West Point, 1978), p. 200; and "US Departure from CoCom Encouraged," *Journal of Commerce*, 24 Oct. 1978, pp. 1 and 21, and "US, France Split over USSR Sales," *Journal of Commerce*, 21 Aug. 1978, p. 16.

[65] House Hearings, op. cit. 1976, p. 218.

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Great Game or Grand Illusion?

J. B. Kelly

"In Central Asia the position of affairs changes not every hour, but every minute. Therefore I say, Vigilance, vigilance, vigilance."

General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobolev, 1881.

"I do not exclude the intelligent anticipation of facts even before they occur."

Lord Curzon, 1898.

UP until the beginning of the last decade the forward defence of Western interests in the Gulf region rested upon the Central Treaty Organization and the British political and military position in the Gulf itself. CENTO, whose Middle-Eastern members were Turkey, Persia and Pakistan, was the successor alliance to the Baghdad Pact, which had been formally inaugurated in 1955. Like that earlier ill-fated coalition, CENTO was the reconstitution in modern form of the system of "barrier powers" for the defence of the Middle East against Russia, which had had its beginnings in the first half of the nineteenth century. The British position in the Gulf also dated back to the early decades of the nineteenth century, when, to assure the safety of commerce and shipping in the Gulf, and to safeguard both the "direct" route from the Mediterranean and the maritime approaches to India on the north-west, Britain had first subdued and then entered into treaty relations with the maritime shaikhdoms along the Arabian shore. Until the end of 1967 the British position in the Gulf was underpinned by the British base at Aden, possession of which also helped to ensure Western command of the Straits of Bab al-Mandab. Taken overall, the British presence in South Arabia and the Gulf was the principal stabilizing force in the Arabian peninsula.

If one were forced to make an arbitrary choice and to say at what particular point this defensive structure began to be undermined, one would probably fix upon the publication of the British White Paper on defence in February 1966. (To say this, of course, is to set to one side all the larger issues which determined or influenced British and Western policy in Arabia and the Gulf at the time—such as Britain's decline as a great power; the general Western retreat from Asia and Africa since 1945; the political, intellectual and moral climate in Britain in the 1960s; the growing ascendancy of that school of thought which believed Britain's post-imperial role outside Europe was drawing to a close, and which, since the débâcle at

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Suez 10 years earlier, also considered it better ended; the growing American involvement in Vietnam—to name but a few.) The defence White Paper of 1966 proposed a drastic reduction in British military commitments east of Suez, withdrawal from Aden colony and protectorate (the Federation of South Arabia), and the repudiation of the previous undertaking to conclude a defensive treaty with the federation on independence. The abandonment of Aden duly took place in November 1967, power being handed over to a quasi-Marxist terrorist organization, the National Liberation Front. A few months earlier the defeat of Egyptian arms by Israel in the six-day war had virtually assured the evacuation of the Egyptian expeditionary force from the Yemen; for one of the conditions laid down by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, at the Khartum Conference of Arab states in August 1967, for the rescue of Egypt from bankruptcy was that Nasser should remove his troops from the Yemen. With the Egyptians gone, the National Liberation Front would have lost its principal supply base, which would have severely impaired its ability to carry on guerrilla warfare in South Arabia against the British forces. Yet in the face of the Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen, and despite the clearly expressed desire of King Faisal that Britain should remain in South Arabia, the British government of the day persisted in carrying out its decision to leave Aden before the year was out.

It was clear at the time, and has become even clearer since, that the aversion felt by the more influential sections of the British Labour party for the continuance of defensive commitments and residual treaty obligations outside Europe (or even within Europe, for that matter) was primarily responsible for the decision to quit Aden. The same doctrinaire aversion to any defensive responsibilities east of Suez underlay the subsequent announcement by the Labour government in January 1968 that the British position in the Gulf was to be relinquished by the end of 1971. Although financial stringency was put forward as the reason for the relinquishment, there is little doubt that the prime motive behind it was the appeasement, for domestic political reasons, of the left-wing ideologues of the Labour party. For the sum of money involved in the maintenance of the British position in the Gulf, some £12 million annually, was inconsequential when set against the total savings which had to be effected in the British economy at the time, some £850 million, and infinitesimal when viewed against the profligacy of British governments then and since.

OVER the next two years leading figures in the Conservative party several times proclaimed their intention to reverse the decision to leave the Gulf if the Conservatives should be returned to office. (At the time of the announcement of the decision the former prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, had condemned it as "a derelic-

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tion of stewardship, the like of which this country has not seen in the conduct of foreign policy before "—strong words from one who had been Neville Chamberlain's parliamentary private secretary at the time of Munich.) Whether any pressure to reconsider the decision was exerted from Washington upon the government of Harold Wilson after President Nixon assumed office in January 1969 is not readily ascertainable; but as no convincing evidence has yet emerged to substantiate a presumption that such pressure was in fact applied, it is only logical to conclude that it was not—or that it was half-hearted at best. The Conservatives were returned to power in the general election of June 1970. It took the government of Edward Heath little more than three months to decide (although the decision was not to be made public until March 1971) to adhere to the time-table of withdrawal from the Gulf laid down by its predecessor.

While the Heath government was swayed in its decision by a diversity of considerations, the influence of the Foreign Office in the decision-making would appear to have been paramount. The Foreign Office had never felt comfortable in the Gulf. Ever since it inherited charge of the British position there from the government of India in 1947 when the British raj came to an end, it had always felt uneasy about the role it had to play in the area, which was one more of an imperial than a diplomatic nature. Indeed, it would not, perhaps, be going too far to say that few officials in the Foreign Office in 1970–71 really understood what constituted the foundations of Britain's historical and legal position in the Gulf. That position was based upon the trucial system, i.e. the series of agreements with Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial Shaikhdoms for the maintenance, under British supervision, of maritime peace; upon the successive treaties with those states for the suppression of the slave trade and the arms traffic; upon the so-called " exclusive " engagements providing for the conduct by Britain of the shaikhdoms' foreign relations and the non-alienation by them of any portion of their territories to foreign powers; and upon a series of subsequent agreements concerning the granting of oil and other mineral concessions, and the exercise by Britain of extra-territorial jurisdiction. It also depended, though buttressed by fewer formal and less restrictive engagements, upon the longstanding British connexion with the sultanate of Oman.

In the Foreign Office's eyes the major Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Persia and Iraq—bulked larger and more important than did the minor Gulf principalities, with the possible exception of Kuwait. Despite the fact that these three states, and Saudi Arabia and Persia in particular, had been the principal sources of disruption in the Gulf since the early nineteenth century, and that they had throughout this entire period resented the British presence there as an obstacle to the pursuit of their territorial designs upon the littoral

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shaikhdoms and Oman, the Foreign Office had for many years treated them with considerable deference—far more, in fact, than the British government of India had been inclined to accord them. Thus in the years before the second world war the Foreign Office had exhibited a readiness to accommodate Reza Shah's ambitions to acquire a navy and to extend Persian jurisdiction in the lower Gulf. It was also prepared to gratify, in part at least, Ibu Saud's territorial demands upon the littoral shaikhdoms of eastern Arabia. The same disposition was evinced by the Foreign Office in 1970–71 towards Muhammad Reza Shah and Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz. Having persuaded the Shah in the early months of 1970 to renounce his ill-founded claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, the Foreign Office was not in the least averse to his obtaining as his *quid pro quo* the Arab islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, which were situated near the entrance to the Gulf, for the ostensible purpose of safeguarding the passage of shipping through the Straits of Hormuz. Likewise the Foreign Office brought pressure upon the ruler of Abu Dhabi to concede the demands for territory that King Faisal was making upon him, the satisfaction of which, so Faisal insisted, was the price of his recognition of the United Arab Emirates, the federation of the former Trucial Shaikhdoms which was then in the process of being formed.

Though little in the way of a convincing case can be made out in defence of the Foreign Office's and the Heath administration's abdication of responsibility for the security of the Gulf at the end of 1971, the abdication has to be viewed in the light of the prevailing wisdom of the day, which held that the era of European authority and dominion overseas had ended, that the strength, moral as much as physical, of Afro-Asian nationalism could no longer be resisted, and that in the Middle East the Arabs' and the Persians' hour had come. According to this doctrine, the British political and military presence in the Gulf, far from helping to preserve the peace and to protect Western interests there, was a positive irritant to local feelings and consequently a potential source of trouble in the future. The argument was held to apply in particular to the international oil companies operating in the Gulf, whose relations with the concessionary governments were said to be adversely affected by the continuance of Britain's tutelary role. The extraction and sale of oil, so the conventional wisdom had it, was a purely commercial affair, best left to the oil companies, the concessionary governments and the operation of market forces. As the comforting adage of the day expressed it, "The Arabs cannot drink their oil." That oil had a strategic importance virtually unequalled by any other raw material, and that its extraction had invariably been closely bound up with politics—and nowhere more so than in the Middle East—was conveniently ignored by the advocates of disengagement.

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ANOTHER argument current in leading political and intellectual circles in Britain in 1970–71 concerned the inevitability of internal political upheavals in Saudi Arabia, the minor Gulf states and Oman. Taking their cue from what had happened in Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Libya and elsewhere in the preceding two decades, the proponents of the theory of imminent revolution contended that the traditional regimes in the Arabian peninsula were bound, sooner or later, either to broaden the basis of their authority by admitting a greater number of their people to a share in political power, or they would be swept away on a wave of popular uprisings. In such an event, Britain might find herself caught up in successive struggles for power in the Gulf shaikhdoms by virtue of her treaty relations with their rulers. Since the leaders of the putative revolts would be drawn from the emergent, educated, younger generation of Gulf Arabs, who would not tolerate for an instant any lingering form of Western tutelage, Britain would find herself faced with the choice of beating an embarrassing retreat from the scene or of becoming embroiled on the side of the established rulers in a bloody and long-drawn-out conflict, with incalculable results for her standing and interests in the Arab world as a whole. Better, therefore, so the argument concluded, that she should withdraw gracefully while she could.

Little point would be served here in commenting upon the numerous flaws in this hypothesis or upon the want of spirit displayed by those who propounded it. Suffice it to say that it was very much the product of its times, proceeding as it did, less from a rigorous examination of the realities of Arabian politics, than from the personal and ideological convictions of its exponents, who themselves retained a touching faith, a legacy from the days of Nasser and his imitators, in the therapeutic and cleansing powers of revolutions conducted by youthful army officers of austere habits and patent rectitude. No matter that each successive *bouleversement* in an Arab capital since 1952 had brought to power a regime more oppressive than its predecessor. The issue was one of faith, not of reason, and both the Foreign Office and the Heath administration subscribed—or affected to subscribe, the distinction is immaterial—to the approved doctrine. Britain's future, they firmly believed, lay in Europe, in membership of the European Community, and in Britain's return to her role as an industrial and trading nation, freed from her tiresome post-imperial responsibilities overseas. So Heath and his Cabinet chose in 1971 to heed the importunities of those local powers which wished, for one reason or another, and none of them particularly creditable, to see Britain withdraw from the Gulf (an assemblage which included Saudi Arabia, Persia, Iraq, Kuwait and South Yemen) rather than to hearken to the entreaties of those who wished her to remain—Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and the sultanate of Oman. So anxious were the Cabinet and the Foreign Office in 1971

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to be quit of any and all future ties to the Gulf that they refused to entertain the idea of concluding a defensive treaty with the UAE, or to explore the possibility of promoting a political and military *entente* between the UAE and Oman, backed by a British defensive undertaking.

WITH Britain gone from the Gulf, responsibility for its security and for its oil reserves devolved, perforce, upon the major local powers. From the West's point of view, this meant Persia and Saudi Arabia, for Iraq had removed herself from the defensive equation by concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in April 1972. All the local states, whatever their differences, were as one in professing that the defence of the Gulf and its oilfields was henceforth the sole concern of the states around its shores, and these professions were solemnly echoed by the Western governments most concerned with the Gulf's future.

So far as Muhammad Reza Shah was concerned, he entertained not the slightest doubt of his country's fitness and right to take Britain's place as the guardian of the Gulf's peace. Evidently the United States shared his confidence, for when President Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, visited Tehran in May 1972 they gave the Shah virtually *carte blanche* to purchase from the United States whatever arms he considered he needed to perform his allotted task. Over the next half-a-dozen years, with the eager assistance of the armaments and aircraft manufacturers of Europe and the United States, the Shah was able to indulge to the full his infatuation with the deadly trinkets of war. At the same time, again with the ardent encouragement of Western governments and manufacturers, he pressed ahead with the implementation of his grandiose design to make Persia, within the space of a decade or two, the second industrial power in Asia after Japan. These vast ambitions were to be accomplished by the expenditure of Persia's oil revenues, which grew by leaps and bounds from 1971 onwards, thanks in no small measure to Muhammad Reza Shah's unremitting efforts in the counsels of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to force the price of oil higher and ever higher.

It does not lie within the purview of this article to examine either the domestic reasons for the Shah's downfall in 1978–79 or the contribution made to that downfall by the Western powers' cynical exploitation of his obsession with military grandeur. What is of proper concern to us here is why the Western powers most involved—the United States, Britain and, to a lesser extent, France—should ever in the first place have considered Persia capable of serving as the northern sentinel of the Gulf. Since the inception of CENTO Persia had been the weakest link in the barrier chain. Unlike Turkey and Pakistan she had no military tradition of any relevance to the modern

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world. The Persian army, again unlike the armies of Turkey and Pakistan, had had no experience of war on anything approaching a significant scale since the Russo-Persian war of 1826–28 or, at best, the Anglo-Persian war of 1856–57. While some of the peoples who go to make up Persia's population—in particular, the Kurds, Afghans and Turcomans—are warrior races, no Persian government, until the reign of Reza Shah, had been able, despite the efforts of successive European military missions, to weld them into a disciplined national army. Even Reza Shah's exertions in this respect yielded fairly unimpressive results. The fault lay less with the Persian soldiery, ignorant, ill-nurtured and dispirited though they were, than with their officers, who possessed little military competence themselves, were largely indifferent to the well-being of their troops, and lacked any real dedication to the profession of arms.

While improvements in the training and morale of the Persian armed forces, and in the quality of the officer corps, undoubtedly were effected during the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah, their actual fighting calibre never came near to justifying the enormous sums of money he had lavished upon their arms and equipment. The lack of education and technical skills in the ranks of the Persian army and air force meant that they could not operate or service the bulk of the advanced weaponry and aircraft, with which the Shah insisted upon equipping them, without the assistance of thousands of American and British technicians and military advisers. On the only occasions on which the Persian army was tested in battle, viz. in the campaign against the guerrillas of Dhufar in the mid-1970s and in the recent conflict with Iraq, it hardly covered itself with glory. As for the Persian navy, it remained, however much the Shah cared to spend upon ships and dockyard facilities, as much a Gilbertian enterprise as it had been since the eighteenth century, when Nadir Shah had tried to create a marine with the aid of Portuguese renegades and Arab pirates.

MILITARY weakness apart, there were psychological factors, arising from the Persian past, which threw doubt upon Persia's ability and willingness to serve as the guardian of Western interests in the Gulf. From the early nineteenth century until the dissolution of the Indian empire in 1947 the continued existence of Persia as an independent state was largely due to the support of the British raj. Thereafter her independence was underwritten by the United States. The knowledge of this dependence did not, and still does not, sit well with the Persians, one of whose more striking national characteristics, remarked by generations of students of Persian society, is excessive vanity. Despite the fact that Britain never annexed a single inch of Persian soil during the entire period of her diplomatic and military intercourse with Persia—in contrast to Russia, who appropriated large tracts of Persian territory in the Caucasus and Transcaspia in

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the nineteenth century—the Persians retained an almost pathological suspicion of Britain's ulterior designs upon their country. At the root of this suspicion lay a fear that the British were bent upon repeating in Persia the pattern of piecemeal annexation which they had followed in India and which had eventually brought the entire sub-continent under British rule. (It was this fear, for instance, which lay behind the Persian government's adamant rejection of occasional British approaches to secure the cession of a Persian island in the Gulf to serve as a naval base for the policing of its waters.)

Apart from their suspicion of Britain's ultimate intentions towards their country, the Persians were also irritated by Britain's refusal, backed where necessary by armed demonstrations, to allow them to compensate themselves for the loss of their Caucasian provinces to Russia by expanding eastwards into Afghanistan. More than once the Persians turned to St Petersburg for encouragement in the prosecution of their schemes of Afghan conquest. As often as not, this encouragement was readily forthcoming, for the Russians were only too pleased to divert the Persians from brooding upon their losses in the Caucasus by directing their gaze eastwards to the Afghan principalities, where any disturbance of the status quo was bound to unsettle the British rulers of India. A further irritant to Persian feelings was the British ascendancy in the Gulf. Conscious of their own lack of sea-power, and therefore of the means to exercise authority in the Gulf, successive Persian governments gave vent to their frustration by obstructing Britain's efforts to suppress maritime warfare, the slave trade and the arms traffic, and by putting forward extravagant claims to dominion over territories and people, some of which have persisted down to the present day. The peculiar mentality induced by the amalgamation of these feelings of resentment, fear, suspicion, frustration and injured vanity was exemplified by the Persian reaction to the Anglo-Russian *détente* of 1907. Obloquy was heaped upon Britain at the time—and has never ceased to be heaped upon her—for what was regarded as the callous partitioning of Persia into spheres of influence, regardless of the affront to Persian national sentiments; while towards Russia, the real oppressor of Persian nationhood over the preceding century, the Persians observed, and still observe, a prudent reticence.

Muhammad Reza Shah harboured in his own person all the constituent elements which went to create this national neurosis. In addition, he nursed a galling resentment of Britain for having deposed his father in 1941 at the time of the Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia. That the circumstances surrounding the deposition of Reza Shah hardly supported this simplistic interpretation of that event was something that Muhammad Reza Shah refused to entertain. He was also convinced that Britain had exploited Persia economically, especially over oil, so that he was inclined to view with marked satis-

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faction, only partly allayed by apprehensions for his own future, the expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's assets in Persia by the government of Muhammad Musaddiq in 1951. Despite the fact that his throne was saved for him two years later by the intervention of the United States, and that it was also as a result of the United States' initiative that a settlement of the oil crisis, on terms highly favourable to Persia, was achieved in 1954, he never ceased to regard the Western oil companies operating in Persia with anything but hostility. As soon as he felt bold enough to do so, which he did early in 1973, after observing the obsequious respect with which the Western powers were becoming accustomed to treat him, he tore up the oil consortium's concession altogether.

YET for all that the Shah's extravagant posturing was in large measure responsible for bringing his country to its present parlous condition, the Western powers must also bear a substantial share of blame for the precarious situation in which their own interests in Persia now stand. In the geopolitical scheme of things Persia has long occupied the position of a buffer state, a role which may offend Persian pride but which is nevertheless a fact of life in a harsh world. For Persia to fulfil this function required that the Soviet Union, on the one side, and the Western powers led by the United States, on the other, should refrain from trying to acquire an absolute ascendancy over the country; and conversely, that each side should strive to prevent the other from acquiring such an ascendancy. By thrusting the role of sentinel of the Gulf on the Shah—albeit that he eagerly sought the part—and subsequently arming him to the teeth so that he might play it properly, the Western powers acquired a preponderance in Persia (that it was, perhaps, more apparent than real is beside the point) which could only serve to unsettle the Soviet Union. For the arming of the Shah was on such a massive scale that it could only have aroused misgivings in Moscow about the purpose behind it. That the whole martial extravaganza was simply the product of greed, culpable irresponsibility and addled opportunism on the part of the West would have appeared to the Russians an implausible explanation. Yet it is, by and large, the true one. No real thought seems to have been given in Washington or London to the implications and consequences of indulging Muhammad Reza Shah's insensate passion for military gewgaws. Was it deemed conceivable, for instance, that Persia, regardless of the amount of weaponry she accumulated, could ever withstand, for more than the briefest instant, an assault from the Soviet Union? Was any consideration given to the possibility that the Shah, bewitched by the glittering arsenal he had assembled, might be tempted to provoke the Russians by some truculent gesture or other along their common borders? Or to the likelihood that this extensive array of arms was intended, not

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to deter the Russians but for use against his neighbours in the Gulf, to the inevitable detriment of stability in the region and the security of Western interests there?

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that over the past decade, through inattention rather than design, the West has failed to abide by the rules of the Great Game as it is played in Persia, thereby inadvertently paving the way for the Soviet Union, in her turn, to break them in Afghanistan. For all his faults, Muhammad Reza Shah was perhaps more aware of how the game should be played; although it has to be said that he tended to grow reckless as he came more and more to take for granted not only the anxious deference paid him by the West but also the protection afforded him by his connexions with the United States. Much of the peevish sermonizing he was wont to address to the West during the 1970s was intended for the Kremlin's entertainment, to demonstrate his independence of, and even disregard for, Western goodwill. (Needless to say, he would never have dared to bait the Soviet Union in this fashion.) Taking a leaf from the record of the Qajar Shahs, he several times solicited and received Russian backing for one or another of his policy initiatives, and especially for his insistence that the maritime security of the Gulf should be the sole concern of its littoral states—a claim which translated itself in his mind into a determination to make that sea once more the *sinus Persicus* of old. It it worth noting that in all the gasconade he was prone to utter on this subject, and especially about the wickedness of the very idea that the Western powers might establish a naval presence in the Gulf, there was not so much as a whisper of protest against the visits of Russian warships to the Gulf or their use of supply facilities at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.

For all this, however, it has to be said that the volume of complaint and criticism which the Shah levelled at the West in the last years of his reign was far in excess of what was required to maintain the balance in his country between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was evident that he was labouring under a deeper compulsion than personal arrogance and paranoia, and the roots of this compulsion are to be found in those attributes of the Persian national character adverted to earlier. The grievances he articulated about economic exploitation, the obsessive suspicions he evinced about the West's covetous designs on the soil of Persia, the ambivalence he displayed towards the Russians, his indifference to the need to conciliate those upon whom the security of his country ultimately depended—all were part and parcel of that peculiar distemper which has afflicted the Persian people, or at least their ruling classes, in their dealings with the West over the past two centuries. This distemper is even more evident today, heightened as it is by religious hysteria, in the leadership and following of the new republican regime. Whether it is in the railing of the Ayatollah

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Khomeini against the West for its debauchery and its evil influence abroad, or in the ranting of his placemen about Western and especially American "imperialism," the echoes of an atavistic fixation are all too clearly audible. Further speculation on the subject would be pointless. To try to determine why the Persian people and their leaders insist upon exhausting their emotional capital in frenzied vilification of the West while the Soviet Union draws the noose tighter around their necks would necessitate venturing into realms of psychopathology as yet uncharted by rational men.

THE second bulwark of the Gulf's defence was, and presumably still is, Saudi Arabia. Here again the Western powers have made a number of assumptions about the country's fitness to play the role assigned to it, and about its commitment to Western interests, that may prove to have been ill-founded. Like Persia, Saudi Arabia has in the past been a prime agent of disturbance in the Gulf, and as Persia is now a dangerous source of instability in the region, so also might Saudi Arabia become another.

The motive power behind the progress of the house of Saud over the past two centuries has been a sense of religious mission coupled to a drive for territorial conquest. The one, needless to say, has helped fuel the other. It was the early Saudi forays into south-eastern Arabia, under the impulse of the Wahhabi reformation, that were responsible in large measure for Britain's eventual assumption of the maritime protectorate of the Gulf. For the spread of Wahhabi influence among the maritime tribes of the southern coast of the Gulf sharpened their already well-developed piratical instincts, leading them to embark upon large-scale piratical campaigns in the Gulf and even further afield, eventually bringing retribution upon themselves in the shape of two British punitive expeditions sent from India in 1809 and 1819. Thereafter the British authorities in the Gulf set their faces against the assertion of a Wahhabi or Saudi ascendancy over the littoral shaikhdoms, lest it provoke a renewal of organized piracy. A contest for influence ensued, which was to continue for the greater part of the century, between the Saudis, who strove to impose their will not only upon Bahrain and the Trucial Shaikhdoms but also upon the sultanate of Oman (for the inhabitants of which the Saudis cherished a particular enmity on religious grounds), and the British, who were determined both to keep the maritime shaikhs to the due observance of their treaty obligations and to preserve the independence of Oman. Although the ill-feeling between the Al Saud and the British diminished with the eclipse of Saudi power in Arabia at the close of the century, and diminished further in the circumstances of the first world war, it left a legacy of suspicion on both sides which was to linger for several decades to come.

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The renewal of Saudi attempts in this century to dominate the Trucial Shaikhdoms and Oman followed the reconstitution of Saudi authority over the greater part of the peninsula in the 1920s and the proclamation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in 1932. A year later he granted an oil concession for the eastern portion of his dominions to Standard Oil of California. It was scarcely coincidental that he should at the same time have seen fit to revive his ancestral claims to dominion over a fair portion of the shaikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and to the desert marches of Oman. Like his ancestors, Ibn Saud found his path blocked by the British authorities in the Gulf, who were further stiffened in their resolve to oppose the extension of Saudi sovereignty over the littoral shaikhdoms by the very consideration which had led Ibn Saud to put forward his claims in the first place, viz. the potential existence of oil deposits in the territories in question.

IBN SAUD returned to the attack after the second world war, having in the meantime secured for himself a powerful ally against the British—the United States. Even since the beginnings of American involvement in Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s the United States government had to all intents and purposes resigned the conduct of American relations with the Al Saud into the hands of the Arabian American Oil Company, a consortium made up of Standard Oil of California, Standard of New Jersey, Texas and Socony-Vacuum (afterwards Mobil). ARAMCO, which had from the very first served the house of Saud nobly and was to continue to serve it with spaniel-like devotion in the years to come, threw itself with enthusiasm after 1945 into the Saudi quarrel with the British over the location of Saudi Arabia's eastern frontier. The company also persuaded the United States government, without too much difficulty, that American interests in Arabia and in the Middle East generally would be advanced by siding with the Saudis over the frontier question and working for the elimination of the British presence in Arabia and the Gulf altogether. By the time that the State Department was forced in the mid-1960s, by the Egyptian campaign in the Yemen and the apprehensions which this aroused in Riyad, to assert more direct control over Saudi-American relations and to assess for the first time the consequences of having allowed itself to be led by the nose by ARAMCO, the damage had already been done. The British were abandoning Aden and preparing to retire from the Gulf.

Having no real policy of its own to pursue in Arabia, the State Department simply picked up the one bequeathed to it by ARAMCO —that of acting as servitor to the Saudi royal house. The situation has not really changed up to the present time. After witnessing the contemptible performance of the Western European powers at the time of the Arab oil embargo and the concurrent price offensive in

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1973, the United States not unreasonably concluded that with allies like these she had better make her own arrangements to secure her economic and political interests in Arabia. In June 1974, therefore, she entered into an understanding with the Al Saud, whereby she engaged to assist with the development of Saudi Arabia's economy and the expansion and modernization of the Saudi armed forces, in return for an undertaking from the Saudi government to keep up a steady flow of oil to the United States at reasonable prices and to deposit the bulk of Saudi Arabia's surplus oil revenues in the United States. How far this arrangement has committed the United States to the preservation of the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia under her present rulers is not entirely clear.

It is almost unnecessary to say that Saudi Arabia has failed in more than one respect to keep her side of the bargain. Saudi oil production has never attained the levels agreed upon, while oil prices have risen from $11.65 a barrel in June 1974 to $28 a barrel in May 1980. Moreover, the Saudi government has expressed strong objections to the creation by the United States of a national strategic petroleum reserve, a good part of which was to have come from the surplus which the Saudi fields were supposed to have been producing by 1980. On the other side of the ledger, the United States has all too amply fulfilled her obligations for the supply of arms, military training and economic expertise. She has also in her official conduct towards the Saudi regime continued to exhibit a fulsome regard for Saudi feelings and prejudices which the Saudi royal house has no doubt found highly gratifying, and which it had come to accept as only due and proper as a result of its past experience with ARAMCO.

How beneficial the relationship has been to the United States, and to the Western world in general, is another question. As in the case of Persia up to 1978, the United States, in company with Britain and France, has deluged Saudi Arabia with advanced weaponry and aircraft. While this policy may have been conceived with the cynical object of mopping up some, at least, of Saudi Arabia's excess oil revenues, its consequences may differ somewhat from what its architects had in mind—as they did in Persia. The sheer moral and political bankruptcy of the policy apart, what exactly was the arming of Saudi Arabia supposed to achieve? There were even fewer grounds for believing that Saudi Arabia was capable of protecting the Gulf's oil reserves and maintaining the peace of the Gulf than there were in the case of Persia. Like Persia, Saudi Arabia had long been a source of disturbance, not a force for tranquillity, in the Gulf. Nor was her military tradition such as to render other than ludicrous the notion that she could serve as the West's surrogate in warding off any threat from the Soviet Union. If the object was to enable the house of Saud to maintain order and security within the kingdom,

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then most of the sophisticated weaponry that the Al Saud have acquired is superfluous to that purpose. It certainly proved irrelevant in coping with the tribal and other fanatics who seized control of the great mosque at Mecca in November 1979, as apparently did most of the military training which the Saudi armed forces had received up to that date. The fact that the rebels could only be subdued after a three weeks' struggle is comment enough on Saudi Arabia's military capacity.

Presumably the possibility that the arms and aircraft with which Saudi Arabia is being equipped are intended for use against Israel can be dismissed. Not only would it be a strange internal contradiction in American policy if they were so intended, but the retaliation which such a step would invite could well prove ruinous to Saudi Arabia and fatal to her ruling house. Besides, it is doubtful, to say the least, whether the Saudis would be able to operate or service their complicated military equipment and aircraft without the aid of American and British technicians. Are the Saudi government's eyes, and those of the administration in Washington, fixed then upon Iraq, whose Baathist rulers seem, for all practical purposes, to be in league with Moscow, and who abominate the house of Saud and the principle of monarchical rule alike? If the build-up of Saudi Arabia's military strength is meant to give the Iraqis cause to reconsider any aggressive designs they may harbour upon the kingdom, or to deter them from an invasion of Kuwait, will it prove sufficient for this purpose? Or is the intention, perhaps, to enable Saudi Arabia to undertake a campaign against South Yemen, to unseat the Marxist regime in Aden and to put an end to the Russian presence in South Arabia? If so, then one can only ask what makes the Saudi government believe that it could carry such an undertaking through to a successful conclusion?

There is no avoiding the suspicion that the macabre carnival of arms sales has no systematic reasoning or calculated purpose behind it —other than the shabby goal already mentioned of soaking up a sizeable portion of Saudi Arabia's financial surpluses. The incalculable dangers implicit in such a disreputable tactic require no lengthy recitation here. The inevitable consequences of indiscriminately arming the Gulf states have been conclusively demonstrated by the Iraqi-Persian conflict and the accompanying destruction of oil installations. One also wonders whether any serious thought has been given to the possibility that the present Saudi government (or, what may be more ominous, a new regime of different complexion in Riyad) may be tempted to use its newly acquired military power to pursue the long-standing ambitions of the house of Saud in eastern and south-eastern Arabia—in other words, to subvert the independence of Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Sheer besottedness with the deadly toys they now possess, and frustration at their inability to use them else-

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where, might well induce the Saudis to employ them to such ends. Whatever happens, the Western powers and more specifically the United States, Britain and France, cannot escape their share of responsibility for it. Through their foolish pretence, to themselves as well as to the world at large, that Saudi Arabia could ever serve as a pillar of the Gulf's security, and through their flaccid accommodation of every one of the Saudi regime's arrogant demands and petulant whims, they have needlessly increased the dangers of instability in the Arabian peninsula.

IT is not only our pathetic reliance upon the cardboard pillars of Saudi Arabia and Persia to protect our interests in the Gulf that has exposed the vacuity of Western policy over the past decade. It is also revealed by the way in which we have allowed the Gulf's oil to slip from our grasp and to be used as a weapon against us. In a mere half-a-dozen years or so, beginning in 1970, we lost physical control of the oilfields through the nationalization of the oil companies' concessions and assets; we lost control over the volume and rate of oil production; and we lost control over oil prices, which have came to be fixed by the member states of OPEC without any reference to the state of the market. So abject a state have we sunk to that when, for example, the Arab oil-producing states raised the price of oil by a further $2 a barrel in May 1980, an increase utterly unjustified in terms of current demand, not a cheep of protest was to be heard in the capitals of the West. Nor did anyone see fit to comment publicly that this latest increase, which was by no means the largest to have occurred during the preceding 18 months, was in itself more than the entire cost of a barrel of oil 10 years ago.

The pusillanimity of the West has been excused on the grounds that to offer any resistance to the Arabs and Persians and their partners in OPEC would have brought retaliation in the shape of embargoes, severe cutbacks in production, even more extravagant price rises, and so forth. At the same time we have been told by those in public life to whom we look for the instruction and guidance that the immense sums of money that the Western industrial nations and Japan have paid out for Arab and Persian oil can be recouped by the magical process of " recycling." More than that, exorbitant oil prices are said to be a blessing in disguise, since they act as a stimulant to Western industry. (Some of our mentors even go so far as to exhort us to regard this mulcting of the West as a well-merited punishment for our past crimes against the peoples of Asia and Africa.) The arguments ring rather hollow when one contemplates the economic condition of the industrial world today, where even the economies of West Germany and Japan are beginning to falter under the impact of cumulative and continuing oil price rises. Yet all that our leaders can offer us by the way of advice in coping with our creeping impoverishment is to counsel us to bend the knee even

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further, and bow even lower in the direction of Riyad, Baghdad or Abu Dhabi, in the hope that the new arbiters of our destiny will abate their demands.

Another pearl of the conventional wisdom which has been proffered for our delectation these past few years is that the Arabs and Persians will be restrained in their use of the power that the oil weapon gives them by the consideration that, if they weaken the West economically, especially by the imposition of high oil prices, they will impair the West's ability to contain the Soviet Union and to prevent Russian domination of the Middle East. It is a pretty tale, its only flaw being that there is not a shred of evidence to support it. On the contrary, by their behaviour over the past 10 years the Middle East members of OPEC have played the Soviet Union's game for her, to such a degree that they could not have improved on their performance if their organization's headquarters had been located in Moscow. To take only one example from among many: the year 1979, as all would agree, was a highly dangerous one in the Middle East. It opened with the fall of the Shah and closed with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Yet those 12 months also saw the greatest increases in the price of crude oil that had ever taken place in the entire history of the oil industry in the Middle East. Nor were those increases the full measure of the Middle-Eastern oil states' contempt for the theory of interdependence with which the West is wont to comfort itself. Two days after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Kuwait, as always the bell-wether among the Gulf oil states, raised the price of her oil yet again, and in May 1980, with the Soviet Union consolidating its occupation of Afghanistan by killing Muslims by the hundreds, if not thousands, the Muslim oil states imposed further increases in the price of oil.

It may be, of course, that deep in their hearts the Western proponents of the theory of interdependence do not actually believe in it. Their public affirmations of faith in the rationality of the governments of the Middle-Eastern oil states may simply be camouflage for their private convictions of the actual irrationality of these governments, and for their fears that this irrationality may at any time impel these governments to violent and arbitrary action. "They would do almost anything," a former chairman of Standard Oil of California told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1974. "You are completely at their mercy and that is why I have always felt that it is extremely important to have friendly relationships with those countries." But if the Western governments are convinced of the capriciousness and volatility of the regimes in power in the Middle-Eastern oil states, is a policy of propitiation and subservience the best way of handling them? There is a confusion of thought in the arguments which have led the Western powers, if only by default, to adopt this policy. On the one hand, they project

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onto Eastern minds Western modes of thought, Western values, and Western ideas of moderation and good sense in the conduct of national and international affairs. On the other hand, they *may* acknowledge to themselves (for, to judge by their actions, there is no absolute certainty that all of them do in fact make this acknowledgment) that Middle-Eastern governments, as just observed, are influenced by a very different set of beliefs and sentiments. One can only surmise, in an attempt to resolve the paradox, that the governments of the West have found it expedient to *will* themselves to believe (as a way of stilling their fears) in the ultimate rationality of the regimes now in control of the Middle East's oil. A necessary adjunct to this exercise in self-deception is that a scapegoat should be found to excuse any wilful or erratic behaviour on the part of these regimes; and, by great good fortune, one is conveniently to hand in the shape of Israel.

Finally, it must be said that, by acquiescing so nervelessly over the past decade in the larceny practised by the Middle-Eastern oil states, the Western powers have not only injured their own economics and those of the poorer countries of Asia and Africa, but they have done perhaps irreparable damage to the peoples of the oil states. The revenues from oil of the Middle-Eastern members of OPEC in 1970 were something over $6,000 million. In 1978 they were reckoned to be in excess of $140,000 million, in 1979 they were over $200,000 million, and this year they are estimated to reach $250,000 million. Arabia, Persia and Iraq have been inundated by vast sums of money over the past few years, which, given the nature of their governments and societies, was bound to have the most deleterious and corrupting effects upon them. The derangement that is now evident in every aspect of life in Arabia, Persia and the Gulf poses a serious threat to the safety of Western interests in these countries, a threat which is perhaps even more immediate than that represented by the designs of the Soviet Union. If the West had been more resolute in its resistance to the upward spiral of oil prices, if it had disputed with the utmost vigour the expropriation of the oil companies, and if it had shown its determination to defend, by whatever means were necessary, its right of access to the Gulf's oil, the combined effect may well have been to inject an element of sanity and a measure of calm into the region, even perhaps to have headed off the hysteria which, in the absence of any effective sedative agent, has come to reign there instead. Who knows but that the Shah, his soaring ambitions curbed by Western parsimony over oil revenues and arms supplies, might still be on his throne?

NOW that the strategy pursued by the West in the Gulf since 1971 lies about us in ruins, what are we to do next? Are we to continue with the pretence, in the face of all that has happened in these past nine

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years, that the local powers are either disposed to protect the West's interests or capable of preserving the security of the region, especially against outside powers? And even if we were to persist in this pretence, as the major Western powers seem disposed to, will it suffice in the changed condition of affairs created by the descent of Persia into chaos, the after-effects of the Iraqi-Persian war and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan? Or has the time now come for serious consideration to be given to the projection of Western military power into the area?

Even today, one is inclined to question whether the magnitude of the shift in the balance of power in the Gulf region caused by the Russian occupation of Afganistan has been fully grasped in the West. Certainly there seems to be little real appreciation, as opposed to ritual huffing and puffing, of the need for the West's response to be on the same scale of magnitude. There is a tendency instead, at least in some quarters, to try to divest the situation of its urgency —even to make out a case for inaction—by advancing various hypotheses designed to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was impelled to act as she did against the Afghans, not out of aggressive intent but for valid reasons of state. If the extension of a Russian ascendancy over Afghanistan is a natural, or at least a logical, development arising from the Soviet Union's position in Asia, and therefore, by implication, one that should not give rise to undue alarm in the West, then why was Britain at such pains up to 1947 to preserve the independence of Afghanistan as a neutral buffer state? Why, after an interval of 30 years in which there has been a great expansion of Russian power around the globe, including the Middle East, should the destruction of Afghanistan's independence now be of less moment to the West? The questions, one trusts, will be taken as rhetorical.

The evidence of the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions towards the Gulf is surely unmistakable. Why otherwise should the Russians be established in South Yemen and Ethiopia, why should they be linked by defensive treaties to Iraq and Syria, why else should they have incurred the odium of being labelled aggressors in Afghanistan? The Gulf's oil is one of the great strategic prizes in the world, possession of which would place the Soviet Union in a position to throttle the economies of Western Europe and Japan, and to tilt the balance of world power decisively and perhaps irrevocably. What other strategic initiatives may be portended by the subjugation of Afghanistan is a matter for wild surmise. Afghanistan is the northern gateway to the Indian sub-continent. It is also the eastern gateway to Persia. Even more resplendent distant prospects, however, may be visible from the battlements of the Kremlin. After his crushing defeat of the Turcomans at Geok Tepe in 1881, the Russian Commander-in-chief in Turkestan, General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobolev, wrote:

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> To my mind the whole Central Asian Question is as clear as the daylight. If it does not enable us in a comparatively short time to take seriously in hand the Eastern Question, in other words, to dominate the Bosporus, the Asiatic hide is not worth the tanning. Sooner or later Russian statesmen will have to recognize the fact that Russia must rule the Bosporus; that on this depends not only her greatness as a Power of the first magnitude, but also her defensive security, and the corresponding development of her manufactures and trade. Without a serious demonstration in the direction of India, in all probability on the side of Kandahar, a war for the Balkan Peninsula is not to be thought of. It is indispensable to maintain in Central Asia, at the gates of the corresponding theatre of war, a powerful body of troops, fully equipped, and seriously mobilized.

It is perhaps worth recalling in this connexion that in nearly every crisis that arose over the Turkish Straits in the nineteenth century a Russian intrigue was concurrently set on foot in Afghanistan or Persia or both. To take but one example: at the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, despite a specific recognition five years earlier by the Russian foreign minister, Prince Gorchakov, "that Afghanistan was completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence," a plan for the invasion of India was drawn up by Skobolev, and a Russian mission was despatched to Kabul to urge the amir "to treat the English with deceit and fraud, until the present cold season passes away, when the Almighty Will will be made manifest to you; that is to say, the Russian Government having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will come to your assistance." The contemporary parallels require no delineation. Who is to say that the Straits of Hormuz are today the only straits that the Russians have in their sights? "The Game," as Mahbub Ali, the Pathan horse-trader, told Kim, "is so large that one sees but a little at a time."

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A View from the USA

Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf

Albert Wohlstetter

A PERSISTENT objective of American policy has been to be able to deter or fight a big war in the centre of Europe, and also to handle a smaller war occurring at the same time or shortly before it. In the early 1960s, in fact, American policy aimed at being able to deal with such a "half-war" without compromising our ability to fight *two* large wars at the same time or immediately afterwards. By the end of the 1970s American policy makers had lowered their sights. They aimed at a capability for dealing with "one-and-a-half" rather than "two-and-a-half" wars. It is not clear that the reduction from two to one big war represented a decrease in our estimates of the probability that we might have to fight two rather than one. It may simply have represented our decreasing willingness to maintain a prudent defence. There was quite a bit of fuzziness in the early, as in the more recent, policy. Nonetheless, whatever can be said about the "whole" or big wars, we continue to recognize the need to deal adequately with a "half-war." Its importance has become more rather than less obvious with time, and in particular with the deterioration of the position of the West in the Persian Gulf. The disasters to alliance policy there and the critical dangers they imply for the American alliance system are now too evident to require extended comment.

For a "small" war in the Persian Gulf might be small compared to a big war in the centre of Europe only in the sense that it would engage fewer forces in battle. The stakes in such a small war could be very large—no less than the cohesion of the alliance itself. Major US allies in Western Europe and in north-east Asia vary in their dependence on oil from the Gulf, but their dependency is very great. It is so great that it makes little sense to ask whether an attack on the Gulf is less important than an attack on the European centre. An attack in the Gulf would amount to an indirect attack on the centre.

In the recent past, it was common to feel that the protection of alliance interests in the Gulf would not call for any exercise of American or alliance power: the Russians would not risk intervention in so vital a spot for the Western alliance and the contending regional forces would balance out. If the Russians did risk it, or if regional powers did not balance out, it would not much matter. Whatever countries were in control of Persian Gulf oil would have to sell it. They could not drink it. And they had no better place to sell it than to Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.

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However, the experience of the last few years reminds us that whoever controls the swing production of oil can interrupt production not only for economic ends, as did the Iranians and Saudis in 1974, but for political ends, as did the Saudis in 1973. Control of a larger fraction of the oil by a radical state in the area could be considerably worse. And Soviet political control could be deadly. Members of the alliance have tended to neglect potential small wars in the Gulf—apparently just because they would be comparatively small in the size of forces engaged.

Because a war in the Persian Gulf would be small compared to the big war in Europe, it was also tempting to think that the US could handle it easily if it could handle the big war—that the capacity to fight a large war *implied* the ability to deal with a small one. The notion that a small war is simply a " lesser included case " of a large one proceeds from the notion, so to speak, that the dog that can handle the cat can easily deal with the kitten. Plausible enough, but not necessarily so. The circumstances governing the use of power in the Persian Gulf today, the meagreness of alliance infrastructure there, the instabilities within and among the regional powers, may call for the application of quite different kinds of power and impose political constraints, time urgencies, and other demands more stringent than those in the centre of Europe. We have, in short, to consider some small wars which are lesser *ex*cluded cases. In any event, the goal of our policy has been and must be to be able to handle a small conflict critical for the alliance without compromising the alliance capability to handle a large conflict in the centre. The demand for a capability in the Gulf is in addition to, not simply part of, the large capability needed in the European centre.

The deterioration of the West's ability to affect events in the Persian Gulf region is the most lucid example of the withdrawal and erosion of Western power to meet the widely separated but potentially critical challenges it now faces. The problem, however, is more general and more fundamental, as is the fallacy of the " lesser included case " which has formed the basis for Alliance planning. Though formal revisions in the NATO treaty are not likely to be feasible, a workable Alliance strategy will have to recognize the critical strategic interconnections between separate potential combat theatres and, in particular, between some inside the NATO treaty area and some outside it. The Alliance needs a basic reconstruction of its strategy if it is to meet challenges on the northern or on the southern flanks of NATO, not to say other potentially critical places outside the NATO formal treaty area, like the Persian Gulf.

IN the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the inadequacies of past alliance policy for the Persian Gulf have become very visible. There is a serious divergence among the allies, but so far both American and other allied responses to the crisis seem largely improvisations. Both here and abroad, political élites

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have yet to meet the challenge of developing a serious and sustained policy capable of correcting the obvious deficiencies of their policies of the preceding decade. Yet the goals that were defined before the crisis by American policy makers for dealing with a "half-war"—in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere—seem quite reasonable.

American policy makers have said in the past that:

(1) We want to be able to protect critical alliance interests that are endangered by a non-nuclear attack on the periphery by meeting such an attack at its own level—that is, without resort to nuclear weapons or to the bluff that we would use nuclear weapons.[1]

(2) We want our response to be rapid and decisive enough to frustrate a quick takeover which would present us with a *fait accompli*.[2]

(3) We want to have such a capability steadily without sacrificing our capability to fight or to deter a large war happening at the same time or shortly thereafter.[3]

(4) We want a reliable capability—one that will "meet a high standard of confidence"[4]—rather than only to create some small uncertainty for the other side; we want more than a long shot for our side.

These four objectives seem eminently reasonable given the massive size of the stakes in a war for control of oil in the Persian Gulf. They define the criterion set down by the Secretary of Defense in his *Annual Reports* for FY 1979 and FY 1980 for determining the adequacy of our power projection capability.

It is clear, however, that the steps so far taken and those announced by the US government make up only a small part of such an adequate power projection policy for the Gulf. The two carrier task groups stationed near the Gulf in the spring of 1980 comprise essentially all the fire power that can be brought quickly to bear in response to an invasion endangering alliance interests there. And according to plans announced so far, we do not plan to keep this large a presence there steadily. Yet in the event of a Soviet invasion, Soviet medium bombers based on land in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and staging in Yemen could attack the carriers in the Arabian Sea along many axes. They could thus impose severe problems on the carriers simply to defend themselves, not to say to project power on shore as well. It is questionable how much fire power two carrier task groups could then bring to bear in the critical upper Gulf.

Moreover, these carriers were drawn from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and from the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific; the move cuts in half the number of our carriers deployed in those fleets. Yet these fleets were already stretched thin. The North Korean build-up,

[1] Department of Defense *Annual Report*, FY 1979, p. 80; FY 1980, p. 75.
[2] Ibid. FY 1979, p. 225.
[3] Ibid. p. 80.
[4] Ibid.

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the assassination of Park, and the attendant uncertainties have not lessened the dangers in the western Pacific. Threats of a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand increase the dangers in the future. Nor has the recent death of Tito, the uncertainties in his succession and the likely Soviet pressures in the Balkans reduced the dangers in the Mediterranean. The current American build-up in the Persian Gulf, then, does compromise our ability to fight a big war elsewhere—or even a second half-war. It therefore violates one of the requirements stipulated by the Secretary of Defense for achieving an adequate capability to project power.

WE might, of course, respond to a Soviet incursion by escalation, that is, by starting a war elsewhere or by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. That, however, would indicate another inadequacy in the capability we have developed so far, if we take seriously the Secretary's criterion for testing adequacy: we want to be able to meet a conventional incursion on its own terms. It is one more indication that we have not yet fielded, nor have we yet projected a serious sustained programme for defending alliance interests in the Gulf.

This does not, of course, mean certain disaster. The Secretary of Defense has been quoted as saying that we could not be certain of the outcome of conflict there, but then neither could the Soviet Union. This is plainly the case. (Neither side in a war can be certain of the outcome.) However, it is not entirely reassuring. As the Secretary has stated in the past, we want a capability that "will meet a high standard of confidence." [5] We want, in short, to do more than create some uncertainty—perhaps only a little—for an adversary. We want the odds on such critical matters to be on our side.

As for the future moves that we have so far projected and are beginning to get under way, they appear also to fall short of what the Secretary requires of an adequate capability. The performance characteristics of a future CX transport aircraft are as yet undefined. It can increase the flexibility of deployments and shorten somewhat the time to reinforce an allied presence in or near the Gulf, but it will not be a substitute for such a presence.

The rapid deployment force of marines presently being organized, which can be expected eventually to be supplied with equipment kept on station somewhere in the Indian Ocean in some sixteen roll-on/roll-off ships, is almost sure to be very useful. However, so far no provision has been made for defending these ships while on station; it appears that the landings that the marines might make with equipment carried on these ships would have to take place a week or so rather than hours after a supposed Soviet incursion; and on the basis of the arrangements and forces announced so far, such landings would have to be uncontested

[5] Ibid.

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" administrative " landings to be feasible. (There is no assurance of or provision for local air cover.)

Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, the countries with which the United States is negotiating for base facilities in or near the region, are not in a position to provide arrangements for an American presence close to the head of the Gulf steadily and in time of peace. Kenya is, of course, very remote, useful for such purposes as bunkering ships and as a liberty port for sailors. Somalia is not quite as far away, but still quite distant and involves many political uncertainties. Oman, the closest and with a leadership that is most forthcoming, nevertheless is subject to many local radical as well as Soviet pressures, and has made clear that it cannot accommodate a steady state American combat presence.

In sum, the US programme so far falls far short of " adequacy " as defined by US standards enunciated before the crisis.

Nonetheless, if American programmes to develop a serious long-term capability to deal with a half-war in the critical Gulf area are still only half-formed—or less than that—such progress puts the United States ahead of its allies. It appears that our major allies have yet to face candidly the dangers made evident by the recent crises in the Gulf region. Yet they have a larger and even more direct stake in the area.

The Need for Non-military as well as Military Measures for the Security of Oil

About 20 of the 50 million barrels of oil consumed every day by the non-communist world come from the Persian Gulf. A well-designed programme of non-military measures could significantly reduce our dependency and that of our allies on Persian Gulf oil, and such a programme is urgent. However, unless Western economic policies are much more far-sighted than seems plausible, and unless policy makers are much more willing to risk popular disapproval and transient domestic political difficulties, allied dependency is likely to persist for a long time to come. An improved military capability to protect Persian Gulf oil is therefore essential. But in the past decade, while allied military capability to affect events there has been weakening, allied dependency on the Gulf has been on the increase.

The British, who had been the dominant power in the Gulf for 150 years, began the debate leading to their withdrawal not long after the return of the Labour Party in October 1964—with only a modest interest displayed by their major allies in Europe. Yet from 1964 to 1977, West Europe's imports of oil from the Persian Gulf grew from 58·9 per cent of its total oil consumption to 64·8 per cent. Moreover, since oil consumption was increasing as a percentage of primary energy consumed, West Europe was increasing its dependency on the Persian Gulf even more than is indicated by figures on Persian Gulf oil as a percentage of total oil consumed. In percentage of primary energy consumed, European oil imported from the Gulf between 1964 and 1977 grew

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from 24·5 per cent to 35 per cent. In Japan, Persian Gulf imports as a percentage of primary energy consumed increased from 44 per cent in 1964 to 59·2 per cent in 1977. Some of our major European allies increased dependency even more rapidly than Japan. French imports from the Persian Gulf as a percentage of primary energy consumed increased very rapidly from 21·1 per cent in 1964 to 51·6 per cent in 1976, making France almost as vulnerable as the Japanese. They declined to 46·3 per cent in 1977, which is still more than double their 1964 dependency. France consumes much more energy in the form of oil than countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, which has substantial amounts of coal. American imports from the Persian Gulf in the same period grew very rapidly in percentage of primary energy consumed. However, since the US produces much of the oil it consumes and has extensive domestic sources of energy besides oil, its dependency is much smaller than that of Europe or Japan. In percentage of primary energy consumed in the United States, American imports from the Persian Gulf for oil grew from 1·4 per cent in 1964 to 8·4 per cent in 1977. The trends over time are indicated in Figures 1 and 2 and in Table 1.

Adversary Strategies for Exploiting Potential Allied Divergence

One point that emerges, then, from even a rudimentary economic analysis of alliance dependency on oil from the Gulf is that the direct dependency of our allies not only exceeds our own, but varies greatly among themselves. This does not mean, as is sometimes suggested, that Persian Gulf oil is "vital" for our allies but only "important" and not "vital" for us. Simple dichotomies between "vital" and "non-vital," or "important" and "not important," of course, approximate only crudely differences within the continuously varying and interdependent interests of our allies and ourselves. In the long run if the alliance itself is, as we have frequently affirmed, essential for us, oil which is essential for our allies is also essential for us. However, it does mean that our allies will have different short run vulnerabilities.

The short-term interests of our allies, therefore, may frequently diverge from each other's and particularly from our own. This has implications for an understanding of the potential aims and strategies of an adversary in the Gulf. The persistent and critical dependency of the Alliance on Persian Gulf oil and the potential divergence among our allies make clear that hostile political control over the flow of oil from the Gulf—the ability of an adversary either to deny or to offer an assured supply to Europe and Japan—is a lever capable of prying the alliance apart. An attack in this region outside the NATO treaty area (and many thousands of miles from our major ally in north-east Asia) would plainly involve smaller risks to the Soviet Union than a direct assault on the NATO centre. Yet it would strike at the heart of NATO—and at the American alliance with Japan.

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Figure 1

Persian Gulf Oil Imports as a Percentage of Oil Consumption*



Sources and methods of preparation: Derived from tables on apparent supply of crude petroleum and world movement of crude petroleum in United Nations, *World Energy Supplies*, various volumes: no. 15, 1961-70; no. 21, 1972-76; no. 22, 1973-78. The oil component of total energy consumption was increased by 5 per cent to account for non-energy oil uses. Hydro and nuclear electricity have been converted to primary energy by dividing by 0·373. Crude oil consumption and imports were adjusted to account for trade in refined petroleum products.

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Figure 2

Persian Gulf Oil Imports as a Percentage Primary Energy Consumption*



*It is important to note that France imports approximately an additional 10 per cent of crude oil to be refined into finished products for export. We have excluded this 10 per cent of crude oil imports in our calculations, though the refining activity produces revenue and would be interrupted if the oil imports were not available.

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TABLE 1

Persian Gulf Oil Imports as Percentages of Total Oil Imports and Total Energy Consumption

Year	(1)[1] MTOE*	(2)[2] MTOE*	(3)[3] MTOE*	(4)[4] MTOE*	(5)[5] %	(6)[6] %	(7)[7] %	(8)[8] %	(9)[9] %
				United States					
1964	1,207	466	72	17	39	6	1	4	24
1968	1,465	562	90	13	38	6	1	2	14
1972	1,728	692	224	43	40	13	3	6	19
1976	1,789	745	346	130	42	19	7	17	38
1977	1,816	788	394	152	43	22	8	19	39
				Japan					
1964	123	93	63	54	75	51	44	59	85
1968	193	123	124	112	64	64	58	91	91
1972	280	215	217	178	77	77	64	83	82
1976	318	233	233	186	73	73	59	80	80
1977	321	241	242	190	75	75	59	79	79
				Western Europe					
1964	743	309	293	182	42	39	24	59	62
1968	875	466	443	240	53	51	27	52	54
1972	1,084	638	621	391	59	57	36	61	63
1976	1,154	641	624	432	56	54	37	67	69
1977	1,160	627	592	406	54	51	35	65	69

France†

1964	106	45	43	22	43	41	21	49	52
1968	127	72	69	34	57	55	27	47	49
1972	163	111	109	71	68	67	44	64	65
1976	171	113	112	88	66	66	52	78	79
1977	176	110	109	82	63	62	46	74	75

Sources and methods of preparation: Derived from tables on apparent supply of crude petroleum and world movement of crude petroleum, in the United Nations, *World Energy Supplies*, various volumes: no. 15, 1961-70; no. 21, 1972-76; no. 22, 1973-78. The oil component of total energy consumption was increased by 5 per cent to account for non-energy oil uses. Hydro and nuclear electricity have been converted to primary energy by dividing by 0·373. Crude oil consumption and imports were adjusted to account for trade in refined petroleum products.

* Million metric tons oil equivalent.
[1] Total primary energy consumption.
[2] Total crude oil consumption.
[3] Total crude oil imports.
[4] Total Persian Gulf crude oil imports.
[5] Oil consumption divided by energy consumption.
[6] Oil imports divided by energy consumption.
[7] Persian Gulf oil imports divided by energy consumption.
[8] Persian Gulf oil imports divided by oil consumption.
[9] Persian Gulf oil imports divided by oil import.

† It is important to note that France imports approximately an additional 10 per cent of crude oil to be refined into finished products for export. We have excluded this 10 per cent of crude oil imports in our calculations, though the refining activity produces revenue and would be interrupted if the oil imports were not available.

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Hostile Control of Oil from the Upper Gulf

What should merit study, therefore, are contingencies in the upper Persian gulf in which the objective of Soviet strategy would be not to destroy or even to interrupt the flow of oil, but to gain political control over the flow, to be able either to assure a supply of oil at a tolerable economic price to Europe and Japan—or to cut it off. Some government studies have examined contingencies in which Soviet objectives or those of regional powers have included the destruction of the wells or of the means of shipping the oil, or blocking its passage. These are important cases, worth studying especially in connexion with a conflict in the Gulf occurring at the same time or shortly before an extended conventional war in the centre of Europe. Our plans, at least since the second world war, have always recognized the crucial wartime importance of Gulf oil.[6] However, we have centred less attention on the damage the West would incur from hostile political control of the oil it requires during peacetime, whether that control is exercised by the Soviet Union or a radical state in the region, and no matter how obtained—by subversion or external pressure or the actual use of military force.

Soviet Interest in the Persian Gulf

The Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf sometimes is said, perhaps by way of reassurance, to be much less than that of the West: it is not in their case a "vital interest"; therefore they are hardly likely to challenge the West there. Such a judgment appears to be based on the fact that, at present, the Soviets produce more oil than they consume. The well-known study by the CIA in 1977, indicating that the Soviet Union will *become* a net importer of oil in the 1980s, seems then to qualify but does not eliminate the implicit optimism of this evaluation. That time is not yet here, and even then the Soviet Union will not "need" the oil as much as the West does.

However, the Soviet Union could derive much wider-ranging benefits from controlling Gulf oil than the opportunity merely to consume it. Reserves in the Persian Gulf in the first place represent an enormous economic asset worth at current prices perhaps 30 trillion dollars. More importantly, the income stream from the use of these assets would represent a very large increment in their gross resources and in the potential for exercising political and military influence. After all, the present Persian Gulf oil producers consume only a tiny fraction of the oil they produce. This is part of the reason that they—and not the United States nor the Soviet Union, which are the largest producers—have controlled the marginal production of oil. They can raise or lower their production by large amounts, and so have been able to affect the world price. Thirdly, and more relevant for our purposes, Soviet control

[6] See JCS 1769/1, Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 Apr. 1947, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1978), p. 72.

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of the marginal or "swing" production would, in so far as Soviet interests are opposed to those of the NATO alliance and to the Japanese alliance with the United States, be of enormous benefit to them precisely because the oil is critical in peacetime as well as in wartime for our major allies. And evidence abounds that the Soviets have directed their efforts for years at weakening or breaking up the American alliance system, whatever other ambitions may be driving them.

In fact, the Soviets have usually deprecated the notion that they were going to become importers of oil and denied that they had any interest either in oil from the Gulf or in a warm water port there. Very recently they have indicated that they may be a potential consumer of Middle Eastern oil and made this the occasion to propose an all-European conference of their own on the security of oil routes from the Persian Gulf—as an alternative to the selfish American policies which threaten to turn the region into a "powder keg." [7] The prospect of the Russians as a protector of the flow of oil to Europe—against American selfish interests and also possibly against interruption by chaos in regional states—should give us pause. It holds out the possibility not only of some immediate confusion and pressures on regional producers as well as on the industrial consumers of oil allied with the United States. It also suggests the sort of pretext and cover that might be used for a future Soviet intervention.

Such a declaration of Soviet interest in the uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil fits well not only with their denial of President Carter's assertion in his 1980 State of the Union address that there is a Soviet threat to that flow, but with several other themes which the Soviets have been loudly sounding in recent times [8]: First, that it is absurd and even "brainless" for the United States to say that it has "'the right' to regard the Persian Gulf which is thousand of miles from the American shores as a sphere of 'vital interests' and even to use military force to preserve the American monopolies' 'hold on the area'." Secondly, that such an assertion is part of the US "claim to the role of 'world policeman'" and thirdly, that the Soviet Union does have the right to ensure its security interests in "neighbouring" areas—that, in short, areas near the Soviet Union are part of its sphere of interest, not ours.

The notion that the interests of a state diminish steadily with distance from it has some base in traditional geopolitical theories. It was never rigorously true and makes a particularly bad fit for the current realities of world markets and interdependencies and today's technologies of military as well as civilian transport and communications, and weapons delivery. However, it has a certain resonance in the Third World, and

[7] Dan Fisher, "Russia Urges Europe Parley on Mideast Oil Security," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 Mar. 1980.

[8] For an excellent summary Soviet statement of these themes, see the article written by Sergei Losev, director general of the official Soviet news agency Tass, for *US News and World Report*, "Carter Wants a Confrontation," 11 Feb. 1980.

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specifically in the Gulf. It underlay much of the regionalism propounded in the 1960s in Europe and in the United States, and formed part of the background for the withdrawal of the British from the Gulf and the failure of the French and West Germans to recognize the value of the British or other alliance presence there as a contribution to NATO; and for the American failure to work out a joint alliance contribution for the protection of NATO and Japanese interests there, to fill the vacuum left by the British. The confusions and dangers of a revival of this old sphere of influence notion have a wider direct relevance than their application to the Persian Gulf. Our major allies are all much closer to the Soviet Union than they are to the United States. Norway and Turkey border the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany is only a few hundred miles away—about as far as the head of the Gulf.

Soviet (and Russian) Interests in the Northern Tier

The Soviet Union has had an interest in extending its influence and control in Afghanistan and in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey—the "northern tier" of the Middle East—almost since the creation of the Soviet Union near the end of the first world war. One of the first violations of Soviet avowals at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty had to do with its sponsorship of a separatist movement in Iranian Gilan and Azerbaijan. In fact, Soviet interests in some respects continue the long term tsarist ambitions there, but with pertinent differences. In the "Great Game" between tsarist Russia and England, the northern tier figured as barrier or gateway to India. The Persian Gulf countries themselves, including those in the lower Gulf, were also regarded as one of the gateways to India. Since India's independence and in particular since the critical growth in importance of oil for industrial societies, the Persian Gulf has itself become the major regional stake in the "game." The Foreign Offices of the West have sometimes been confused by the change in the stakes. Our own Department of State at the beginning of the 1950s misunderstood the importance of Afghanistan for this reason among others. It turned Afghanistan away when it requested aid and military protection.

After the second world war, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan formed a critical part of a barrier in the air and on the ground separating the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In the early 1950s that barrier extended without a break from the North Cape of Norway to south-east Asia and beyond. Coming from the West, a Russian transport plane would have had to fly about 13,000 nautical miles (nm) non-stop to reach the Gulf. Figure 3 illustrates this. The thick black line marks the land barrier. The long mostly dashed line starting from Russia's Kola Peninsula in the north to the upper Gulf marks the air route. Its short unbroken segment covers the maximum length a Russian transport plane could fly without a refuelling stop. The situation was not much better for the Russians coming from the

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
Figure 3
Air Access in Early 1950s
U.S. able to respond from nearby on basis of ambiguous warning
Soviet airlift infeasible
U.S. distance: 990 nm
USSR distance: over 13,000 nm all in one hop
U.S.: high confidence access by United States
USSR: high confidence access by Soviet Union
Neutrals blocking Soviet Union
Neutrals unlikely to block Soviet Union

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
Figure 4
Air Access 1979
U.S. distance: 7,265 nm
Longest hop: 2,230 nm
USSR distance: 725 nm
U.S. needs intercontinental airlift but enroute staging is uncertain
Soviet Union able to act from nearby with no staging or refueling required
U.S.: high confidence access by United States
USSR: high confidence access by Soviet Union
Neutrals blocking Soviet Union
Neutrals unlikely to block Soviet Union
Western-aligned but unlikely to block Soviet Union

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east. Starting from Vladivostok they would have had to travel for 7,000 nm. In short, they had no way of reaching the Gulf by air.

The United States and its allies, on the other hand, had access in 1950 to base facilities and air space along the northern and southern littoral of the Mediterranean and its major islands, and access to major bases in the Gulf. The distance from Incirlik in Turkey to some key points in the Gulf was a little less than 1,000 nm. In Figure 3, the arrow shows one such route from Incirlik to the Upper Gulf.

SINCE the 1950s, the relative position of the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies has been almost reversed. It is now the United States which has major difficulties with air space and base facilities. The Soviet Union is now some 500 to 1,000 nm from the Upper Gulf along politically and militarily feasible routes. The United States, on the other hand, at the end of the 1970s would have had to travel nearly 7,300 nm from Fort Riley, Kansas in order to lift heavy ground forces to Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and would have had to make three stops on the way. Figure 4 presents this change. The air barrier has been penetrated in many places, but most pertinently in Iran: the short arrows show the Soviets taking off from bases in southern Russia and Afghanistan, while the long arrow indicates the lift from the United States, starting from the interior of the American continent.

The change came gradually and almost without notice by the West. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union breached the air barrier in Yugoslavia, with permission to fly reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare flights, and then continued to probe for at least intermittent openings elsewhere and specifically in the northern tier during the 1970s. The crumbling of the ability of the Iranians to offer any convincing defence of their air space marks the culmination of a long period of increasing Soviet over-flights with or without permission of the barrier countries. The access the Soviets had obtained by 1980 by air alone represents a vast increase in their ability to project power rapidly into the Gulf region. Since they started with a negligible capability in this area so critical for the alliance, we must count this change as one of the most important alterations in the strategic situation of the West since the first world war —or indeed since the second world war.

A parallel change has taken place in the availability of naval facilities for the alliance. Figures 5 and 6 present this change.

US Power and the Short and Long Run Interests of our Allies

With few exceptions, our allies have been much more reserved than the US government about the dangers to the security of the Gulf, and therefore to themselves, which are implicit in the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

French statements, for example, after the Afghan invasion have said little about the interests of the alliance in this region outside the NATO

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

Figure 5
Naval Facilities Available to United States and Soviet Union 1950

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

Figure 6
Naval Facilities Available to United States and Soviet Union 1979

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treaty area. And little or nothing about the need for NATO jointly to increase its power to defend its interests there. And nothing in public about facilitating the application of American military power to help protect French and other European interests. (This does not necessarily mean that the French are unwilling to provide some help—like the regional powers—in less public form.)

In public they have been concerned, rather, to stress the importance of not increasing tensions excessively—of saving *détente.* Giscard d'Estaing has issued a joint communiqué with Indira Gandhi saying that the invasion of Afghanistan was "unacceptable," but without any mention of the identity of the invader. The communiqué fits the fluctuating inconsistent stance that Mrs Gandhi had adopted after the invasion. That stance has varied between explicit support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (like her support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and her father's support of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956), and the view that the invasion was unfortunate but only a response to prior American interference; and unfortunate in particular because it gave the Americans a pretext for continuing or increasing their presence in the Indian Ocean. The emphasis in the joint communiqué on the need as soon as possible to lessen tensions in the area, as Raymond Aron has suggested, really means an acceptance of the invasion as a *fait accompli* in spite of the nominal declaration that it is unacceptable.[9]

West German reaction has been somewhat more forthcoming, but still rather cautious and concerned about the pressures that a forward German stance might invite. Chancellor Schmidt has taken the lead in the important matter of bolstering Turkey, a NATO country whose strategic position for the defence of the Persian Gulf is of maximum importance. But the joint communiqué, which Chancellor Schmidt issued together with Giscard d'Estaing,[10] was only a partial advance over the communiqué issued by Giscard with Indira. The communiqué strongly condemned the invasion of Afghanistan and indicated that *détente* could not sustain "*another*" shock of the same order. "*Détente,*" this implies, has sustained the shock of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

There have been encouraging German statements expressing "solidarity" with the United States in its positions on the Gulf, but such expressions seem to offer moral support to protection of American interests there rather than a recognition that the alliance interests that are most directly affected are German and other European interests. In fact, there has been recent discussion in Germany of a rather scholastic sort on the question of "the divisibility of *détente*," [11] with

[9] Raymond Aron, "L'inacceptable," in *L'Express*, 2–3 Feb. 1980. He said it meant "en bref, accepter l'inacceptable."

[10] Joseph Fitchett, "France, Germany Condemn Soviet Afghan Actions," *International Herald Tribune,* Zurich, 6 Feb. 1980. See also "A Fine French-German Duet with a Few Fuzzy Notes," *The Economist* 9 Feb. 1980.

[11] Theo Sommer, "Die Spannung Muss Teilbar Bleiben," *Die Zeit,* 11 Jan 1980.

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much influential opinion coming down on the side of those who feel that "*détente* must remain divisible." To an American, this appears to mean a division in which Europeans would continue to carry out *détente* in Europe while the Americans might be engaged in a confrontation in the Gulf, and in which the chief interest for the Europeans would seem to be to make certain that the Americans manage the crisis there soberly and with restraint. For there is much evidence that our major allies strongly doubt the idea expressed in President Carter's State of the Union message that "the implications" of the invasion of Afghanistan "could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the second world war." [12] Some of these implications have to do with the long-term growth in Soviet power that preceded the invasion and the willingness of the Soviets to use that power in this area so critical for the alliance. This secular change may indeed present latent dangers more serious than any since the second world war. Nonetheless, many Europeans think that the President's State of the Union message exaggerates the threat.

It is not only our major allies in Europe and in Japan who seem to be lukewarm about perils in the Persian Gulf region that affect them more directly than they do us. It is also true of the conservative and centrist states in the region which, in the past, have leaned toward the West. They are reluctant to offer facilities for an American presence in their countries, even though a continuing presence in or very near the Gulf seems essential to match the massive Soviet presence not only in Afghanistan but in the Transcaucasus and the Transcaspian. Oman, which has been the most forthright and eager to help, has made clear that they want no permanent American presence nor much expansion of the modest but useful employment of Omani facilities which we have been making and that their major interest is in having us supply the means for Omani forces themselves to defend the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia, whose fear of Soviet aggression is manifest, obviously has a huge stake in protection from outside. Nonetheless, it has made clear that it has no intention of allowing American forces to be stationed on Saudi bases and that they believe that such a presence would make it impossible to rid the Gulf of the Soviet presence.[13]

Like ourselves, the Saudis sometimes want incompatible things. They do want protection against Soviet aggression which the regional powers are palpably unable to repel themselves. But keeping American or other alliance forces out of the Gulf regions would not rid the Gulf of the Soviet presence, even if the Russians acquired no further bases near the

[12] *New York Times*, 24 Jan. 1980.

[13] *Wall Street Journal*, 4 Mar. 1980. See the programme advanced by Abdul Rahman Mansouri, first deputy foreign minister, in an interview with a *Wall Street Journal* staff reporter: "Saudi Leader Urges Three-Point Program for Mideast Stability." Compare the anonymous Saudi policy maker reported in the *New York Times* of 27 Feb. 1980: "We are trying very hard to get the Russians out of the Arab world. How could we condone the presence of another major power in the region?"

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Gulf, gave up their use of facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia, accepted the " neutralization " of Afghanistan, and kept their ships out of the Indian Ocean. They can now have quite direct access to the Gulf from south Russia. Protecting Saudi interests against Soviet attack will require a substantial Western presence in the region. Some of the false premises of past American and NATO policy (as well as that of Saudi Arabia and of Iran under the Shah) had to do with neglect of this requirement. Nonetheless, in reaction to the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan, at least one high Saudi official has announced a three point programme for maintaining stability in the Middle East which involves the dictum that the US as well as other " big " powers should keep out of the region.[14] Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi's oil minister, has recently said, " We do not want to see the superpowers present in our area. We must try to bring back a quiet atmosphere." [15] Like other Saudi officials, Sheik Yamani opposes bases for the United States in Saudi Arabia or indeed, elsewhere in the area. On the other hand, he believes that " If the Soviet Union marched into Saudi Arabian oilfields there would be a third world war because they would be met there by armies of the United States, Europe and Japan." [16] Sheik Yamani is a hard-headed realist on tactics of negotiating terms for the sale of oil; but not, apparently, when it comes to military logistics.

ALL of these reactions from their allies and friends to the evidently increasing dangers in the Persian Gulf have puzzled many Americans. Our major allies are much more vulnerable than we to any shift which would bring a major increment in Persian Gulf oil under Soviet control or under the control of a radical state. After all, as we have already emphasized, by comparison with the US, West Europe derives four, France nearly six, and Japan seven times the proportion of the primary energy it consumes from the Persian Gulf. Are not their interests plainly on the side of joining us in the defence of the Persian Gulf? It it not even more in the interests of the centrist and conservative states in the region to help us prevent a Soviet or radical takeover of their own countries?

Probably so in the long run. But in the near future what concerns each of these states is that joining us in an increased defence of the area is likely to expose them to threats and pressures from the Soviet Union, from forces of the Left inside their own country and, in the case of the regional powers, from their radical neighbours. In the short run, therefore, they worry about the extra risks to which they would be exposed by association with us.

This short-run fear is compounded by a frequently explicit worry about whether the US will be there in the long run to help them—

[14] See the *Wall Street Journal*, 11 Mar. 1980.
[15] London *Reuters*, 7 Feb. 1980.
[16] Ibid.

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whether we will have the will and the power, and specifically the staying power essential to do so. In brief then, just what their net interests are and how much they overlap with ours depends on our will and ability to contribute to the protection of our and their interests in the region. It depends, in short, on the future of US power there.

The Saudis were clearly unsettled in January 1979 when we responded to a Soviet warning not to interfere in the internal affairs of our ally, Iran, by declaring that we had neither the desire nor the ability to do so. We warned the Soviets not to interfere, but since we had said that we could not, it was not clear precisely how we would enforce that warning. The loss of American access to air space and facilities en route and in the region has been related to our hosts' fear of pressures by the Soviet Union or by local powers who see their interests as opposed to ours—pressures that we might not be able to counter. On the other hand, countries in the northern tier and some on the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, have increasingly permitted the Soviet Union to use their air space, even when it seems obviously to be directed against their own and allied interests. The Saudis, for example, who have worried about the threat against them presented by the Marxist regime of South Yemen, disclosed recently that Moscow had requested and received permission to send military planes over Saudi territory on the way to South Yemen.[17] This illustrates once again the point that weakness in our ability to affect events in the region has a cumulative effect. Allies who might facilitate our projection of power there have hesitated to do so, and in fact have greatly restricted our access in recent years. This in turn has weakened our ability to protect them, and so on. In recent years it has seemed as if we " can't win for losing."

On the other hand, as the example of Russian power in the region will suggest, a reversal of the trend toward decreasing power is also likely to be self-reinforcing; and even more so since our long-run interests are closer to those of our allies than are the interests of the Russians.

Threats from Inside the Region and Conflicting Interests of Radical States

The Soviet Union is not the only potential source of harm to Alliance interests in the Gulf. Some radical states inside the region threaten their neighbours, either overtly or indirectly by supporting subversion or revolutionary forces, and even more or less spontaneously generated internal changes can be adverse. The radical Islamic transformation of Iran, for example, has done substantial direct damage already and has introduced further instabilities that could lead to something worse: threats against Iran's neighbours, the stirring up of Shi'ite minorities within countries nearby led by Sunni governments, disruptive local wars

[17] *New York Times*, 27 Feb. 1980.

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which the chaotic government in Iran might provoke or for which it might merely provide a tempting opportunity, the disintegration of Iran into several separate states (Azerbaijan, Arabistan, Turkmenistan, etc.), and, in the end, the extension of radical hostile control over a larger proportion of Gulf oil. The collapse of the Shah in any case removed a considerable counterweight to the longstanding ambitions of Iran against Kuwait, Khuzistan and Saudi Arabia, and of South Yemen against Oman, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and so on.

Iraq's ineptly conceived and executed invasion of Iran interrupted the flow of oil from both countries. It has raised the spot price of oil on the world market by $10 a barrel, and has begun to affect the average price. If it continues for much longer, it might cut the GNP of the non-communist industrial countries—now in a recession—by as much as 1 or 2 per cent—perhaps $100 billion. Iran might spread the war to other Gulf states supporting Iraq, further cutting the flow of oil. The war could end, moreover, in any of several ways that would gather more oil production and oil reserves into hostile hands. It could end, after all Iraq's stumbling, in an Iraqi victory decisive enough to whet its appetite for more. Or it could end with a loss of internal control by one or other of the two contending powers, and perhaps open the way for subversion and Soviet domination. Or the West might be lucky.

The gist of the matter is that at this point in time the West has very little power to shape events that may do it either modest or very great harm. If this particular conflict ends less badly, others more damaging may be waiting in the wings.

SINCE the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf and the American decision (made near the end of the Johnson administration and reaffirmed by Nixon) not to replace the British with an American or allied presence in the area, the historic instabilities that continue to be endemic to this region have become too obvious to ignore. There is hardly a boundary in the Arabian Peninsula which has not been a matter of dispute among rival states. And the two countries we have looked to, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s, as monitors of order in the Gulf region—Iran and Saudi Arabia—have been among the states advancing dubious territorial claims.[18]

The ethnic, tribal, dynastic, religious, political, and ideological rivalries among states are compounded by the enormous instabilities internal to each of them. The internal instabilities have been intensified by the internal migrations and dislocations involved in the extremely rapid

[18] For a precise, scholarly account of some of these boundary disputes, see for example, J. B. Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers* (London, 1964). For a vigorous discussion of the failure of Western policies to take into account the instabilities of this area, see his article, "Of Valuable Oil and Worthless Policies," *Encounter*, June 1979, Vol. 52, No. 6, p. 76, and his recent book *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (London, 1980).

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economic change financed by swollen oil revenues. Moreover, the ambitious economic development of many of these countries has also brought in a large influx of foreign workers, in some cases rivalling in size the native population.

The fragilities both of the relations among the states and in the internal order within each state have become so plain in the last two years that they hardly need underlining. It is symbolic of the way these interstate and intrastate antagonisms compound each other in key oil-producing areas of the Gulf that Basrah at the centre of oil production in Iraq, which is led by a small Sunni Arab minority, is also the centre of the Shi'ites who make up 55 per cent of Iraq's population (the remainder being mainly non-Arab Sunni—the Kurds); that Khuzistan, the chief oil-producing area in Shi'ite Persian Iran is largely Arab rather than Persian; that Arab Bahrein is half Iranian in population; that in Kuwait, foreigners (of whom 40 per cent are Palestinian) outnumber citizens; that the majority of the population and the overwhelming majority of the working population of Qatar is not Qatari; and that the largest concentration of the Shi'ite minority in Sunni Saudi Arabia is located in the oil-producing Eastern Province (Aramco officials estimate that approximately 40 per cent of its employees are Shi'ite).[19]

The multiplicity of active and latent rivalries within and among these regional states, then, can be deadly. They belie the conventional belief that "multipolarity" is somehow inherently much more benign than a "bipolar" world. The Soviet Union did not invent these explosive instabilities, though it might stir them up or benefit from them no matter how they arise.

YET American and Alliance policy in the last decade relied on these rival shaky governments to compose their differences and to construct formal or informal regional security arrangements—arrangements that were supposed to be able both to control regional antagonisms and to defend regional and Western interests against any likely threat from the Soviet Union.

A National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) on US options in the Persian Gulf in August 1972 opted for "the encouragement of regional cooperation for peace and progress" and for "supporting friendly countries in their efforts to provide for their own security and development."[20] The salient beliefs dominating that choice of policies, according to one of its authors and proponents,[21] were (1) that the American public would not, after Vietnam, accept Americans replacing British in the Gulf; and (2) that Saudi Arabia and Iran did not want any Western presence at all. These salient beliefs may have motivated

[19] *New York Times*, 3 Jan. 1980.
[20] James H. Noyes, *The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979), p. 53.
[21] Ibid.

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the policy, but even if true, they hardly implied that the policy would work. Neither we nor our allies were willing directly to defend our interests with an adequate presence. And the three largest powers in the Gulf, radical Iraq as well as conservative Iran and Saudi Arabia, differed from smaller Gulf powers, such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates, by opposing any Western presence. Therefore, we wanted very much to believe that these unstable rival regional states would settle their rivalries, manage the pressures internal to them, and deal with the potential Soviet threat as well—that they would provide for their own security; and incidentally, that they would want to and would be able to take care of Western interests. We not only wanted to, but like the Red Queen who made a practice of believing several impossible things before breakfast, we actually managed to believe all that.[22]

IF it is difficult in the case of the Western powers to disentangle the realities of power and genuine expectations about power and about threats to their interests in the Gulf from wish and ideology, it is even harder to make such a separation in the statements of the Gulf powers themselves. It would be nice for us as well as for the Kuwaitis and Saudis if we could keep our combat force 7,000 miles away and yet defend them with the speed of light against an attack launched from bases only hundreds of miles away. Only the realities of the state of the art of power projection get in the way of that fond thought. Lasers are not that far advanced. Nonetheless, the Kuwaitis and the Saudis and some other conservative Gulf powers continue to issue declarations about keeping both superpowers out of the region—as if the other superpower really were not there, snugly lodged just beyond its own borders in the Transcaucasus and the Transcaspian. Only the Sultan Qaboos and a few other brave figures in the area are candid on the subject. Similarly, most of the conservative Gulf leaders continue to say that the Palestinian problem is at the centre of all the troubles in the region near the Gulf, even though there is a long sequence of troubles having nothing substantial to do with the Palestinians stretching back in history from the recent Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the fall of the Shah earlier that year; the Soviet-supported takeover by Taraki, Amin, and Karmal in 1978 from Daud, the architect of the Soviet-Afghan relationship; the Iraqi demands, backed up by the Soviets, on Kuwait in the Warbah and the

[22] Some of the men who worked on the Persian Gulf NSSM managed to believe all that for quite a time thereafter. James Noyes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, wrote in his *The Clouded Lens* about regional cooperation on security in the Gulf. The title was not intended to be autobiographical; it referred to the pessimistic predictions about instabilities in the Gulf at the time of the British withdrawal before, as the author put it, "cooperation in the Gulf [had] blossomed far beyond the expectations of even the most optimistic observers . . ." (p. 22). The "blossom" had withered by the time the book appeared in 1979.

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Bubiyan Islands and for an increased share of the Gulf coastline and seabed in 1973; the Yemeni-supported rebellion in the Omani province of Dhofar starting in the mid-1960s; the Egyptian military expedition in North Yemen in the early 1960s; the revival in June 1961 by Kassim of Iraq's dubious claim—as successor state to the Ottoman empire—to all of Kuwait; and so on and on. And European heads of state continue to issue declarations jointly with each other or with heads of conservative Gulf states affirming at least the latter proposition—the primacy of the Palestinian problem—and sometimes the former one—the need and ability of the regional powers to care for the security of the Gulf.

Of course, what is said in private may differ greatly from what is said in public about a Western presence or even about the varied collection of intractable problems connected with the Palestinians.[23] The intense internal pressures, the pressures of the radical states in the Gulf—in particular Iraq—and of intra-Arab politics in general and of Soviet threats, compel discretion. And such pressures are transmitted indirectly to the oil-importing industrial states and inevitably suggest caution to them as well. Nonetheless, prudence differs from caution. Genuine prudence calls for the non-communist industrial importers as well as for the conservative oil exporting states in the Gulf to recognize what are the essential threats to their security there and the intrinsic implausibility of the notion that all of them, including a Soviet threat, can be handled without an exercise of power and combat presence on the part of the West.

The interests of even the conservative states coincide only incompletely with those of the West. Both conservative exporters and industrial importers of oil are interested in trade, but naturally differ about the terms of trade and the division of the economic rents. That is witnessed by the succession of broken agreements, beginning with the Tehran and Tripoli agreements at the start of the 1970s. No American, French or other Western "special relation" with an oil exporting country has served nor is likely to serve to stabilize prices. If the West withdrew such protection as it furnishes, it would risk having the oil come under more hostile control. The price of Gulf oil is likely to be determined neither by its long-run marginal costs, which are very low, nor by any special relationship, but only by the cost of alternative oil or other energy supplies. And the security of Gulf oil for the West will depend on the Western defence of it.

[23] Dr Kissinger reports that he failed his first test in preparing Mr Nixon for a high level meeting by assuming that the Amir of Kuwait put the Arab-Israeli conflict at the forefront of his concern. "Unfortunately, the Amir wanted, above all, to learn what plans the new Administration had for the Persian Gulf after the United Kingdom vacated the area, as it had announced it would do in 1971. What were America's intentions if, for example, Iraq attacked Kuwait?" Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979), p. 51.

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The oil exporters and oil importers differ also on such matters as the optimal size of Western strategic petroleum reserves which may affect both future oil crises (by making the West less vulnerable to OPEC's interruptions in the flow of oil) and national security (by making the West less vulnerable to seizure and manipulation of oil by regional or outside powers who are hostile both to conservative exporters and to the West). The Saudis have strongly opposed increases in Western strategic petroleum reserves. The American strategic reserves are minimal.

Past anticipations of a stable regional equilibrium supported by the "twin pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia now appear to have been extremely unrealistic. Yet this has not prevented the revival of new Western hopes—especially in Europe—for regional security arrangements making a Western presence nearby unnecessary.

In the year or two before it invaded Iran in September 1980, some of these hopes implausibly enough centred increasingly on Iraq.[24] This in spite of the fact that Iraq had been regarded as the most radical state in the region, with a burgeoning military establishment, longstanding ambitions opposed to those of several of its neighbours, a history of meddling in their internal affairs and of recent military incursions against some of them, and a very fragile equilibrium among its own Shi'ite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Sunni Kurds, a governing elite recruited from the small Sunni Arab minority, a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union since 1971, and in spite of all indications that it is the principal opponent of a Western presence in the region.

Early Defense Department studies on the security of the Gulf considered contingencies in which Iraq might, with or without Soviet support, attack a neighbour. In short, they considered Iraq to be a potential troublemaker rather than a policeman.[25] In the year or two before the invasion, some American as well as European officials seemed to take seriously Iraqi suggestions that it was "willing to use its well-equipped army, if necessary, to become the new policeman of the Gulf."[26] Indeed, in spite of the many preliminary skirmishes between Iraq and Iran and broad Iraqi hints in the press that they might take care of the Iranian problem, some officials appeared to toy rather ambiguously with that prospect. It was tempting at least to use the prospect both in seeking a rapprochement with the Iraqis and in reminding the Iranians of the danger in Iran's continued isolation. Dr Brzezinski said,

[24] For one among many reports of such hopes among Western officials, see Richard Burt in the *New York Times*, 23 Dec. 1979.

[25] See Congressional Budget Office, "U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios and Options," *Budget Issue Paper*, FY 1979, Apr. 1978.

[26] Bill Paul, "Baghdad Seeks to Use Oil to Gain Influence, Shed its Radical Image," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 June 1980.

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> We are not interested in the eruption of hostilities there nor in intensifying tension between Iraq and Iran.[27]

But he also said,

> I make two separate propositions. One, that we do not wish to continue the anomalous state of US–Iraqi relations, though we recognize that the road towards improvement is a long one. Secondly, the Iranians themselves ought to consider the potential consequences for Iran of Iran's continued isolation.[28]

And in spite of the continued reiteration by Iraq, for example, in the "Arab National Charter" proposed by Saddam Husayn in February 1980, of the rejection of any Western presence,[29] Dr Brzezinski stated that "We see no fundamental incompatability of interests between the US and Iraq."[30]

Saddam Husayn's National Charter also banned the resort to armed force against any state neighbouring the Arab homeland, but made an explicit exception for the Zionist entity "because it is not considered a state."[31] On the evidence of the Iraqi invasion of September 1980, neither is Iran considered a state. It is uncertain but quite possible that some European and American illusions about Iraq as a potential pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf may even survive the current war. It is worth looking at the source of optimism on the subject.

ONE hopeful sign was when Iraq boosted its estimates of its own proven reserves. It has been said, therefore, that it has less "need" for the oil. However, this is not a very impressive point. For the Iraqis, as for the Soviet Union, control of more substantial fraction of Persian Gulf oil would give it a powerful instrument for extending its political influence and control. And the larger the fraction the better. Moreover, some territorial expansion has a strategic purpose for Iraq, for example, the broadening of its narrow access to the Gulf at the expense of Kuwait, which has the best harbour there.

Another item of evidence given in support of new hopes is the fact that Iraq, which has in the past received its military equipment predominantly from the Soviet Union, broadened its purchases to include the procurement of a considerable number of arms from the West as well —from France, Italy, and West Germany. In particular, it has bought

27 14 Apr. 1980 Brzezinski interview on the *MacNeil/Lehrer Report*.

28 Ibid.

29 Baghdad, *Voice of the Masses*, 8 Feb. 1980. The first principle of the Arab Charter is: 1. The rejection of the presence or the facilitation of the presence of any foreign armies, bases or armed forces in the Arab homeland in any form, under any pretext and guise or for any reason; the isolation of any Arab regime which does not adhere to this principle, boycotting such an Arab regime politically and economically and resisting its policies by all available means.

30 Brzezinski interview on *MacNeil/Lehrer Report*, op. cit.

31 Baghdad, op. cit.

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an advanced fighter, the F–1, from the French. And it has increased its purchases of non-military goods as well. (Some of the non-military goods have a formidable potential for military application. The highly enriched uranium which the French announced they will sell and deliver to Iraq for the purposes of nuclear "research" has only the remotest application in the civilian economy of Iraq, but such concentrated fissile material is the most important and hard to produce component of nuclear weapons and can be quickly incorporated in a weapon assembly. Highly enriched uranium makes feasible weapons of the simplest design—the gun as distinct from the implosion type essential for plutonium. There is some public evidence that the "research" facilities Iraq has been obtaining from Italy might serve Iraq in producing plutonium weapons.)

Such purchases clearly are likely to enhance Iraq's independent military capability, but it is doubtful that they "tie" Iraq to the West. (Kuwait and other traditional monarchies in the region are diversifying their sources of supply to include the Soviet Union.)

The most substantial evidence for the optimistic view has to do with the Soviet Union and the relationship of Iraq's ruling Ba'athist Socialist Renaissance party to the local communist party. The Ba'ath rulers of Iraq have always been a suspicious lot, and there has been evidence that they are increasingly wary of their Soviet partners. There is much to be wary about. The Russians have assisted Marxist *coups* in South Yemen, in Ethiopia, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In some cases they overturned governments that were already aligned with the Soviet Union in order to install ones still more closely aligned with it. Some evidence suggests that the Russians may have been associated with such an attempt in Iraq which failed in April 1978.

The most frequently cited indication of a reversal of alliances or something close to it is based on that rumoured attempt at a *coup* and subsequent statements by Saddam Husayn, the Iraqi leader. In an interview[32] with Arnaud de Borchgrave in July 1978, Husayn has been cited as issuing "his first public warning against Soviet machinations in Africa and the Persian Gulf. 'They won't be satisfied until the whole world becomes Communist'." However, Husayn followed his statement about the Soviet Union seeing "its own security in spreading communism" with the statement that "the US believes its own security lies in having the world with a bourgeois system." Like Mrs Gandhi, he suggests that the *fons et origo malorum* is prior Western, not Soviet, intervention.

Moreover, the degree of independence that he was insisting on from the Soviet Union was greatly exaggerated. Asked whether he had not compromised his independence by allowing Soviet military cargo planes to use Iraqi bases on their way to Ethiopia, Husayn answered,

[32] "A Fresh Warning," interview with Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek*, 17 July 1978.

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> No, we didn't allow Soviet planes to go to Ethiopia via Iraq. We objected and got a formal understanding from the Soviets that these planes would go to South Yemen instead. We deduced, of course, that some of these shipments were going on to Ethiopia by other transport, but there was nothing we could do about that.

Finally, when asked whether Iraq was trying to lessen its dependency on the Soviet Union by diversifying its sources of arms supply and specifically by buying arms from France, Husayn indicated that when he deals with an enemy, "it does not mean the beginning of comprehensive changes in our stand." And that "when Iraq criticizes the policies of a friendly country"—namely, the Soviet Union—"it should not be judged that this is the beginning of a change in relations." So much for the reversal of alliances.

Viewed soberly then, even before the invasion of Iran Husayn's statements were a long way from suggesting the realignment that had been hoped for in various Western capitals. In fact, the position taken in that interview, like more recent statements by Saddam Husayn after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, amount in effect to an exclusion of the West from the Persian Gulf and a continuation of the present configuration of power there—with Iraq dominant among the regional powers, and with the Soviet Union maintaining its present overwhelming preponderance.

AS for the Iraqi reaction to Afganistan, the hopes that were floated on the basis in France, in the United States, and elsewhere in the West for a Westward leaning Iraq on which we might count seem quite dubious. Doubts are raised if one notes in particular that Iraq's condemnation of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was made in the context of repeated Iraqi calls for *both* superpowers to keep out of the Gulf. Such a call is only superficially evenhanded, for the Soviets are there on the ground—very nearby. It continues Iraq's opposition to any US presence in the Indian Ocean or to any military use of the facilities offered by Oman and other conservative states. And it does not alter the fact that the Russian bases in the Transcaucasus and east of the Caspians are only 400 to 1,100 miles away from the largest oil producing regions of the Gulf.

In fact, the first press reports of President Husayn's condemnation of the Soviet move in Afghanistan were misleading. A reading of the actual text of the speech shows that he nowhere explicitly mentions the Soviet Union. There is a great deal on US imperialism, on aggressive Zionists, on the Egyptian regime's capitulatory policy, and on the hostility of some Iranian leaders towards Iraq. In fact, he identifies "the events in Iran and what has recently happened in Afghanistan" as serious because they have "provided the *United States*,[33] whose policy

[33] Italics added.

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has been condemned and whose plots have been defeated, with new opportunities to enter the area, tamper with it and realize its colonialist designs." There are some vague references to imperialist forces, covetous superpowers (in the plural) and to foreign intervention to be opposed in all its forms. But he named no big power other than the United States.

The upshot of the January 1980 speech is simply, then, to reaffirm the longstanding Iraqi call for non-Gulf powers to stay out of the Gulf region.[34] That would prevent the United States and the West European powers from affecting events there, but not the Soviet Union, which has direct and close access to the Gulf from the Transcaucasus and the Transcaspian.

A HYPOTHESIS of possible Soviet-Iraqi cooperation need not and should not assume that Iraq is a Soviet "puppet," that the Ba'ath Socialist Renaissance government has no interests independent of and different from those of the Soviet Union. (Pure puppet states are rather rare: Cuba, for example, is far from being a Soviet puppet. Castro moved against the local Soviet-supported Cuban communists. Nonetheless, he has found no better partner in realizing his own ambitions than the Soviet Union.) It need assume only that there is a considerable intersection of interests between the two states. There has been such an intersection embodied in the past in the Treaty of Friendship and in massive Soviet support in armaments. Currently, it appears that Iraq's long standing territorial ambitions are realizable only with Soviet acquiescence, if not Soviet support. After the Iraqis invaded Iran, some European countries accelerated deliveries to Iraq of equipment that it had previously purchased. It would be extraordinarily shortsighted if the West European powers or the United States were to support Iraq in further adventures. For the Soviet Union, the case is quite different. It apparently has been helping both sides in the Iraq-Iran war, and is likely to benefit from a general disruption in the region, if not necessarily from an Iraqi victory.

Western Presence and Indian Ocean Arms Control

The idea that peace and the legitimate interests of all parties could be preserved if the superpowers would only keep their combat ships out of the Indian Ocean and if they would abandon base facilities on the littoral of that ocean—runs as a common thread through the arguments advanced by quite diverse countries in the region. It continues

[34] Iraq's diplomatic strategy appears to aim at excluding some non-Gulf powers from more than simply the Gulf. According to First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan and the Foreign Minister, Saadoun Hammadi in an interview with Claudia Wright, "One of the targets of Baghdad's effort . . . is the removal of American bases in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus . . ." Claudia Wright, "Iraqi Diplomatic Strategy," *New York Times*, 5 June 1980.

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to be propounded by Iraq and India, which have Treaties of Friendship with the Soviet Union. And, with modifications, it appears in the views of the traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have been aligned with the West. In their case the difference is that, while they oppose a continuous US presence, they base some of their hopes for security on the possibility of the US being able quickly to deploy power into the region in a crisis, and especially in the event of a Soviet attack. But they too declare themselves against a Western and, specifically, against a US presence.

The policies of the United States and the West Europeans themselves were based in the previous decade on the same assumption: that the regional powers could maintain stability and in fact preserve Western interests without a Western presence. Western proposals for Indian Ocean arms control embodied the idea in its most explicit form.

Proposals for arms agreements, much more than unilateral decisions on national defence, are plagued by the need to compare simple ratios of forces on the two sides without any clear criterion of what forces to compare, or of how to make the comparison so as to show that the stability aimed at in the arms control agreement would be achieved if the opposing sides had forces in that ratio. Questions of "stability" are much too complicated to be captured by a simple ratio. Defence planners usually understand that and the process of making decisions among alternatives in national defence, however flawed, usually involves much less rudimentary considerations. However, negotiations with adversaries on force levels and deployments on the two sides have to deal with simple observables if they are to reach conclusion at all. In general, they rely on precisely such rudimentary and hopefully verifiable relationships as force ratios. This frequently has very perverse effects, and nowhere more obviously than in the case of Indian Ocean arms controls. Western proposals for an Indian Ocean arms control agreement in essence have proceeded on the assumption that one need only compare Western bases on the shores of that ocean and Western naval presence there with Soviet bases and Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, the vastly increased Soviet ability to project power in the Persian Gulf region was achieved, as suggested earlier, mainly by the build-up of Soviet combat and military lift forces on Soviet territory, and by a greatly increased ability to penetrate the air and land barriers surrounding them. This capability would not be altered by the withdrawal of both Soviet and American ships from the Indian Ocean, nor by the removal of all foreign bases from the littoral of the Indian Ocean.

One of the American Navy's essential missions is the projection of power ashore. For the foreseeable future, it is clear that this mission will be especially important in the Persian Gulf. The only power the United States has in the Gulf at the present time is embodied in the

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two carrier task groups which it diverted from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and from the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no need for a navy in order to project power to the shores of the Persian Gulf. It can do so from the Transcaucasus or the Transcaspian (and now also from Afghanistan). The mission of the Soviet navy in the Gulf has been largely " sea denial "—that is, to deny the use of that sea to the United States. The Soviet Union could most handily and inexpensively accomplish the mission of sea denial by an Indian Ocean arms control agreement. And such an agreement would have very little effect on its own ability to project power on shore in that region. The agreement could have such an effect only if it extended overland in the Soviet Union very far to the north indeed, perhaps to the Barents and Kara Seas. But in any case, it would call for an implausibly extensive demilitarization of large areas of the Soviet Union itself.

It is worth noting that if the Soviet Union had accepted the last American proposal for Indian Ocean arms control, the United States would not have been able to respond to the crisis in Iran nor to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by moving carrier task groups into the Indian Ocean.

The gist of the trends described earlier in Soviet and Western ability to project power into the Gulf region is that by the end of the 1970s, the Soviets had accumulated the military combat and transport forces, the facilities and the access needed to project massive power very rapidly into key parts of the Upper Gulf. The Western presence, on the other hand (the forces, the infrastructure and the access both en route and in the Gulf), had dwindled drastically. Moreover, contrary to some of the stereotypes about the growth of multipolarity, this was by no means a case of the strength of both superpowers decreasing relative to that of a multiplicity of local powers. The military equipment available to local powers had indeed increased in quality and quantity. However, the power of the Soviet Union in the area, which was very modest at the start of the period, had become by the end of the period quite overwhelming. The West had diminished in its power relative to some of the hostile or unstable states in the region. The Soviet Union had not. No plausible regional security arrangement can counterbalance Soviet power. And no American rapid deployment force based in the United States is likely to be rapid enough.

What is needed is an American and other Western presence able to bring fire power to bear in hours rather than in days or weeks, so as to disrupt the complex—and vulnerable—initial elements of an invasion force. Things can be done to bolster regional defence, but it is inherently implausible to suppose that the small, unstable, and antagonistic rival states in the region are likely to be able to compose their differences, and still less likely that they will be able to defend themselves and Western interests against the Soviet threat. It is remarkable

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that wan hopes for this have been revived once more since the invasion of Afghanistan. Western Europeans who do not feel able to manage a defence of West Europe without a large American military presence should hardly expect the Gulf states to be able to do so.

Meeting the Threat

For our allies inside and outside the Gulf region to expose themselves to the short-term risks entailed in helping us to help them, they must believe first of all that there is a serious and persistent threat to their interests in the Gulf; secondly, that it is possible to do something about it by improving alliance strength; and thirdly, that the leaders of the alliance, and in particular the United States, are developing with some urgency and persistence a serious programme that will be sustained over the long term.

However, it is possible to argue that there really is not much of a threat, that talk of dangers in the Gulf "more serious than any since the second world war" is so much empty rhetoric. The growing preponderance of Soviet strength in this vital area and the weakness of the West may, by a curious inversion, be seized on as a kind of reassurance: the Soviets would never strike at the West in so vital a spot where the West is patently at a disadvantage. That, it is suggested, would mean world war.

This sunny view of the matter can easily be extended in the manner of Dr Pangloss. If the Soviets will not strike the West at a vital point where the West is weak, they are even less likely to strike at a vital point where it is strong. As for non-vital spots, the Soviets would be plainly foolish to risk striking for marginal gains.

The world envisaged in such an argument may not be the best of all possible worlds, but it does seem more satisfactory than the one we find ourselves in. Reasoning of this kind is a way of cheering oneself up. It fails to take the possibility of war seriously, and it fails to understand that some possible wars which never occur can have an important actual effect.

In the event, for example, of a takeover of swing oil production by a radical local state or in the event of an internal or ostensibly internal takeover by a hostile faction inside a swing oil producing state, or in the event of some mixture of these two circumstances, or possibly a combination of the two stirred up or aided by the Soviet Union, it is the West that might have the burden of initiating military action. The Soviet Union would be in the position of warning us to stay out, and one may be sure that it would use regional or internal troubles for cover, if not as opportunity for intervention or for threats to intervene. In such a circumstance, a continuing preponderance of Soviet power would have its effect in deterring American or Western "interference." Such a preponderance and the outcome of possible conflict which it

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foreshadows, can shape the behaviour of internal factions or of other regional powers, as well as the behaviour of our major allies. It can make potential hosts reluctant to provide facilities or airspace in the region or on the way. Nobody likes to be on the losing side. " Virtual " or shadow wars have many actual effects.

There is a threat and that should be obvious enough. Attempts to wish it away are whistling in the dark. Moreover, there is nothing intrinsic or permanent in the disadvantage the West has allowed to develop in the Gulf area. The disadvantage is *not* simply a matter of physical geography. The continents have not perceptibly drifted apart or shifted much in position in the last 20 years. It is a matter of the political-military use of geography, and its remedy is a matter of Western will to undertake a long-term effort to improve the position of the alliance. The most urgent immediate interim measure is the development of a serious and sustained programme.

THE debate in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has suggested four broad alternatives for reducing the danger to American interests in oil from the Gulf.[35] The first three implicitly or explicitly assume that there is no way of redressing the conventional military balance. The first has been espoused, for example, by George F. Kennan, in line with his familiar view that military strength declines steeply and in a straight line with distance, that the " power radiated from any national centre diminishes in proportion to the distance involved." [36] The advantage to the Soviets in the Gulf, he believes, is intrinsic. He holds, therefore, that the United States should substitute for an increase in military capability a programme for reducing American dependence on foreign oil.

A second alternative advanced by those who oppose any effort to increase American military power in the Gulf would rely on regional powers. Paul Warnke and John Gilligan,[37] for example, have recently proposed regional security agreements " in which both Moscow and Washington would guarantee the neutrality and security of countries in the area." Such guarantees, of course, only reintroduce inexplicitly the military power of Washington as well as of Moscow as backup for the guarantees. There would be no reason to expect an American guarantee to be persuasive in the Gulf if our military disadvantage were intrinsic. In any case, extra regional guarantees are a fillip in a more general revival of interest here and abroad in regional security arrangements to which we have already referred.

[35] One convenient summary of this debate is provided by Richard Burt, " Does the US Have Muscle to Back Carter Doctrine? " in the *New York Times*, 29 Feb. 1980.

[36] Kennan, George F. *Russia and the West, Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York, 1962), p. 261.

[37] Richard Burt, op. cit.

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The third alternative proposed, or more usually hinted at by those who think it inherently impossible to overcome the advantage in conventional strength which the Russians are supposed to achieve simply by having their homeland nearby, would rely implicitly or explicitly on a threat to escalate—that is, to start a war outside the region or to use nuclear weapons.

Finally, there is the alternative of advancing a serious programme to increase the alliance's military capability for meeting the threat at its own level. Here there are many variants; a number of specific proposals were put forward—and met with rather serious criticisms.

The first alternative, that suggested by Mr Kennan and others of undertaking a programme to reduce American dependence on foreign oil, is fine as far as it goes. It cannot, however, go far enough. It cannot entirely replace an alliance effort to redress the balance in the Gulf by expanding its military power to affect events there. It is important to reduce American dependency on Persian Gulf oil, if not on oil imports in general. It is unlikely, however, that any politically feasible programme will reduce the dependence of our major allies on the Gulf drastically and soon enough to make the protection of their interests in the Gulf unnecessary.

As for the second alternative—to rely on defences put up by regional powers and to rely on any likely regional security arrangement—this simply revives the fantasies of the late 1960s and the 1970s, fantasies one might have hoped would have crumbled with the crumbling of the "twin pillars" on which we had previously founded our hopes for a security of the Gulf involving little effort on our part beyond the profitable sale of expensive military hardware. The intense instabilities in the area are now too obvious to ignore, as is the vulnerability to Soviet power. Little neds to be said about the idea of meeting a possible threat from the Soviet Union by securing a guarantee from the Soviet Union. The issuance and acceptance of such a guarantee would invite the Soviets to insert military forces to restore stability in the event of some future turbulence. Even the turbulence might be preferable.

As for the threat of escalation (the third alternative), some such possibility is always there. However, the actual execution of a threat by the US as leader of the alliance to start a war elsewhere—for example, on the northern flank of NATO—might only worsen matters for us and for our allies. It is not likely to be welcome "elsewhere." For example, it seems improbable that the Norwegians would welcome opening up a front in the northern flank, in particular since it may seem to have no direct connexion with aggression in the Gulf. The threat of using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional incursion—of introducing a "tripwire" or "plate glass defence" of the Persian Gulf—is likely to frighten allies, especially those in the region, more than it will the Russians.

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A " nuclear tripwire " in the late 1950s was supposed to define a line in Europe whose crossing would trip a full nuclear retaliatory response. As it was formulated by the NATO Military Committte in MC-14/2, any incursion by Warsaw Pact forces—even a local incursion, so long as it was clearly intended to persist—would trigger the third world war. The purpose of conventional forces in Europe was, then, not to defeat an incursion, but merely to establish its persistence; that is, to establish that the line had seriously been breached, not by mistake or without authorization. That was enough supposedly to trip " the nuclear sword." Despite the vividness of the metaphor, the policy was not convincing. By the start of the 1960s, NATO began to replace massive retaliation with a more substantial conventional defence and a more convincing prospect of escalation. A tripwire became progressively less persuasive as Soviet nuclear strength increased at short, medium, and intercontinental range. A tripwire in the Persian Gulf, where there is little or no Western conventional force, nothing remotely comparable even to NATO's conventional force in Europe in the 1950s, would be less persuasive against Soviet power in the 1980s.

Some Europeans as well as Americans, reluctant to undertake the extra effort now called for to protect the security of their energy supply, have argued that the tripwire might work in the Persian Gulf even though it will not in the centre of Europe. Europeans would be ready to escalate to nuclear war in the Gulf because the security of that oil is clearly " vital " for Europe. However, such reasoning is quite hollow. Europe is clearly " vital " for Europe. Yet a serious and persuasive defence against an attack on the European centre cannot and does not rely on the tripwire. In particular, both the onset and the outcome of a conflict in the Persian Gulf may be shrouded in ambiguities, with oil producers arrayed on both sides, and with the Soviets likely to intervene in the name of restoring stability and protecting the flow of oil. A swift Soviet preemptive action would put them in the position to offer energy alternatives to Europe which would at the very least look better to it than the alternative of nuclear war.

There *is* a relevant sense in which the possibility of escalation, implicit in guarantees issued by NATO and supported by contingency plans for meeting a sequence of threats at their own level, might play an important role in deterring war in the Persian Gulf as it does in the European centre. This can be made clear by analysing the potential role in the Persian Gulf of a strengthened southern NATO flank. That analysis will show that guarantees and implicit threats of escalation are no substitute for a prudent increase in conventional strength—only a complement to it.

In general, to declare a bare tripwire policy does not register a determination to use nuclear weapons in a time of crisis; rather, it

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registers a lack of will to prepare before the crisis to meet a non-nuclear threat on its own terms.

We are left with the alternative of meeting a conventional threat on its own terms.

Meeting the Threat on Its Own Terms

Working out an effective and efficient long-term alliance programme to meet the threat in the Persian Gulf on its own terms without an excessive increase in alliance risks elsewhere will take time, persistence, negotiation, and joint planning with our allies. Its ultimate form can be decided only sequentially on the basis of resolving many political and technical uncertainties. Getting adequate forces in place will take much longer. Meanwhile, the start on an alliance programme for the long term is itself perhaps the highest priority of all interim measures. It can clarify the nature and depth of the threat the alliance must address, and keep the interim measures moving toward the goal of reducing the risks to which the alliance is exposed as a whole rather than merely reshuffling them, and help assure our allies in and out of the region of a long-term American commitment to defend our joint interests.

There is no way to get an adequate capability in the Gulf immediately without compromising American or other alliance capability needed elsewhere—without, that is, violating an essential and persistent objective of our defence policy for dealing with "small" but critical wars. In the short run we can for the most part only redistribute the risks by taking American or allied forces from important tasks to which they are committed and shifting these forces to the task of protecting alliance interests in the Gulf. But essential needs in Europe and in East Asia are likely to persist and even grow, as they have recently. Only a substantial additional alliance effort can redistribute the risks and also gradually reduce them in total to more prudent levels.

Functional Objectives

To meet the threat on its own terms will require a continuous and substantial allied combat presence in the region, not merely a force rapidly deployed from the United States on the basis of signals of an attack. Such a force must be politically tolerable to its hosts. It must be able to defend itself against land-based air attack and yet project enough firepower ashore to deter, delay, or disrupt an initial surprise attack aimed at seizing key points on the Gulf. The delay must be long enough to bring in reinforcements and the allied combat force must be able to protect the points at which they would land. Signals of an attack are likely to be extremely ambiguous if they occur days before the attack—too subject to error to permit a costly response by the United

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States, its major allies, or its local hosts. We must measure the costs in terms of the political risks imposed on hosts, as well as in economic terms. The usable amount of "warning time"—where warning is shorn of ambiguities enough to permit the insertion of firepower or massive movements to the theatre—is likely to be measured in hours or tens of hours rather than in weeks or even days.

On the other hand, the firepower and the presence required can be more modest if it is available very early. Soviet power projection forces in the process of moving to the theatre and initiating attack would have many vulnerabilities. They involve complex, highly coordinated movements of airlift vehicles, airborne regiments, motorized rifle regiments, and combat aircraft. A cat set among these pigeons while they are taking off, on the way, or as they arrive, could disrupt the attack and give time for a rapid deployment force to bring in reinforcements. The presence of a standing force could so increase the risks to an aggressor as to discourage him from attacking.

While it is clear that we will need both a rapid deployment force and a substantial continuous combat presence from outside the region to complement the weaker forces of local allies, trade-offs are possible between the deployment force and the combat presence. "A battalion for the Persian Gulf in first," according to an Israeli general, "is worth three divisions there second." This may not be the exact trading ratio, but it is clear that the stronger the combat presence, the less rapid and powerful the deployment needs to be; the more rapid the deployment, the less powerful the combat presence needs to be.

Combat Presence

The political constraints here tend to dominate, and they affect both regional allies and our major allies outside the region. Regional allies who want Western protection, nonetheless, for the many reasons I have outlined, find it hard to play host to substantial foreign forces, especially combat forces, on their own territory. Some, like the Kuwaitis and the Saudis, oppose a presence not only on their own territory but, at least nominally and some of the time, in the region. Ideally they would like to be defended immediately but from a great distance. The inevitable compromises have to be made with tact.

The NATO alliance has yet to face squarely the problem of protecting its own direct and massive interests in the Persian Gulf. Since the 1967 war, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts in mind, NATO members have often been qute explicit about limiting NATO's interests and responsibilities to the formal NATO treaty area—which stops at the eastern boundaries of Turkey and at the Tropic of Cancer. It is not feasible politically to make a formal change in the treaty. However, it should be feasible to get an interpretation by key members of the alliance in the practice of contingency planning and actual deployment which recognizes the facts of NATO's critical dependence on the Gulf.

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So far the United States has pressed its NATO allies mainly to take on some American combat obligations elsewhere so as to free American combat forces for use in the Gulf. The US has not emphasized the participation of allied combat forces in providing a presence near the Gulf. There is no doubt that such participation will present domestic problems for the major European allies. On the other hand, they have also to face the fact that, in the long run, a division of labour in which only Americans provide the extra-regional forces to do the fighting in the Gulf—where Europeans and Japanese have much larger and more direct interests—is unlikely to be accepted by the American public.

The least obtrusive combat presence in the region would be offshore and over the horizon but close by—that is, a naval combat presence. That this is undoubtedly the most tolerable politically for regional allies is suggested by the fact that the only substantial firepower we have been able to move close to the Gulf since the crisis starting in November 1979 has been the two carrier task groups and the marine afloat force of 1,800. While unquestionably useful in raising the risks to an aggressor in the Gulf region, deployment of two carrier task groups does not meet some essential conditions that the United States has stipulated for dealing with a critical small war; it is not a high confidence capability for dealing with a small war in the critical Upper Gulf region and it compromises our ability to fight a large war elsewhere by halving our deployments in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. That is to say, it increases the risks in the Mediterranean and western Pacific without reducing the risks to prudent levels in the Persian Gulf. (Something analogous might be said about arrangements for "rapid deployment": for example, the airlift is not fully adequate for reinforcing defence in the Gulf; using it would compromise our ability to reinforce the centre of Europe at the same time or shortly afterwards.)

Nonetheless, because of the political constraints one essential component of a sustained adequate combat presence is likely to be an increase in the Navy force structure. This might conceivably be done simply by increasing the number of carrier task groups and associated number of ships in their present classic form. However, an adequate combat presence would almost certainly be more efficiently obtained by mixtures involving improvements in the classic naval task groups and involving major contributions from the other services and from other allies inside and outside the region.

In what follows, therefore, I start with an increase in the naval force structure of the classical carrier task groups and associated ships, and consider successive introductions into the mixture that might reduce the total cost to the United States of an adequate combat presence.

1. An increase in the Navy force structure. This is necessary in order for us to keep a continuous naval combat presence near the Gulf

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without sacrificing, as the present deployment does, essential naval commitment in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific.

If the US deploys a powerful naval force near the Gulf in a way that persuades our allies in the region that we are going to sustain the power to help them over the long term, this may encourage them to take the short-term risks involved in aligning themselves with us and providing facilities on land for land-based air and ground forces—though even then these facilities are likely to be constrained by local as well as by Soviet pressures. We are also more likely to get the cooperation of our allies outside the region. But a naval combat force drawn from essential tasks elsewhere is less likely to convince our allies inside or outside the region that we will be there steadily over the long pull.

2. An improved, more efficient naval combat presence than can be obtained by simply adding classical carrier task groups. We could reduce the number of carriers in the classical mixture:

(a) by distributing precise, extended range non-nuclear cruise missiles among surface ships and submarines. These missiles might have various payloads tailored to damage runways and to home in on aircraft on runways and aprons, and they might include mines to delay clearing and repair operations. This would relieve the carrier-based aircraft of some of the strike, as distinct from the intercept, mission. It could reduce the enemy threat to the carriers by helping to disrupt his initial offensive against the carriers as well as against the landing bases for our rapid deployment force. And it could dilute the enemy attack on the carriers by forcing it to deal with more ships capable of projecting power. Cruise missiles also complement fighters in penetrating enemy air defences [38] (by the late 1980s a missile might be able to use information provided by airborne radar with excellent MTI to attack moving targets with an "Assault Breaker" type of payload: a precision-delivered bus carrying many submunitions for destroying massed armour);

(b) by improving the effectiveness of the air defence of the carriers. In and near the Gulf, in particular, improved overland warning and control are needed to permit interception of medium bombers approaching along several axes before they launch air-to-surface missiles. (AWAC is especially suited to this purpose and its basing presents fewer political problems than combat aircraft does.) Cover and deception could be used to improve passive defence.

If the United States had to maintain the whole of the combat presence itself and had to do it all simply by adding the classical carrier task groups, achieving adequate capability would be expensive and would take a long time.

[38] See Henry S. Rowen, "The Future of Cruise Missiles," PH80-2-980001-39, *PAN Heuristics*, 1980, for ARPA; also Thomas Brown, David McGarvey and Arthur Steiner, "The Political Military Significance of Continuous Terminal Homing," PH-76-01-435-07, *PAN Heuristics*, 1976, for ARPA.

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Because ranges to the head of the Gulf are quite extended, carriers on patrol in the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea could not bring much firepower to bear on shore (though this could be increased somewhat by changing the mix of aircraft to include more tanker planes). On the other hand, if carrier task groups go into the Gulf itself, *four* classical groups might be needed to defend themselves in the constricted waters of the Gulf against land-based air attack approaching from several directions, and still project power ashore. Four carrier task groups would equal the total number we have normally deployed forward in recent years, that is, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. As in their case, keeping them on station would require a backup of perhaps another eight carriers. It would also require many auxiliary ships for air defence and underway replenishment, and a security force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open: a naval group including perhaps an attack submarine, seal teams, minesweepers, and two destroyers.

If no allied or US ground forces are in the region to join the weak local forces in defending the facilities needed to receive our rapid deployment force, we would have to rely exclusively on marine amphibious forces. The force afloat in the Arabian Sea would then include at least one and possibly two marine battalion landing teams and their associated amphibious task groups. The latter is roughly what we have in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets.

3. Forward Floating Depots or Fast Deployment Logistic Ships carrying material for a substantial marine amphibious force. Such depots or logistic ships are vulnerable to air and sea attack. They need to be protected if they are near enough to the Gulf to be counted as a combat presence able to be used in hours or tens of hours rather than in days or weeks. They should, therefore, come under the protection of the naval task group but would then have to move with it and stay close to it, matching the task force in speed. If the marine landings are opposed they would need local air cover, which the naval task group could also supply. If administrative landings can be made at a distance from the scene of battle, the marine force should have enough organic transport to be able to reach the battle.

The programme for the 16 RO/RO ships and a marine amphibious Rapid Deployment Force which has been announced so far is undoubtedly a useful step. However, it is as yet unclear where the ships and the men will be located, and whether they will be close enough to affect the initial battle. No programme has been announced for protecting the RO/RO ships or for providing local air cover for opposed landings. The remarks above about the benefits of associating FDL ships and the marines with the naval combat force would seem to apply to the present programme.

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4. Faster logistic and other ships. The Navy has had under development much faster ships—logistic ships, for example—that might carry a load two orders of magnitude larger than our largest air transport, and might move at perhaps twice the speed of the present " fast " ships (60 rather than 30 knots). This is an interesting possibility between airlift and conventional sealift. The technology of surface effects ships (SES) is much more relevant to the present application, the projection of power in extremely time-constrained contingencies where the infrastructure is meagre, than to most applications generally studied. In comparing SES with other alternatives with which I am familiar, time enters in a much less essential way. It appears to me that this technology is well worth re-examining in this light. On the other hand, as my comments on the need to associate more conventional FDL ships with a naval combat group able to defend it and which it matches in speed will suggest, it seems likely that one should consider SES in combat simultaneously with logistic roles.

5. Land-based air. B-52s based in Diego Garcia could strike at the origins of a Soviet attack in south Russia or at the destinations in the Upper Gulf in a matter of hours. They could carry large payloads adapted to the purpose. Diego Garcia is about 3,250 miles from Yerevan in the Transcaucasus and about 2,980 miles from Nebit Dag in the Transcaspian, about 2,660 miles from Abadan and 2,400 from Dhahran. There would be costs for improving Diego Garcia to handle B-52s, but few political problems in using this British base. It would handle part of the strike mission though not, of course, interception or securing the facilities to receive our rapid deployment force. It would involve a net subtraction from the force available for the triad devoted to the nuclear strategic mission. How much this compromises our ability to fight a big war is a more complex issue than diversion of the carriers.

To use other shorter-range, land-based aircraft as part of the combat presence in the Gulf raises questions of basing. The shorter the range of the aircraft the more difficult it is to solve both the political problems of acquiring and maintaining regional bases, and of performing the mission effectively. The combat radii for our fighters or fighter bombers with an effective load may vary from as low as 250 miles unrefuelled to perhaps 1,000 for the F-111 and for an extended-range version of the F-15 with three conformal tanks. The Israelis are the only ones to have bought the latter, but since range is essential in bringing firepower to bear quickly in the Gulf, we might consider buying conformal tanks ourselves. Another of several alternatives is to extend the range of the F-18L to 750 nautical miles by adapting it to carry fuel in its wings. Like the F-15, but unlike the A-6, A-7 or F-111, the F-18L could perform both intercept and strike missions—provided we had confidence that base facilities could be made available on a steady state

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basis before the crisis and that they would be available in the crisis itself.

In connexion with using our fighters or fighter bombers, large political uncertainties surround all the base facilities in the region.

6. A multiplicity of alternative base facilities in the region. Because of these large uncertainties we need to hedge by securing many alternatives. We cannot be sure that we will have even one alternative when we need it. Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, the countries with which the United States appears to be negotiating intensively for base facilities in or near the region, are not in a position to make arrangements for a steady state presence of American combat aircraft in time of peace, and the availability of these bases in some crisis in an indefinite future will be more uncertain. As Table 2 illustrates, Kenya is remote from the head of the Gulf, useful primarily for such purposes as bunkering ships and as a liberty port for sailors. Somalia is somewhat less distant, but is of more interest for contingencies in or near the Horn of Africa. In any case, it is quite precarious politically. Oman, the closest of the three, with a leadership that is most forthcoming, is too subject to local radical as well as Soviet pressures to offer any reliable, quick access for combat forces, although it is an excellent place for staging non-combat aircraft such as the AWACs. Egypt and Israel, which have received much less public emphasis, are better placed strategically than Kenya, Somalia, or Diego Garcia. However, both have obvious disabilities for defending countries in the Upper Gulf. Egypt is at odds with all these countries and it is hard to envisage joint contingency planning or a rapid impromptu response on the basis of even slightly ambiguous warning which might turn out to be a false alarm. Uncertainties also lie in the future attitude of the possible successor regime to Sadat. Nonetheless, Egypt and Israel deserve more attention than they appear to be receiving.

The governments of Egypt and of Israel, indeed any government that offers its facilities to the United States or to any other NATO power for intervention in the Persian Gulf, would almost surely be concerned about the possibility of retaliation and setting in train a process of escalation that might eventually bring in the Soviet Union, which has treaty arrangements with several powers near the Gulf and a declared major interest in it. The dangers to the host government would be even greater if its own forces and not just its facilities and air space were involved. No political leadership, no matter how courageous, could avoid thinking of what would happen next. For example, the Israelis asked for and received a US guarantee against Soviet retaliation if Israel responded to Jordan's request for help against Syria and the PLO in September 1970. And Sadat has explicitly rejected the continuous basing of American combat forces on Egyptian territory.

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Table 2

Utility of Various Bases for Defending Upper Gulf Against Soviet Attack
(Great Circle Distances Between Relevant Points)

Airfields		Coordinates		Oman Thumrait 17.40N 54.01E	Oman Misirah 20.41N 58.3 E	Somalia Berbera 10.24N 44.56E	Kenya Mombasa 4.03S 39.40E	Diego Garcia 7.20S 72.25E
SOVIET UNION	Nebit Dag	39.29N	54.22E	1309	1148	1816	2735	2983
	Yerevan	40.08N	44.24E	1437	1372	1784	2664	3243
	Baku	40.24N	50.12E	1378	1257	1822	2729	3116
IRAN	Abadan	30.22N	48.14E	825	803	1212	2123	2656
	Ahwaz	31.20N	48.46E	868	826	1274	2186	2688
	Bushehr	28.57N	50.50E	699	648	1161	2082	2509
	Shiraz	29.32N	52.35E	716	620	1225	2148	2490
	Tabriz	38.08N	46.15E	1294	1224	1665	2557	3095
	Tehran	35.14N	51.19E	1064	952	1530	2447	2819
	Vahdati AB	32.26N	48.24E	937	888	1336	2245	2753
IRAQ	Baghdad	33.15N	44.14E	1073	1070	1371	2253	2917
	Basrah	30.34N	47.47E	845	828	1220	2128	2679
	H–3	32.54N	39.45E	1195	1240	1380	2217	3049

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SAUDI ARABIA	Dhahran	26.16N	50.09E	559	568	997	1918	2397
	Riyadh	24.43N	46.44E	587	694	865	1774	2440
	Al Jouf	29.47N	40.05E	1054	1137	1194	2030	2904
	Hail	27.33N	41.33E	909	1014	1046	1899	2755
	Hufuf	25.20N	49.36E	522	565	934	1855	2370
	Sulail	20.28N	45.36E	506	724	605	1512	2299
	Gassim	26.18N	43.46E	770	877	956	1836	2618
	Tabuk	28.22N	36.38E	1152	1277	1175	1953	2979
	Taif	21.29N	40.33E	795	1005	711	1533	2551
	Jiddah	21.30N	39.12E	868	1081	743	1533	2611
	Medina	24.33N	39.42E	901	1066	900	1716	2705
	Bisha	19.59N	42.37E	662	894	590	1452	2404
	Khamis Mushait	18.18N	42.49E	640	898	490	1354	2331
	Gizan	16.52N	42.35E	657	932	411	1267	2289
	Nejran	17.37N	44.26E	548	818	434	1330	2234
	Wajh	26.12N	36.29E	1100	1254	1062	1824	2903
KUWAIT	Kuwait Intl.	29.14N	47.59E	769	768	1143	2054	2609

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The shadow of adversary escalation, including Soviet intervention, would overhang any decision by a government near the Gulf to take part in combat or to allow us to use its facilities and air space in waging war. NATO would have to offset this danger by a guarantee to match or overmatch any retaliation by regional or extra-regional adversaries. In this sense threats of escalation or a demonstrated will to respond to escalation would operate in any serious preparation to defend NATO interests in the Gulf. But what makes such a process a genuine component of a serious defence rather than an empty bluff is that it would be one aspect of contingency planning in which NATO would affirm or reaffirm the NATO guarantee, making clear that the guarantee applies in this defence of NATO's interests outside the NATO treaty area.

For NATO to extend a guarantee to Israel or to Egypt in connexion with their participation in a conflict to prevent the hostile control of oil in the Persian Gulf would raise two questions. First, neither country is a member of NATO. Secondly, the conflict, even if it is in defence of NATO interests, lies outside the formal NATO treaty area.

The first question at any rate does not apply to Turkey. It is a member of NATO. It benefits from the institutional framework of NATO guarantees and political–military planning. Turkey then is important not only for its strategic position, which is unsurpassed for a defence of oil in the upper Gulf, but because of its membership in NATO.

The second question remains. In the course of the last 24 years the United States, in connexion with its support of decolonization in the Middle East and particularly in connexion with Suez, at first tended to narrow its interpretation of the NATO treaty and the use by European powers of NATO facilities and equipment outside the NATO treaty area. The US was less stringent in applying the rules to its own use of facilities and forces earmarked for NATO in Lebanon and elsewhere. Especially after the June 1967 war the European powers themselves narrowed the interpretation of the treaty as relevant only for conflicts in the treaty area itself. They did this in good part out of the conviction that a broader interpretation by the United States would jeopardize their flow of oil from the Gulf. They believed that any conflict in the Middle East would almost certainly concern the Palestinian issue, and would place the United States on one side and Arab oil producers on the other.[39] The collapse of the Shah, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraqi invasion of Iran are some of the events that have delivered major body blows to this European belief. It should not be hard now for Europeans to conceive of contingencies critically affecting the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf which are quite unrelated to the Palestinian-Israel issue.

Dogmas, however, die hard. While Europeans cannot help but be

[39] See, for example, statements by both Americans and Europeans at the conference in Teheran in 1975: Abbas Amirie, ed. *The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics* (Institute for International and Economic Studies, Teheran, 1975).

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vividly aware of their interests in deterring or disrupting attacks on the sources of oil just beyond the eastern borders of Turkey, they have not yet come to grips with the problem of how to defend these interests, even if they do not, as they almost certainly will not, change the formal boundaries of the NATO treaty.

The Turks, who above all want and expect to be treated as a full-fledged European member of NATO, have shared some of west Europe's tendency to restrict NATO's actual concerns to the formal boundaries. However, they were late in narrowing their interpretation and are likely to be more forward in broadening it once more. The Turks did allow use of Incirlik in connexion with the Jordanian crisis in September 1970, and there are significant indications that the Turks would be in the forefront of a broader interpretation of NATO's concerns today. A number of influential Turks have made clear their understanding that, like other NATO countries, they would be critically affected by Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf, because oil from the Gulf is essential for Turkey as it is for the rest of NATO. But they also recognize that they are more affected than any other NATO country since such aggression would involve their immediate neighbours. One of several recent indications that the Turks are moving more rapidly than the rest of Europe in this direction is a report in mid-August in *Tercuman* of an "important change in Turkish foreign policy, determined jointly by the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry." According to this report, Turkish officials believe:

> ... the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could be considered as marking the beginning of a tendency to move down to the oil regions. Adding, however, that no one at the moment knows the next Soviet step, the Foreign Ministry officials say "it is out of the question that the United States can use Turkey as a springboard for an attack in the Middle East. However, if the Soviet Union attempts to move down to the Persian Gulf, this would prejudice Turkey's interests. Turkey would then act jointly with its allies because, having occupied the Gulf, the Soviet Union would certainly threaten Turkey's oil supplies." Finally, the authorities have said that technical work has begun in view of such a probability.

Whatever the basis for this specific report, there have been a number of other indications of such interest in the Turkish military and political leadership.

It is of great importance that other members of the alliance prepare to act jointly with Turkey in defence against potential Soviet aggression in the Gulf. Preparations for such joint action, of course, would have to envisage reaffirming that some sort of guarantee by NATO powers would apply to Turkey. If not, one would have to conclude that all the light talk of defence by escalation is empty bravado. Such joint planning would lay out a believable path of potential escalation calculated to discourage aggression in the first place. Then the Soviets might well

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Table 3

Utility of Various Bases for Defending Upper Gulf Against Soviet Attack
(Great Circle Distances Between Relevant Points)

Airfields		Coordinates		Egypt * Ras Banas ~23.3N 35.39E	Egypt Mersa Matruh 31.2 N 27.13E	Sinai * Etzion ~29.40N 34.40E	Israel (Negev) Eilat 29.34N 34.58E	Israel Ben Gurion 32.01N 34.53E
SOVIET UNION	Nebit Dag	39.29N	54.22E	1350	1408	1134	1125	1046
	Yerevan	40.08N	44.24E	1092	987	789	785	670
	Baku	40.24N	50.12E	1252	1238	996	989	894
IRAN	Abadan	30.22N	48.14E	788	1082	706	691	692
	Ahwaz	31.20N	48.46E	841	1103	735	721	710
	Bushehr	28.57N	50.50E	879	1231	846	831	844
	Shiraz	29.32N	52.35E	977	1314	934	919	923
	Tabriz	38.08N	46.15E	1032	1021	767	761	667
	Tehran	35.14N	51.19E	1077	1228	905	894	842
	Vahdati AB	32.26N	48.24E	861	1079	725	711	686
IRAQ	Baghdad	33.15N	44.14E	739	870	534	523	478
	Basrah	30.34N	47.47E	774	1058	683	668	667
	H-3	32.54N	39.45E	604	643	325	316	252

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SAUDI ARABIA	Dhahran	26.16N	50.09E	806	1241	845	828	870
	Riyadh	24.43N	46.44E	611	1105	709	692	763
	Al Jouf	29.47N	40.05E	445	671	282	267	299
	Hail	27.33N	41.33E	401	782	384	367	438
	Hufuf	25.20N	49.36E	770	1233	835	819	871
	Sulail	20.28N	45.36E	582	1184	810	794	900
	Gassim	26.18N	43.46E	472	920	522	506	578
	Tabuk	28.22N	36.38E	297	521	129	113	237
	Taif	21.29N	40.33E	297	927	585	571	701
	Jiddah	21.30N	39.12E	230	872	548	535	672
	Medina	24.33N	39.42E	231	776	408	393	515
	Bisha	19.59N	42.37E	442	1074	724	710	833
	Khamis Mushait	18.18N	42.49E	508	1152	815	801	928
	Gizan	16.52N	42.35E	557	1206	882	869	1001
	Nejran	17.37N	44.26E	606	1246	899	885	1007
	Wajh	26.12N	36.29E	168	576	229	217	359
KUWAIT	Kuwait Intl.	29.14N	47.59E	746	1082	696	680	696

* Coordinates approximate

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Table 4

Utility of Turkish Bases for Defending Upper Persian Gulf
(Great Circle Distances Between Relevant Points)

	Airfields	Coordinates		Batman 37.56N 41.07E	Diyarb-akir 37.54N 40.12E	Erhac 38.26N 38.06E	Erzurum 39.57N 41.10E	Sivas 39.49N 36.54E	Incirlik 37.0 N 35.26E
SOVIET UNION	Yerevan	40.08N	44.24E	202	237	310	149	345	460
	Nebit Dag	39.29N	54.22E	627	669	761	609	806	903
	Baku	40.24N	50.12E	447	488	573	415	611	720
IRAN	Abadan	30.22N	48.14E	575	602	696	671	793	752
	Ahwaz	31.2 N	48.46E	547	577	675	635	770	743
	Bushehr	28.57N	50.5 E	725	755	851	814	947	911
	Shiraz Intl.	29.32N	52.35E	761	795	895	840	987	968
	Tabriz	38.08N	46.15E	243	286	384	261	447	518
	Tehran	35.14N	51.19E	517	559	662	559	738	776
	Vahdati AB	32.26N	48.24E	486	519	618	571	711	695
IRAQ	Baghdad	33.15N	44.14E	319	341	431	428	529	487
	Basrah	30.34N	47.47E	552	578	671	649	769	726
	H-3	32.54N	39.45E	309	301	341	428	437	325

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SAUDI ARABIA	Dhahran	26.16N	50.09E	836	950	861	936	1049	988
	Riyadh	24.43N	46.44E	843	858	933	956	1033	937
	Al Jouf	29.47N	40.05E	492	487	528	612	622	491
	Hail	27.33N	41.33E	623	625	675	744	771	646
	Hufuf	25.2 N	49.36E	870	893	978	974	1078	1007
	Sulail	20.28N	45.36E	1073	1083	1146	1191	1244	1125
	Gassim	26.18N	43.46E	711	719	782	829	881	769
	Tabuk	28.22N	36.38E	616	599	608	730	687	521
	Taif	21.29N	40.33E	987	985	1025	1108	1116	968
	Jiddah	21.3 N	39.12E	991	985	1017	1111	1105	950
	Medina	24.33N	39.42E	806	801	837	927	927	778
	Bisha	19.59N	42.37E	1080	1082	1131	1200	1226	1088
	Khamis Mushait	18.18N	42.49E	1181	1184	1233	1302	1327	1187
	Gizan	16.52N	42.35E	1266	1268	1315	1387	1408	1266
	Nejran	17.37N	44.26E	1231	1237	1292	1351	1388	1256
	Wajh	26.12N	36.29E	742	727	738	857	817	650
KUWAIT	Kuwait Intl.	29.14N	47.59E	624	649	739	725	837	783

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pause before launching a complex operation which would be vulnerable to disruption by a member of NATO with full support from other members of NATO.

From the geographical standpoint the Turkish bases are in any case far and away the best placed strategically. Inspection of Tables 3 and 4 on Great Circle Distances from various bases to the plausible origins and destinations of Soviet attack will confirm this. Figure 7, which shows the nominal approximate combat radii for American aircraft based in Turkey east of Incirlik, makes the strategic value of Turkish bases quite vivid. With the F-111F, strike missions would cover the important sources of attack in the Transcaucasus and Transcaspian, and could reach all important destinations in tht Upper Gulf. An F-15 with conformal tanks might perform intercept as well as strike missions that far. For most of our aircraft with shorter combat radii, Turkey might provide the only bases in the area from which the origins of the attack could be struck. Turkey has some excellent bases 200 miles from Yerevan in the Transcaucasus and close to the Transcaspian as well.

Moreover, it is important to note that while it would take many hundreds of millions of dollars to bring bases in Oman, Somalia, and Kenya up to NATO standards, the Turkish bases shown, and others in Turkey, are basically up to NATO standards now and were in fact brought there partly through NATO infrastructure funds. Several also have the advantage of association with NATO Air Defence Ground Environment stations (NADGE).

So far as substance is concerned, the comparative neglect of these Turkish bases seems rather puzzling. It has to be explained in terms of some largely accidental matters. First, of course, are the American domestic problems associated with the Greek-Turkish conflicts and the longstanding disputes on Cyprus and on the Aegean. However, the two countries have strong mutual interests in defence against a Warsaw Pact threat. The possible instability of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the invasion of Afghanistan, it appears on the basis of some oral evidence, have made these interests more vivid to some Greeks as well as to Turks and, one may hope, to their supporters in the USA. The Turks have recently taken a generous step toward resolving the Aegean disputes. There is no doubt that the reconciliation of Greece and Turkey is an urgent NATO concern.

A second more accidental factor explaining the neglect of the Turkish bases near the Gulf may have to do with bureaucratic organization. When Turkey joined NATO it was transferred to the European desks in various ministries of foreign affairs and defence, including our own. It is easy therefore to forget that, although Turkey is a European member of NATO, it is also a Moslem country in the Middle East, very close to the source of current and potential crises.

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

Figure 7: Turkish-based Aircraft Radii

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A third reason has to do with a long history of cumulative misunderstandings between Turkey and the United States about Turkish facilities, and illustrates some current misunderstandings which misconstrue that history. Turkey had allowed the United States extensive, sometimes almost casual, use of its facilities for purposes not directly related to NATO. There was a succession of blows: American use of Incirlik in connexion with the 1958 crisis in Lebanon on extremely short notice without consultation (even though that crises had developed slowly and the US had prepared for it for at least three months); the shooting down of Francis Powers on a U-2 flight over Russia from Incirlik, later cited by Bulent Ecevit before he became Prime Minister as an example of the US having extended the use of NATO facilities beyond NATO purposes; and, the most severe blow of all, a hasty and unfortunate letter from President Johnson during the 1964 Cyprus crisis warning the Turks against using NATO equipment for a non-NATO purpose in fulfilling what they regarded as their own treaty obligation to protect Turkish minorities on Cyprus, and hinting that the NATO guarantee might not apply if the Soviets attacked Turkey. Turkey allowed us to use Incirlik in 1970 in connexion with the crisis in Jordan, but with the growing estrangement between Turkey and the United States it had come, like other Europeans, to interpret more strictly the use of NATO facilities as being limited to NATO contingencies, meaning those within the NATO treaty area. In the Turkish case, this involved a certain symmetry with our own much harsher behaviour in 1964.

Finally the Turks, like the Norwegians, if press reports are correct, indicated in 1979 that they would permit our use of Turkish air space by the U-2 only if the Soviet Union did not object. This had an obvious, though perhaps little understood, connexion with the earlier history of the U-2 flights and questions about use of air space and facilities in NATO countries for purposes not directly connected with NATO.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from our problems during the last few years in obtaining use of Turkish air space or facilities for purposes with little direct connexion with NATO, that it will be impossible to secure their use where the interests of NATO are massively and directly involved. That is the case for defence of the oil supply of NATO's members, including Turkey. The Persian Gulf is outside the formal NATO area as defined in the treaty, but if the connexion is properly understood there is reason to believe that the Turks would be no more reluctant than our other European partners to recognize that NATO has a vital interest in the Persian Gulf, and that some NATO contingencies will have to take this into account. It would be most fruitful, however, to evolve such plans for the use of Turkish facilities in a NATO context, that is, in discussions with other NATO partners for developing policies and plans for the defence of the Gulf.

So far I have dealt with US use of Turkish facilities, but other NATO powers are also interested in them in the defence of Persian Gulf oil.

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Perhaps most important of all, Turkish forces in Turkish facilities can make a major contribution there.

7. A contribution by our extraregional allies. This contribution could be indirect or direct:

(a) An indirect contribution might be an increase in an American combat presence made possible when one of our allies outside the region replaces American combat forces at present committed elsewhere, thus freeing the Americans for use in the Gulf, with no significant net increment in the US effort. It should be observed that unless previously uncommitted allied forces were used, it would sacrifice allied capability elsewhere, or would require a net increase in alliance effort. This important alternative—having our allies assume tasks now performed by American forces in the western Pacific or in Europe—is being pressed. The Japanese might take on more of the ASW mission in the western Pacific; the Europeans might replace some of our tactical air wings in Europe, and so on. It is unclear, however, whether this would mean a net reduction in the total risks. It depends on whether our allies sacrifice essential tasks elsewhere or increase their defence effort.

(b) A direct contribution to a combat presence in the region is illustrated by the useful but so far modest naval forces the Australians and the French are keeping in the Indian Ocean. For the reasons given, NATO participation in fielding a fighting force near the Gulf has importance beyond merely reducing the resources the US is devoting to that purpose. It is an explicit recognition that NATO interests are direct enough to risk combat in the Gulf.

As suggested under point 6, the strategic geography of one member of the alliance, namely Turkey, and the precedent for use of joint mobile forces in NATO, make it possible to exercise land-based air of other European NATO countries in Turkey more or less frequently, and to do so without going outside the formal treaty boundaries during the exercises. Even the Germans, who are especially constrained politically on the movement of military forces outside the Federal Republic, might be able to take part in joint exercises using Turkish bases, and they could more easily increase their pilot training there. (Lacking airspace for training pilots above their own territory, they have been using the Konya range in eastern Turkey.) German relations with Turkey are very good and it is quite possible that, given the past strains on US–Turkish relations, it might be easier for the Turks to permit the Germans rather than the Americans to expand such use and easier to permit both rather than Americans alone. Expanded German use might pave the way for the Americans.

However, for the Turks, emerging from a long period of strain with the United States and its other allies in NATO, it might be easier to provide a strong combat presence of their own and to accept assistance

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in developing one, rather than merely to provide facilities for other NATO powers. Some of the reasons for this extend back into history. They include not only the experience with the "Status of Forces Agreement" in Turkey since the 1950s, but also the Ottoman Capitulations of earlier times. The Status of Forces Agreement, which we negotiated with NATO countries providing us with bases, stated that in the case of "offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty," when American personnel were charged with such a crime the NATO country would surrender jurisdiction to the United States. The phrase "in the performance of official duty," however, was enlarged to mean "while in general duty status" and was interpreted as conferring immunity from normal Turkish judicial procedure on cases which were only remotely connected with the performance of duties. For the Turks, this evoked memories of the Capitulations which Suleyman the Magnificent had first granted at the peak of Ottoman power in the sixteenth century to small groups of French, Austrian, and British merchants in Turkey to encourage foreign trade. With the decline of Ottoman power by the mid-nineteenth century, the Capitulations had become a humiliating grant of autonomy and exemption from Turkish law to all manner of thieves and scoundrels living in the Pera quarter of Istanbul. For such reasons, for reasons of tradition, and, particularly because they alone of the NATO powers are in the Gulf region, the Turks find it easier to contribute their own forces to the defence of NATO interests in the Gulf rather than merely supplying facilities.

While it is politically difficult for most NATO countries to station troops and, to a lesser extent, land-based air forces in large numbers outside their home territory, especially in a distant and alien place near the Gulf, it is easy to forget that this NATO country does not have to move its forces outside its home territory at all to maintain a large combat presence near the Gulf. In the north and north-east Turkey borders the Soviet Union; it also borders Iran and Iraq. It is immediately adjacent to the origins, paths, and destinations of plausible Soviet air and airborne attacks on the Upper Gulf, very close to the origins of a ground invasion of Azerbaijan, and most strategically located to deter an Iraqi attack on its neighbours. As Israel's massing near the border of Syria was a potent factor in the preservation of King Hussein's rule in the face of a Palestinian challenge and a Syrian invasion, so the possible mobilization of Turkish forces could deter an Iraqi attack.

Turkey, perhaps more than any other country strategically situated for the defence of the Gulf, is capable of usefully absorbing a great deal of military assistance. Its armed forces are the largest in NATO except for the United States. As the result of the US embargo, they are obsolescent and in extremely poor repair. Unemployment is high, and the Turks wanted much more extensive military aid after the lifting of the embargo than we were willing to concede or than our present plans

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contemplate. They hoped to use defence co-production to stimulate the economy. They also see it as a way to build human and other capital for increasing civilian productivity in the rigorous programme they are undertaking to make their products competitive on the world market. That programme, in turn, is one of several measures critical for Turkey's future internal stability.

The military and economic aid we have been willing to offer the Turks so far is only 50 million dollars more than what President Zia of Pakistan characterized as "peanuts," despite the fact that Turkey is the only country in the region with which we have a treaty relationship and is ideally located to deter a Soviet advance to the Gulf. US aid to Turkey would be multiplied since the Germans have offered to match whatever we allocate. Finally, the improvement of Turkish forces and facilities would have a multiple payoff connected with Turkey's unique strategic location.

First, (a point already made), improved ground radars, AWACS, and F-15s with conformal tanks (or the equivalent) in the hands of Turkish and of American forces in Turkey would be a major factor in deterring, delaying, or disrupting Soviet regional attacks near the Upper Gulf, in Azerbaijan, in Khuzistan, Iranian Kurdistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Secondly, the Turks would make a large contribution to defending the southern flank of NATO (the north-east littoral of the Mediterranean), which sorely needs improvement, given the long-term deterioration since the 1950s (the build-up of Soviet forces, including the great improvement in their land-based air and naval forces; the fragmentation of what was an entirely friendly southern littoral to one that is largely neutral or hostile; withdrawal of French and Greek forces from the NATO structure; the drastic reduction in the Sixth Fleet and diversion of much of it to the Persian Gulf; increased claims by other theatres, such as the North Atlantic and northern Norway, on forces that might have been earmarked for reinforcing the southern flank; the increasingly sophisticated equipment of nearby, potentially hostile powers, etc.). Much of the improvement in Turkish forces which we have described as needed in connexion with the Persian Gulf would be transferable, because of the mobility of air power, in defence of Turkish Thrace, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Black Sea coast, or against an invasion of north-east Turkey. It would also be critical for defence of the southern flank, including Greece and Turkey, because of the way it would advance the capability of the Sixth Fleet, which itself is central in defence of the southern flank.

Thirdly, like the Sixth Fleet, an improved Turkish defence would be relevant for direct defence, not simply of the southern flank but also of the eastern Mediterranean. Improved land-based radars and AWACS would provide the essential jam-resistant warning of overland air attack

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on the Sixth Fleet and interceptors based in Turkey would help defend not only the warning aircraft and ground radars, but the Fleet itself.

A fourth payoff related to this joint product with the Sixth Fleet has to do with the southern littoral of the eastern Mediterranean. Members of NATO, including the United States, have talked freely of guarantees to Israel and Egypt in connexion with a settlement of the Palestinian problem. As the Jordan crossroads crisis of December 1970 demonstrated, the Sixth Fleet is an essential underpinning of such guarantees.

Fifthly, improvement in the defence of Turkey is likely to be critical for defending the sea lanes of communication to the Persian Gulf and the neighbouring region. Therefore, it is likely to be crucial for some of the other alternatives for defending the Persian Gulf which are under consideration. The direct sea lanes of communication for bases in Egypt, in the Sudan, in Somalia, in Kenya, and in Oman all pass through the eastern Mediterranean. They would be extremely vulnerable if Turkey were neutral. A strengthened Turkey could offer both a direct defence of the Sixth Fleet and indirect help in defence of the sea lanes.

It is clear that adequate improvement in Turkish forces and facilities will involve much more substantial aid than the $450 million a year for economic and military support which we have projected. The necessary aid has to be measured in billions. Moreover, according to the present implicit rule practised in Congress, it would mean added aid to Greece of 60 cents for every dollar to Turkey. However, this should not be regarded as a loss. The Greek forces need improving and a more generous aid programme would undoubtedly ease the problem of re-integrating Greece into NATO. Indeed, the right way to look at the strategic problem would be to see it in terms of the essential strategic connexion between the southern flank of NATO and the Persian Gulf. Improvement in the southern flank is essential to increasing our capability for prudent defence of the Gulf.

Turkey has largely 1950s jet aircraft to oppose 1970s jets possessed even by its Third World neighbours. The announcement of a serious long-term commitment to help Turkey acquire modern aircraft would greatly ease this problem of allowing increased American use of Turkish facilities. A programme for co-locating American tactical air with greatly improved Turkish tactical aircraft would provide an auspicious context for obtaining early expanded American use of Turkish bases. It would reduce the bitterness remaining from the embargo and would help renew military ties. This is only one important example of how a serious proposal for long-term improvements could have an immediate effect. As we have stressed, development of a serious and adequate long-term programme is the most important interim measure in the Persian Gulf.

Funds for military improvements in Turkey can be provided indirectly to Turkey by more generous economic aid, since money is fungible. In this way countries such as Japan which find it hard to

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supply either military aid or military forces, could contribute much more substantially. Japan has recently contributed $60 million. The neutralization of Turkey, with its key geographical position, would be as much a disaster for Japan as for NATO Europe and the United States.

I spell out this option at great length in order to stress those courses of action which appear to be receiving less than appropriate emphasis. The US has tended to treat improvements in Turkish forces as the price we have to pay for American use of Turkish facilities. We should consider them instead as a principal objective of American policy.

Improving Rapid Deployment and the Forces to Be Deployed

The foregoing focuses on improving combat presence. However, deployment can be facilitated by both American and allied efforts.

1. We need to improve our long-range airlift, especially that needed for outsize equipment, since the limits and the number of C-5s pace our strategic airlift today. For existing MAC forces to surge from peacetime to wartime utilization rates (seven times higher for the C-5s, four for the C-141s) and sustain them, MAC would need in peacetime more aircrews, more aircraft spare parts, and more aerial port capability, including more materials handling equipment. However, to handle deployment to the Gulf without compromising its capability for lift elsewhere, MAC will need more long-range, high-payload, outsize aircraft. Buying a derivative of the C-5 appears to be the least risky, least costly, and quickest way to get the needed extra capability, perhaps between 75 and 100 additional planes.

2. Our allies could help both by replacing our airlift to the European centre with some of their civil reserves and especially by reconsidering their policies on use of intervening space, en route facilities, and pre-positioning.

3. Finally, it appears that we could greatly increase the power projection capability of our army if we developed with some urgency forces designed to be airborne, which have greater mobility, armour, and firepower than our 82nd Airborne Division, and which are more easily liftable than our present mechanized and armoured divisions.

A substantial net increase in the ability of the alliance to keep conventional forces in the region and to deploy reinforcements rapidly is essential for meeting the conventional threat on its own terms. This will involve changes in armies, air forces, and navies. The fear that such a defence would be very costly, if not infeasible, drives some participants in the debate to advocate one of the first three broad alternatives I have listed: (1) the futile hope that alliance dependence on the Persian Gulf can be eliminated; (2) the wan and discredited hope that regional powers will be willing and able to protect the persistent, critical alliance

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interests there; and (3) the reliance on desperate and unconvincing threats of escalation, possibly to nuclear war.

An adequate and less reckless defence cannot be secured on the cheap, and it will not be undertaken without strong political leadership. It is impossible at this time to estimate the cost of such an effort except crudely and within a wide range; too many technical and political uncertainties can be resolved only with time. Nonetheless, the effort likely to be required is far from being so extensive that it means " the Militarization of Western Society," " Life Underground," or any of the other bogies we sometimes conjure up to avoid sober thought or action. The United States is spending about 5 per cent of its Gross National Product on national defence. Its major allies, for the most part, are spending much less. A programme to redress the imbalance in conventional arms which we and our allies have allowed to grow in the Persian Gulf might involve annual increments in defence budgets of 10 to 15 per cent, or a little more. That would mean an increase for the purpose of projecting power there of perhaps one percentage point of the GNP devoted to defence in the United States and considerably less for our allies—over and above whatever increases are needed for other essential defence purposes, such as increased readiness, nuclear force modernization, etc. This is substantial, but it would hardly impose intolerable hardships.

The United States managed in the 1950s to increase consumer outlays, to continue increasing productivity in industry, and to keep inflation within bounds while spending 9 or 10 per cent of its GNP on defence. We should be able to manage 6 per cent today. Western Europe and Japan can hardly excuse a failure to increase their smaller effort on the ground that they cannot afford to do so. The Soviets have gained their advantage in conventional power through a steady expenditure of national resources to build their capability for projecting strength, and by a persistent political and military effort to secure direct and close access to the Gulf. The need for a corresponding increment in allied effort cannot be taken as a demonstration of a supported strategic fact, namely that it is " inherently impossible " to overcome the Soviet strategic advantage. Rather, it would be a demonstration of wishful thinking or lack of political will.

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The Struggle for Afghanistan

Zalmay Khalilzad

AFGHANISTAN'S place in contemporary history is marked by a number of paradoxes. It is peripheral to several worlds, Islamic, Middle Eastern and South Asian, and at the same time at the centre of a strategic junction between the USSR, China, the Indian sub-continent and the Persian Gulf. It has been the object of numerous invasions dating back to Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan and continuing up to the Britsh, the Soviet army being only the most recent in a long line of occupying forces. Yet Afghanistan also has one of the longest records of national independence for a developing country, as it became independent from Britain in 1921. To the West, Afghanistan has been both remote and strategically important, its importance being largely derivative. It has been a desirable object not for itself, but for what control of the country can provide in terms of access or leverage vis-à-vis the surrounding region. To the Soviets, Afghanistan has been a target of sustained interest as a source of raw materials. It has also provided an alleged example of successful Soviet dealings with developing countries and positive relations between the socialist state and a "transitional" polity with a traditional social order. During the colonial era, Afghanistan was important as the "gateway to India": now, some fear that it is being cultivated by the Soviet Union as a gateway to the Gulf.

Although the Soviet invasion was not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a continuing endeavour to bring Afghanistan under greater Soviet influence, several specific characteristics should be mentioned. While in the past, proxies were often used to serve Soviet interests in several internal conflict situations in the Third World, in the case of Afghanistan Moscow used its own forces on a substantial scale in a country which was not a member of the Warsaw pact. And the invasion brought about a new directness in the degree of control. Whereas in the past indirect involvement has been more common, the Soviet Union is directly in charge in Afghanistan, deciding on major administrative appointments, domestic, and foreign policy and dealing with the national insurgency.

While it appears that Moscow's decision to dispatch its armed forces to Afghanistan was the result of a careful and deliberate calculation of risks and opportunities, some of the risks faced by the Soviets are different from those inherent in other Soviet involvements in the Third World. Given the substantial Afghan opposition to the Soviet presence in their country, it puts large numbers of Soviet personnel in danger,

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provides an opportunity for Soviet adversaries such as China and the United States to raise the need for greater Soviet involvement in a protracted and costly war through assistance to Moscow's opponents, and reduces Soviet capabilities for actions in other parts of the world.

AT first glance the conditions in Afghanistan appear typical for an extremely poor developing country. Landlocked and poverty stricken, 80 per cent of its 250,000 square miles consists of deserts and mountains, and only half of the remaining 20 per cent is actually under cultivation. The country's population, estimated (in the absence of reliable statistics) at between 12·7 and 20 million people, has a life expectancy of less than 40 years and a per capita income of around 100 dollars. The infant mortality rate of over 20 per cent and the literacy rate of less than 10 per cent (even lower for women taken alone) are two further indicators of underdevelopment. With no railroad and only about 2,000 miles of paved highways, the infrastructure is at best rudimentary, with parts of the country insufficiently integrated by the central government. While Kabul has been the official political capital since the eighteenth century, the countryside has traditionally been ruled by the rural elite, consisting of Khans, maliks, beys, arbabs, mullahs, akhunds, mirs, etc. This is all the more significant since less than 25 per cent of the Afghan population lives in towns and cities.

There are numerous divisionary factors. The country is largely Sunni, but with a substantial Shi'ite minority. The population is composed of many ethnic groups. The Pashtuns, who speak a Persian-related language, Pashtu, are estimated to make up nearly half the total population. Distributed throughout the east and the south and into Pakistan, the Pashtuns, divided into many tribal confederations, have provided Afghanistan's rulers, both during and after the monarchy, and most of its officers and civil servants. Some Pashtun tribes were exempted from military service during the monarchy. The next largest ethnic community are the Tajiks who form 25 to 30 per cent of the population and speak a dialect of Persian called Dari. The Tajiks are not tribal, but rather form the majority of the urban Afghans. They have dominated the country's trading and cultural activities. They have also played an important role in the country's bureaucracy and have managed to retain Dari as the language of the government as well as the *lingua franca* of the various ethnic groups. The Hazaras and the Uzbeks are the next two largest communities, numbering some 1,000,000 and 800,000 respectively. The Hazaras, who are of Mongolian origin, speak Dari, and practice Shia Islam, are the worst off of ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Other ethnic groups in the country include the Turkmans, the Baluch, the Sikhs and a small Jewish community. Social attitudes among the various ethnic groups have generally remained rigidly traditional and resistant to reform.

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DESPITE its poverty, Afghanistan has been a focus of big-power interests for many decades. Long before its independence, it was the scene of Russian and British rivalry, the " Great Game," as Kipling called the competition. During the nineteenth century, Russia expanded southward across the deserts of Central Asia, inhabited by Khazaqs, Turkmans, and others. Tashkent was taken in 1856, Bukhara in 1866 and Merv in 1883. In 1885, the Russian press was calling for the occupation of north-western Afghanistan including Herat, the largest Afghan city in the region. The British warned Russia that " any attempt on the part of Russian troops to approach Herat would be equivalent to a declaration of war." [1] This warning was followed by an agreement with Russia in the same year defining Afghanistan's northern border. In 1907, in a convention between Russia and Britain, the tsarist government affirmed Afghanistan's territorial integrity while recognizing Britain's control over Kabul's foreign policy.

After the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviets faced a variety of threats including those from Central Asian Muslims. Since the new Russian leaders wanted to end their isolation, and hoped to score a victory over Western powers in Asia and the Middle East (" attacking imperialism at its weakest link "), they sought improved relations with their southern neighbours, including Afghanistan. In their Decree of Peace of November 1917, the Soviets declared themselves an ally of the Muslim countries and opposed the British control of Afghan foreign policy. Once Afghanistan became independent, the Soviets were quick to recognize the Afghan government, encourage it to follow an anti-British policy and offer military and economic assistance. Soviet aid in 1919 included 13 airplanes as well as pilots, mechanics, transport specialists, and telegraph operators. Afghanistan, like Iran and other neighbouring countries, signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1921. Until the end of the second world war, during which Afghanistan remained neutral, relations between the two countries were generally correct, with occasional lapses into hostility. Afghanistan was critical of Soviet policies towards the Central Asian Muslims and even trained some anti-Soviet Muslim rebels. It sought improved relations with Germany in an effort to add a third European power to balance the two big powers contending for influence in the region, Russia and Britain. In 1937 it joined Iran, Turkey and Iraq in an agreement which provided for non-aggression, consultation, and mutual cooperation in stamping out subversive ideological and military activism in the region. The Soviets expressed varying degrees of opposition to these Afghan acts, varying from mild protest to military intervention.

1 Quoted in Firuz Kazemzadeh, " Afghanistan: The Imperial Dream," *The New York Review of Books*, 21 Feb. 1980. See also Zalmay Khalilzad, *The Return of the Great Game: Superpower Rivalry and Internal Turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey* (California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, No. 88, Los Angeles, Sept. 1980).

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Although, unlike Iran and Turkey, Afghanistan was not faced with immediate territorial threats by the Soviet Union after the war, the Kabul government, nevertheless, reacted to the perceived signs of expansionism by expressing interest in a close political, economic and military relationship with the United States. Like its neighbouring Islamic countries, Afghanistan sought to meet a potential Soviet threat from across the border by seeking an alliance relationship with Washington, a distant countervailing force. In 1946, the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmoud, was quoted as saying "America's attitude is our salvation." [2] In 1948, according to US State Department records:

> Afghanistan urgently wants US arms to maintain internal security. . . . Secondly, it wants US arms to make a positive contribution in the event there is war with the Soviets. Properly armed and convinced of US backing, Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in the passes of Hindu Kush which would be a contribution to the success of the armed forces of the West and might enable them to utilize bases which Pakistan and India might provide.[3]

Washington, however, did not respond favourably to Afghan requests for military aid and alliance. There were a number of reasons for this, including assumed limited American logistics capability in providing effective help to Afghanistan in case it was threatened by the Soviet Union, as well as the fear that the Afghans might use US weapons against Pakistan, against whom Kabul had territorial claims. The intensification of the border conflict with Pakistan and cordial relations between Washington and Islamabad led to closer ties between Kabul and Moscow. For example, in 1950 when Pakistan blocked the transport of goods to Afghanistan,[4] Kabul faced many shortages including petroleum. The Soviets offered Afghans petroleum and signed a trade agreement. This agreement was followed by a major economic deal including Soviet loans and participation in several projects including oil exploration in northern Afghanistan, the construction of highways and silos and the establishment of a Soviet trade office in Kabul.

The US decision to provide arms to Pakistan in 1954 and the Pakistan accession to the Baghdad pact in 1955, further alienated the Afghans. In response, the Soviets persuaded Afghan leaders, such as Premier Mohammed Daud who was the most hostile of the Afghan leaders towards Pakistan, to accept Soviet arms. Moscow had been actively seeking this opportunity by making arms offers even before the failure in Afghanistan–US negotiations. Ever since the $25 million arms deal of 1956, Afghanistan has been dependent on the Soviets for arms and most of its military training.

[2] *The New York Times*, 9 Aug. 1946.
[3] US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 Washington: GPO, 1975, Vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 492.
[4] Pakistan did the same in 1955 and 1962.

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The Soviet-Afghan military agreement was followed by economic competition between the superpowers in Afghanistan. Between 1955–65, the Soviets provided Afghanistan with $552 million in aid. The US aid for the same period was $350 million. Americans concentrated on educational institutions such as the Kabul University, several agricultural projects such as the Helmand Valley and competed with the Soviets in highway construction. Referring to the cordial cooperation between the US and the USSR, an American reporter during this period wrote:

> Russian and American advisers use the same teacups and telephones (both are in short supply in Afghan government offices) and lecture Afghans with equal vigor on the blessings of economic progress. At noontime, Russians, Americans, and Afghans all queue up for GI style hamburgers and chocolate pie at the chrome-lined Khyber Cafeteria, one of the showplaces of the Afghan capital.[5]

Besides economic assistance, the United States maintained a small military training programme which was terminated in 1979. However, while in the first decade after Soviet-Afghan military agreement, the US economic assistance was substantial, it decreased steadily during the second decade. This decrease took place at a time that Afghans were experimenting in "democracy," allowing greater freedom of the press and political activity. High government positions were largely in the hands of American educated Afghans. It also coincided with the period of *détente* in superpower relations, US entanglement in Vietnam, and the growing American tendency not to regard foreign aid as an important instrument of foreign policy as well as competition with the USSR. J. C. Hurewitz,[6] referring to the active superpower competition in Afghanistan during the initial phase, called Afghanistan a "cold war beneficiary." With the abating of interest in Afghanistan that was America's response to the apparent lull in superpower confrontation, the Soviets once again took on an overriding position of dominance vis-à-vis that country's internal situation. If Afghanistan was a cold war benficiary, it might be termed a victim of *détente*. Between 1965 and 1977, US aid totalled $150 million, less than half the amount for the previous 10 years. By 1975, US aid for Afghanistan had decreased to a symbolic level of less than $15 million.

While Washington was reducing aid, Moscow sustained not only its military aid but also its economic interactions. Between 1965-77, it provided more than $700 million in economic aid. With Soviet assistance, the inventory of Soviet supplied arms in Afghanistan in 1977 included more than 700 tanks (T-34s, T54/55s and T-62s) and 184 combat aircraft (MiG-17s, MiG-21s, Il-28s and SU-7s). There had been

[5] Welles Hangen, "Afghanistan," *The Yale Review*, Vol. 56, Oct. 1966, p. 61.
[6] J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (Praeger, 1969), p. 296.

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almost no trade with the Soviets prior to 1950, but in the 1970s more than 50 per cent of Afghanistan's trade was with its northern neighbour. Moscow became Kabul's principal supplier of capital goods, petroleum products and sugar. Soviet imports from Afghanistan, at terms not unfavourable to Moscow, have included cotton, fruits, and natural gas. The price paid by Moscow for Afghan natural gas, for example, has been well below international prices, and even those paid to Iran, another large exporter of natural gas to the Soviet Union. After 1973, Iran charged the Soviets more than 50 cents per 1,000 cubic feet, while even in 1976, it paid only 34 cents per 1,000 cubic feet to the Afghans. One of the first acts of the Soviets, after invading the country, was to announce the conclusion of a new agreement with the Karmal government to triple the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union (2·3 billion cubic feet per year).

In the 1960s, a new element in the external relations of Afghanistan was the interest of the People's Republic of China in the country. China provided economic aid to Afghanistan in areas such as textiles and agriculture. Peking was aiming to keep Afghanistan from becoming part of the Soviet satellite empire, and encouraged improved relations between Kabul and Islamabad. In the early 1970s, the Soviets were worried about the prospects of increased Chinese influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and sought to persuade these countries to decrease their ties with Peking. The threat of a new challenge to their position in Afghanistan, after the apparent decline of such a threat from the US, may also have contributed to the Soviet decision to secure their hold on Afghanistan even by drastic means.

BIG power competition has influenced domestic developments in Afghanistan. Domestic developments in turn have provided risks and opportunities for outside powers. As in many other developing countries, the crises of economic development, national integration and political legitimacy have led to political fragmentation: the creation of many new political groups, new dimensions added to traditional cleavages.

Although there were individual Leftists covertly active in the country in the 1920s and 1930s, major overt political activists, critical of the Afghan political and economic system, including Marxist-Leninists, did not emerge until the late 1940s. After the second world war, the Afghan government partially motivated by the desire to get American economic and military assistance, allowed greater political freedom. Several forums for debating various ideologies and Afghanistan's political and economic problems emerged. One of these was the Wish-Zalmaiyan (Awakened Youth) which was established in 1947, whose members included Noor Mohammad Taraki. Wish-Zalmaiyan had a publishing organ called *Wulus*. Another forum was the Kabul University Student Union whose membership included Babrak Karmal, President of Afghanistan after

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the Soviet invasion. Critical political discussions, however, were limited to a small group of literate Afghans, especially those in Kabul. For example, the three main newspapers which published critical articles sold around 1,500 copies each. Although small in number, these groups were very influential; in the parliament of 1949–52 (known as the liberal parliament), 40 per cent of the deputies were critical of the government and were either sympathetic to or linked with oppositional groups outside. Two other small groups were Watan and Nedaie Khalq.

With the failure to gain American assistance and the fear that continued oppositional activities might threaten the monarchy, the government reverted to the less tolerant policies of the past. The Student Union was banned in 1950, the free press in 1952 and during the same year some 25 leading members of Wish-Zalmaiyan were jailed. It was not until the promulgation of a new constitution in 1964 that overtly organized political opposition to the government re-emerged. Although this constitution explicitly stated that the King was not accountable to any other political institution, and that he had the right to nominate the Prime Minister and select one-third of the members of the Senate, it was more "liberal" than the previous one. It promised freedom to found political organizations, including parties, and freedom of the press. This time the small Afghan literate community with its very different ideologies was divided into many political groups, a number of which published their own weekly newspapers.

Among the major groups were several Islamic ones who opposed secularization, Westernization and participated in peaceful as well as violent competition with various Leftist organizations. One such group was the Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Association) which had ties with similar movements in the neighbouring countries. The various Islamic groups called for the establishment of an Islamic social, political, and economic order in weeklies such as *Nida-i-Haq* (Voice of Truth) and *Gahiz*. Another Islamic group was the Jawanani Musalman (Young Muslims).

Although the main religious groups were limited to Sunnis, their membership cut across ethnic lines. These groups also opposed Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan, a country whose *raison d'être* was Islam. Another major group with a considerable following in Kabul were the Afghan "social democrats," a nationalist group who strongly supported Afghan irredentist claims against Pashtun and Baluch areas of Pakistan and otherwise followed an eclectic ideology similar to Ba'athists and Nasserites in the Arab world. This group received most of its support from Pashtun nationalists and was generally ill-regarded by other groups especially those associated with minority ethnic groups. The group favouring parliamentary democracy was the progressive democratic party. It supported the legalization of political parties, a constitutional monarchy and social democracy. In foreign policy, while favouring non-alignment, it was sympathetic to the West. While the

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majority of the Progressive Democrats were Pashtuns, it also had a large number of Tajiks in its membership. Another important group commonly known by the name of its weekly publication, *Shulahi Jawid* (the Eternal Flame) was the most radical. It called for violent struggle against the Afghan political and economic system, attacked both superpowers, and considered itself fundamentally Maoist. It had its main source of support among ethnic and sectarian minorities, opposed Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan and supported the People's Republic of China against both the Soviet Union and the West.

Another group established in 1965 was the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Two of the factions of this group have taken turns in ruling Afghanistan over the past few years. The Party was headed by Noor Mohammad Taraki, who became Afghanistan's President after the 1978 *coup d'état*. Taraki was also the publisher of the Party weekly *Khalq*. Six issues of this publication appeared in 1966 before it was banned by the Kabul authorities. After the paper's demise, the PDP itself was commonly referred to as Khalq. In addition to his articles in *Khalq*, Taraki wrote several books. Both the articles and Taraki's other publication followed an orthodox pro-Soviet communist line, embraced "scientific socialism," and favoured a non-capitalist path of economic development for Afghanistan.[7] It asserted that Afghanistan was ruled by large landowners, wealthy merchants, compradors, bureaucrats, and representatives of foreign monopolies. It called for the unity of the working class with patriotic intellectuals, small shopkeepers and small landholders and progressive bourgeoisie to confront "the system" in Afghanistan. At the international level, *Khalq* invariably supported the Soviets against the West, arguing that the Afghans had much to be grateful for from the Soviet Union, and supported Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in Pakistan.

For reasons such as personality differences, ethnic considerations and the family backgrounds of various leaders, *Khalq* split into three groups. In 1968, one of these groups published its own weekly called *Percham*. The Khalqis had generally more support among the Pashtuns while Perchamis have been favoured by the Tajiks, and some of its leaders, including Babrak Karmal, came from prosperous families and had friendly relations with some members of the royal family. Percham's articles had an ideological predisposition similar to that of *Khalq* on international issues, especially in their support of the Soviet Union against the United States. It called for a broad national democratic alliance to oppose the governments of the time and generally had more support among university students than *Khalq*.

Another group which seceded from the PDP was Setemi-Melli

[7] The first issue of *Khalq* sold 20,000 copies, but subsequent issues sold only half that number. Taraki's work won a literary prize in the Soviet Union. For a discussion of his background, see H. Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis*, Spring 1979.

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(National Oppression) headed by a Tajik named Taher Badakhshi. Setemi-Melli, as well as a number of other small groups, was concerned with and claimed to speak on behalf of minority ethnic groups, charged Khalq, Percham, and the " Social Democrats," with being agents of the Pashtun ruling class, regarded the ethnic conflict as the most fundamental one in Afghanistan and opposed Afghanistan's support of nationalist Pashtuns and Baluchs in Pakistan.

LIKE many other political groups, these two groups were dissatisfied with the political and economic situation in the country. Afghanistan's experiment in democracy was facing serious difficulties and many of the institutions were malfunctioning. As in many other developing countries, the five successive Afghan governments of the " democratic " period (1963–73) found themselves faced with conflicting demands they could not reconcile. For example, the Lower House, the main legislative body of the Parliament, was dominated by conservatives headed by traditional religious leaders, mostly representing small towns and rural areas, who wanted the government to go slow on its modernization and secularization plans. They also opposed any increases in taxes on land and livestock which had remained the same for half a century. Liberal and leftist deputies, including Perchamis and Khalqis elected from the major cities had little influence on parliamentary decisions. In order to influence government policies, these groups relied on students' and workers' demonstrations and strikes and on the non-government press. Dissatisfaction among students included limited higher educational and employment opportunities. For example, of an estimated 18,000 high school graduates only 2,000 were admitted to the universities. Most graduates looked to the government for employment because, with the economic stagnation, the private sector did not offer many opportunities.

Besides, many parliamentarians looked at their office solely as a vehicle for attaining their personal goals, rather than serving the national interest. Many spent considerable amounts of money in order to get elected, expecting to make more money while in office. Most of the money spent in some electoral districts was given to local leaders in exchange for the vote of their followers. Once in parliament, some deputies had prices of their own for getting the executive branch to do favours for particular individuals. Many deputies spent considerable time in government offices rather than in the parliament, which often failed to muster a quorum. The King, too, contributed to the failure of the executive and legislative branch, by refusing to legalize political parties and by often interfering in the operation of the legislative institutions.

The malfunctioning of the political institutions was accompanied by serious economic problems, exacerbated by the decline in foreign aid

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from countries such as the US. A three-year drought (1969–72), as a result of which an estimated half-a-million Afghans died, dealt a further blow to the country's economic development projects as funds had to be diverted for large scale food purchases.

Although both Percham and Khalq participated in parliament, they believed that given the structure of Afghan society and especially the conservative and Islamic orientation of the majority of Afghans, it was unlikely for them to come to power through the parliamentary process. While participating in parliament, they infiltrated the armed forces. By 1973, Percham and Khalq, especially the former, had considerable backing in the armed forces and helped Mohammad Daud overthrow the Afghan monarchical regime. One reason for the successful infiltration of the armed forces was that such groups as Percham and Khalq maintained ties with the Soviet Union as did the armed forces. These groups received financial assistance and ideological support, including favourable press coverage by the Soviet Union and some of its allies such as the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Communist Party of India. Several thousand Afghan officers were sent to the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s for training. The Soviets played a major role not only in influencing some of those officers ideologically, but also in establishing contacts between them and the Afghan Marxist-Leninist Organization. Moreover, the Soviets have used the successful economic modernization of Moslem central Asia, across the Afghan border, as a showcase of what a Soviet-type regime could achieve in the neighbouring countries. To a number of Afghan officers, mostly from rural areas without experience in other parts of the world, the message was persuasive. Some of these officers participated in the 1973 *coup* that brought Prince Mohammad Daud to power.

PRINCE Daud had many friends among pro-Soviet Leftists because of his favourable attitude towards them during his premiership (1953–63) and his arms purchase from the Soviets. The Leftists supported Daud because they believed he would share power with them and that in time they would be his successors. Daud, however, was interested in leading a *coup* for a number of reasons of his own. Some were personal: the King had forced him to resign in 1963, and, in Article 24 of the 1964 Constitution, had excluded members of the royal family from participation in politics. As cousin and brother-in-law of the King and well-known for his dislike of the King, Daud believed the article was directed at him, to prevent him from coming to power via parliament. His participation in an alliance with pro-Soviet Leftists thus had pragmatic motives.

After the 1973 *coup,* Daud expressed support for Moscow's "Asian Collective Security" plan, appointed pro-Soviet Leftists at all levels of government, followed Moscow in objecting to Iran's arms build-up and

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emphasized Afghanistan's support for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in Pakistan. However, once he had consolidated his position, Daud broke his alliance with the Leftists. He brought back a number of the members of the royal clan, the Mohammadzais, to high positions in government, declared a one-party system, demanded the dissolution of other political organizations including the pro-Soviet ones, and acted in an increasingly dictatorial fashion. Daud's economic policies were unsuccessful and his initial ties with the Leftists, as well as his secularism, alienated several Islamic groups and added to his growing isolation and unpopularity.

Besides changes in domestic policies, Daud also shifted his foreign policy. By 1978, his relations with Iran and Pakistan had improved significantly while those with the Soviets had deteriorated. At the same time, new middle powers in the area were emerging and focusing their attentions on Afghanistan. With the Nixon doctrine and the oil price increases, Iran's role in the region began to change significantly. After initial suspicion of Daud's ties with the Left, the Shah encouraged him to decrease his reliance on the Soviets and improve relations with Pakistan. He increased Daud's incentives by promising substantial economic assistance. Reportedly, the Shah believed that the Daud regime was a "strong" one, and that the alternative to him was likely to be a radical pro-Soviet government.[8] Thus, the Shah made an effort to bolster the security of the Kabul government through economic aid and to discourage Daud from destabilizing the region.[9] Although a substantial amount of economic assistance (up to $2 billion), was promised, very little was actually delivered by the time Daud's government was overthrown. Daud's improved relations with Pakistan were reflected in several state visits and his reported pledge to respect Pakistan's territorial integrity.[10]

While relations with Islamic neighbours were improving, the opposite was true with the Soviet Union. One reason for the deterioration of relations was Daud's suspicion that with Moscow's encouragement, the pro-Soviet Leftists wanted him to either share power or be overthrown. Reportedly, several months before the 1978 *coup* by Khalq and Percham, Brezhnev pleaded with Daud at a Kremlin meeting to assign key government positions to pro-Soviet communists. Daud is said to have responded that he would not allow the Soviets to "interfere in the internal affairs of my country."[11] Daud began replacing Soviet personnel in several projects, visited President Sadat after his trip to Israel, asserted that Afghanistan sought true non-alignment, improved relations with India, and attacked Cuba for its role as Soviet proxy in Africa.

[8] Amir Taheri, "Policies of Iran in the Persian Gulf," in Abbas Amirie (ed.), *The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics* (IIPES, Tehran, 1975), p. 271.
[9] Ibid.
[10] *Pakistan Times*, 24 Aug. 1976.
[11] Afghan National Liberation Front: "The Appeal of the Afghan People to the United Nations," New York, Sept. 1979, p. 2.

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AS Daud's relations with the Soviets were deteriorating, Percham and Khalq formed an alliance to overthrow his regime in a *coup* which finally took place in 1978. Although the causes of the *coup* by the pro-Soviet groups were many and long-term,[12] what occasioned it was the killing of a Perchami leader [13] and the subsequent arrest of some of the leaders of both factions including Karmal and Taraki. After the *coup*, Khalq-Percham relations began to deteriorate once again, resulting in the dismissal of many Perchamis from positions of power.[14] Babrak Karmal, who had been appointed Vice-President after the *coup* was sent away as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Later Perchamis were accused of attempting a *coup*. Several Party members were jailed and Karmal, along with others, was dismissed. Khalqis began a national campaign against Perchamis calling them "imperialist lackeys and traitors" while Perchamis in turn were calling Taraki a CIA agent.

The Khalqis declared that they had carried out a revolution and that power had been transferred from one class to another. Several thousand government employees, including university teachers, local officials, civil servants, army officers and internal security personnel, were replaced with party loyalists or sympathizers as well as Soviet citizens, especially Tajiks who spoke a dialect of Persian most Afghans could understand and who played a leading role in the country's government office. The total number of Russians in Afghanistan under the Khalq regime increased from about 2,000 to 7 or 8,000. Soviet advisers were attached to Afghan military units as far as the platoon level and assisted the regime to establish party bureaux at all levels of the armed forces.

The Khalqis initiated major changes in the country's domestic and foreign policies. During the months following the *coup*, several major domestic policy changes were announced as decrees. While some critics called the new regime "Marxist-Leninist" or "communist," its leaders called these labels "malicious and slanderous propaganda." The first few decrees dealt with new government appointments and the abrogation of the old constitution. It was decree number four, announcing Afghanistan's

12 For according to Taraki, "we had ordered our comrades in the armed forces no matter who toppled the Daud obsolete regime, the political power should fall into our hands. And should Daud attack our party, we must again secure the political power. I always told my comrades the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was an inevitable successor to Daud's regime and no other body should gain power." *Kabul Times*, 25 July 1978.

13 On 17 Apr., a Percham leader, Mir Akbar Khybar, was killed by unknown assailants. Several thousand pro-Soviet Leftists and their sympathizers took to the streets after Khybar was buried, blaming the government for his death. Daud responded by arresting the Khalqi and Perchami leaders. Fearing for the fate of their leaders as well as their "parties," Hafizullah Amin, who was in charge of the military recruits for Khalq, then ordered the *coup* for which both groups had been working for some time. Some analysts have confused what occasioned the *coup* with what caused it and have called it "the accidental *coup*." See Louis Dupree, *The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1979, American Universities Field Staff Reports*, No. 32, p. 2.

14 For a detailed discussion of the 1978 *coup*, see Hannah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security" *Orbis*, Spring, 1979, pp. 93–113.

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new flag, solid red with golden symbols, very similar in appearance to those of the Soviet central Asian Republics, that convinced many Afghans of the Marxist nature of the new regime and initiated the widespread rebellion against the new government. Subsequent government reforms, which included some desperately needed ones such as a land reform, elimination of usury in the countryside, confirmation of equal rights for women and regulation of marriage, were opposed not only by those whose interests were negatively affected, but by the population at large, as they were seen emanating from a " Godless " and " Russian " government. By combining their substantive reforms with symbolic acts such as the new flag which antagonized the population, the Khalqi leaders exhibited a lack of understanding of popular sentiments and had to face increasing public opposition to the regime.[15]

As far as international relations are concerned, the Taraki regime received considerable support from the Soviet Union, and it, in turn, was invariably supportive of Moscow's foreign policy. Kabul signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. Hafizullah Amin, Khalq's strongman, argued on many occasions that the Soviets " never attempted to exploit " [16] the developing countries and referred to Soviet bloc nations as " brother countries." Kabul also supported Soviet allies in the Third World. As far as the US is concerned, the Khalqis exhibited ideological hostility, combined with the desire to receive American aid. Initially, many in the US exhibited confusion about the identity of Kabul's new rulers. Many analysts took the Khalqi leaders' line and denied that they were " communists " [17] and argued that Khalq's domination of Afghanistan " did not necessarily portend a radical shift in policy " for that country (*The New York Times,* 10 May 1980). Continuing its traditional policy of limited economic assistance to Afghanistan, the State Department reportedly ordered the US Embassy in Kabul " not to apply the communist label in its political analysis of the regime " (*The Wall Street Journal,* 22 March 1979). When Ambassador Adolph Dubs was killed under peculiar circumstances which might even have involved the Afghan government itself, US economic aid was substantially reduced and some important projects such as the small military training programme were cancelled.

ONCE the identity of Kabul's new rulers was " discovered," popular opposition to the Khalqis began to mount It took some time for opposing individuals and groups to organize themselves. Although less than two months after the *coup* a group of Afghan exiles formed the

15 Fred Halliday in " Revolution in Afghanistan " argued that the Khalqis " appear to have a realistic and sensitive grasp of the particularities of Afghan society," *The New Left Review,* Nov.-Dec. 1978.

16 *Kabul Times,* 30 July 1978.

17 Louis Dupree, America's foremost authority on Afghanistan, wrote that calling the new regime " communist " was unjustified. (*New York Times,* 10 May 1978.) Simon Winchester called the Khalqis " agrarian reformers." (*The Washington Post,* 8 May 1978.)

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National Front of Afghanistan to oppose the Taraki regime, the first serious signs of major opposition inside the country did not occur until late in the summer of 1978. Several groups led the insurgency. The best-known groups were those motivated by Islam and headquartered in Pakistani areas close to the Afghan border. These included the Afghan National Liberation Front headed by Sebghatullah Mujadidi with links to the traditional Islamic movements in the Middle East and the United Islamic Revolutionary Council (also known as the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan) led by Said Ahmad Gailani Affendi, whom many believe to be a descendent of the Prophet Mohammad. The Islamic Party, headed by an engineer named Gulboddin Hekmatyar who claimed to have the largest number of partisans in his group, was active against Daud as well as the Khalq regime and received favourable press coverage in Khomeini's Iran. Other groups were the Islamic Association led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor of theology at Kabul University, who talked about the possibility of a compromise with the Soviets, the United National Front headed by Abdul Hakim and a breakaway faction of the Islamic Party led by Y. Khalis. Several opposition groups had their headquarters in Iran. One key group was the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, led by Mohammad Asef Mohseni Qandahari. These groups declared a Jihad (holy war) against the Khalq government, accusing their leaders of being a "handful of Kremlin servants who had given Afghanistan to the Soviets."

On the basis of available data, a definitive history of the fighting against the Taraki regime is not feasible. It appears that the first major revolt against the government took place in Nuristan in October of 1978 (*Times of India*, 8 January 1979). Another area of fierce and persistent resistance to the government was the province of Kunar. The Afghan National Liberation Front, one of the opposition groups, claimed as early as January 1979 that one-third of the province was under opposition control (*Tribune*, 11 January 1979). As the fighting against the government intensified the number of refugees leaving the country increased. Already in January 1979, 20,000 Afghan refugees were reported to be in Pakistan (*The Bangladesh Observer*, 21 January 1979). Official refugee figures for Afghans in Pakistan are underestimates since a number of Afghans in Pakistan have moved in with their relatives and do not register as refugees.

From Nuristan and Kunar fighting spread to other parts of Afghanistan. Towards the end of January, there were reports of fighting in central Afghanistan, where the minority ethnic group the Hazaras (who are Shi'ites and of Mongol origin) rebelled against the regime (*Tribune*, 25 January 1979). In February there were reports of fighting in the Perwan Province. The overthrow of the Shah and the emergence of an Islamic Republic in Iran encouraged "fighting in the name of Islam," especi-

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ally in Afghan areas close to Iran. In March there was a major uprising in Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city. Hundreds, including several Soviet citizens, were killed in the uprisings. The Herat revolt lasted several days, and led to a greater Soviet military presence and transfer of arms, including the MI-24 helicopter gunships, much feared by the Afghan fighters, to the Kabul government.

Although the regime succeeded in regaining control of Herat, the general security situation in the country began to worsen quickly. In April several major Pushtun tribes of eastern and southern Afghanistan joined the rebels. They included the Momands, the Mengal and the Waziris who together had the support of thousands of warriors (some have estimated over 100,000: *Indian Express*, 15 July 1979). Although these tribal forces suffered serious defeats such as their attempts in April and June to gain control of Jalalabad, the largest city in eastern Afghanistan, the opposition was gaining considerably in the countryside. By the end of May parts of Kunar, Paktia, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Ghor, Bamian, and Urzgan provinces were under opposition control.

INITIALLY and throughout most of 1978 the Taraki government denied that there was any conflict in the country. It claimed that the country was calm and tranquil. In 1979 the regime established committees for the defence of the revolution to report on those hostile to the regime and propogate favourable information about the government programmes (*Tribune*, 15 January 1979). As the internal conflict accelerated in 1979, Taraki declared a holy war against his opponents who he at times referred to as " Brothers of the Devil." After the March uprising in Herat which included a mutiny by most of the Afghan armed forces there, the government began a succession of purges in the armed forces, depended more and more on the Soviet supervised airforce, and at times indiscriminate bombing of suspected opposition controlled areas. Faced with growing opposition, the regime became increasingly repressive and arrested large numbers of opponents.

An indicator of the degree of the repression was the admission in September 1979 by H. Amin that 12,000 political prisoners had been executed in the country. The popular support base for the regime increasingly narrowed. The resulting insecurity led to greater reliance on Soviet help and more repressive measures and these measures in turn fuelled the resistance. A major indication of this trend was the increased mutinies and defections by the armed forces. In July 1979 there were reports of fighting at Baghram, an air base near Kabul, and a mutiny at an army garrison in Kabul (the Balahissar garrison) the following month. The uprisings were forcefully put down, but they further undermined the morale and cohesion of the armed forces. As the internal security situation deteriorated, the government began increasingly to blame the situation on external powers such as the US, China, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan.

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Pakistan and Iran were particularly criticized. Taraki charged that "the reactionary circles of Pakistan are worried because the toiling people of their country may soon stand against the despotic and exploitative people of their country and behave with them in the same way which our toiling people did in Afghanistan . . ." (*The Kabul Times*, 9 May 1979). The Iranian and Pakistani leaders were accused of being in the service of "international imperialism" (*Khalq* editorial, *FBIS*, 13 June 1979). Some of the fighting inside the country was reported by the government controlled media as fighting between Afghan and Pakistani forces. For example on 12 June 1979, the *Kabul Times* reported: "Fierce fighting is continuing between forces of Afghan and Pakistani militias in the Mohmand area of Nangarhar. . . ." In reprisal, Taraki threatened to support opposition groups within Pakistan, especially the Pashtun and Baluch nationalists (*Patriot*, 15 May 1979).

Relations with Iran also reflected a similar situation. Whereas until March 1979, the Kabul regime, like the Soviet Union, supported the Khomeini led revolt against the Shah, after the Herat uprising relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply. Khalqi leaders blamed Iran for the Herat uprising and charged that:

> The present fanatic leaders of Iran also make vain efforts to thwart our revolution. These fanatics have no other means but to bring to the fore the issue of Shiites and on the pretext that they are the only guardians of Shiites in all parts of the world. The fanatic leaders of Iran commit tyranny against Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmans, Azerbaijanis, and other nationalities, which is not seen in the history of mankind (*FBIS*, Vol. XIII, June 1979, p. 52).

While the Pakistani-based groups received considerable coverage in the international press, most of the fighting in Afghanistan was undertaken by various localized ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups without direct links with the groups in Pakistan. The Afghan opposition, while encouraged by countries such as China, which regarded the 1978 *coup* as part of Soviet efforts to encircle and isolate the Peking regime, received very little aid from the outside world. The Pakistanis, while tolerating the headquarters of several groups and Afghan refugee camps, imposed severe restrictions on the guerrillas. These restrictions included the repeated imposition of bans on holding press conferences, intermittent refusal to issue visas for Afghans living in other parts of the world who wished to visit or join the partisans, and on importing major weapons. The major source of weapons for the opposition was the defeated or defecting Afghan forces, and the small but lucrative weapon industry in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. The guerrillas also received limited financial assistance from some Arab governments, especially those in the Persian Gulf, and were encouraged by the success of the religious movement in Iran. Moscow, on the other hand, attributed guerrilla success to "large scale" aid from the United States, China, Iran, and

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Pakistan and warned of serious consequences if the Afghan opponents of the Khalqi regime continued to receive external support.[18]

Despite their fragmentation, the anti-Khalq groups were scoring major victories against government forces especially in the countryside. Even Kabul was the scene of many explosions and small military uprisings. Herat, the third largest Afghan city, came under opposition control for several days before it was recaptured by government forces. While defeated in the cities, the anti-Taraki forces were bringing more and more of the countryside under their control. With the continuation of the civil war and several purges, the regular armed forces were disintegrating. Defections were increasing and the Soviets were playing an increasing role in the war, including flying MiG-21s and MI-24 helicopter gunships against the opposition forces. Faced with growing opposition, the government became increasingly repressive. Several thousand political prisoners were killed. Some 60–80,000 Afghans were taken as political prisoners. Casualties from the civil war were in the order of tens of thousands.[20]

MANY local and global factors are likely to have influenced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the local level, it appears that with the continuation of the war, the Soviets faced the risk that the Khalq regime might be overthrown and replaced by groups very hostile to the Soviet Union. To avoid the overthrow of the Khalq regime, it appears that with Taraki's consent, Moscow tried to blame the "excess" of the April *coup* on Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, known as Khalq's strongman, by eliminating him, reversing some of the unpopular policies, including Perchamis in a new government, and introducing more Russian ground forces into Afghanistan. Moscow's attempt at salvaging its Afghan dilemma failed largely because of Premier Amin's lack of cooperation. Amin, rather than allowing his own elimination, killed Taraki in September 1979.

Taraki's elimination affected Afghan-Soviet relations. Because of the Soviet role in the anti-Amin plot, Kabul asked Moscow to recall its ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov. Amin's demonstration of independence antagonized Moscow. While congratulating Amin on his ascension to power, the Soviets began to lay the groundwork for their invasion. Moscow gave refuge to Amin's opponents in the struggle with Taraki, stepped up contact with Perchami exiles in Eastern Europe, increased the Soviet military presence inside Afghanistan by persuading Amin that he needed greater Soviet assistance in his conflict with the partisans, and bolstered Soviet military capability in areas of the USSR

[18] *Pravda*, 10 Apr. 1979.

[19] See Amnesty International, *Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*, London, Sept. 1979.

[20] An Afghan opposition source in September of 1979 estimated the casualties at 250,000. *Afghan National Liberation Front: The Appeal of the Afghan People to the United Nations*, p. 3.

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near the Afghan border. These actions were clear warning signals of a major possible military move against Amin. After the invasion, however, several Western leaders expressed surprise at the Soviet action. In fact, information about the Soviet Union's preparatory steps were available to Western governments and through press leaks to the mass media. (See for instance, *New York Times*, 8 December 1979, *New York Times*, 29 December 1979, *Dawn Overseas*, 27 October 1979). But much of the international community including the USA, either misinterpreted or ignored these signals for a great deal of the period prior to the invasion.

Once in Afghanistan, the Soviets initiated a multi-pronged policy which included the abandonment of many of the dominant policies of the Khalq regime especially those most unpopular; an emphasis on Islam,[21] and an attempt to bolster some traditional leaders and clergy to stabilize the situation; the terrorization of their opponents by use of massive force against guerrillas and large scale arrest as well as violent attacks on urban demonstrators including school children, shopkeepers, civil servants, and university students; an encouragement of ethnic and sectarian conflicts in order to take advantage of them; and an effort to bring non-Perchamis into the government. Internal Afghan patterns of cleavages present both risks and opportunities for the Soviets. The Soviet invasion might add new disintegrative elements as people compete for new posts and try to use the occupying power for their own ends. However, the invasion and occupation has created a new integrative element in the name of a struggle against a " foreign " and " Godless " power which is following a policy similar to traditional colonial powers. The abandonment of some of the radical Khalqi policies by the Soviets in Afghanistan is similar to what Moscow did in Soviet Muslim territories in central Asia after the 1917 Revolution. The Bolshevik leaders initially tried to undermine the traditional social order by destroying traditional social structures such as the subservience of women. This policy led to a declaration of Jihad by anti-Soviet guerrillas which lasted for years and died down only after the Soviets modified their reforms, took a conciliatory attitude to traditional Islamic religious practices and came to terms with local leaders and clergymen. Soviet abandonment of radical policies in Afghanistan illustrated that the Soviets give higher priority to political control than commitment to any one particular socio-economic policy.

THE Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while it may have been occasioned by the local situation had regional and global implications far beyond that consideration. At one sweep, the Soviet invasion over-

[21] Like the present Iranian political-religious leaders the Soviet installed Afghan President, Karmal, punctuates his speeches with cries of Allah-u-Akbar, Allah-u-Akbar (God is great, God is great). For a detailed discussion of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan since the occupation see Z. Khalilzad " Afghanistan under the Soviets: the First Year," *Problems of Communism*, Nov.–Dec. 1980.

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turned a number of assumptions about the situation in the region, relations betwen the superpowers and in American thinking. It eliminated a traditional buffer state and set a new precedent for the massive use of Soviet forces in the area outside its satellite empire. What makes this use of force more threatening for considerations beyond Afghanistan is the enormous growth in comparative Soviet capability to project power in the region over the past years. The invasion has further increased Soviet capability to put pressure on the surrounding areas. It has substantially reduced the distance between the Soviet forces and the entrance of the Persian Gulf, putting that region within the range of a large number of Soviet tactical aircraft; it has extended Soviet presence to within 350 miles of the Arabian Sea; it thus increased Soviet capabilities to threaten vital NATO and Japanese interests; and it impressively demonstrated the Soviet capability for rapid deployment of forces.

The Soviet intervention came as a shock to the international community. Initial world-wide response included economic reprisals and the threat of Olympic boycott by the United States and a number of other countries, condemnation by the United Nations and the Islamic Conference in Pakistan. Many in the Third World regarded the Soviet move as a blow to Moscow's credibility as the supporter of national liberation movements, and expressed fear for the continued independence of small states. However, the initial international concern about the invasion has already declined, especially in the Third World. Even in the Islamic world many are far more concerned about the Palestinian problem (in which they regard the Soviets as playing a positive role) than the Afghan conflict. Others regard the Afghan crisis as essentially a conflict between the big powers that the small states should stay out of. And still others feel intimidated by Moscow.

THE invasion also demonstrated the disarray within the Western alliance. Some members of the alliance acted more as if they perceived themselves as interested spectators in a superpower game, than as involved participants. Countries such as France and Germany have been reluctant to take actions such as trade restrictions against the Soviet Union or providing military assistance to the Afghan Resistance Movement to maximize the cost of aggression for Moscow. To the present West German leaders, for example, trade relations with the Soviets, German to German relations and "*détente* in Europe" are regarded as too important to be jeopardized for Afghanistan. German and French leaders have warned Moscow that *détente* will not survive another Afghanistan, thus implying that it has survived this one.

On the issue of Soviet activities in the Persian Gulf region, despite a short-term division of interests the allies have a number of common long-term interests. The differences in short-term vulnerability are in the areas of trade with the Eastern bloc countries and in degrees of

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dependence on Persian Gulf oil. For example, in 1974, 20 per cent of the industrial world's trade with the Soviet Union took place with West Germany, 11·4 per cent with France and only 4·5 per cent with the US. On the other hand, the dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf shows a different weighting. While the US gets less than 25 per cent of its oil from the Gulf, Western Europe is dependent on such imports for 50 per cent and Japan for 70 per cent of their total. Despite these differences, direct or indirect Soviet control of the Persian Gulf could result in a large-scale interruption of oil supplies with catastrophic consequences for the economies of the industrial countries. Even without substantial interruptions, Moscow's control of Gulf oil would provide the Soviet Union with a powerful means for weakening and dividing the Western alliances, a persistent Soviet goal. The current reluctance of some European leaders to take a more active stand for the defence of the Gulf is the product of various attitudes; while some seem to believe that if the Soviets really have good chances to gain control of oil supplies, it is better not to antagonize them, others tend to think that the use of oil as a sanction by the Soviets could be so disastrous as to be literally inconceivable.

Objectively, neither resignation nor naïve optimism is proper here; there are quite a number of viable actions that allies could take to contribute to the increased security of the Gulf. To redress the decline in Western ability to influence developments in and near the oil rich region, however, will require sustained efforts and some division of labour among the members of the Western alliance. Some allies, for example, could take on a greater responsibility for the defence of regions from which US forces have been or might be withdrawn for Persian Gulf contingencies. Some allies, such as Germany and Japan, could provide financial assistance to critically located countries especially Turkey and Pakistan. Countries like Britain, which have historical and continuing links with some of the countries of the Persian Gulf, could more usefully employ their political familiarity and revive their neglected ties with these nations. Some allies such as France, Britain and Turkey could contribute directly to an allied presence in or power projection to the region.

To begin reversing the military imbalance in the region the US stationed two carrier task groups near the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the American Embassy takeover in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some of these forces have been withdrawn from other areas. It is not clear how long these forces will be stationed in the Gulf region. These task forces, while useful, are not sufficient to establish a military balance in the area. One other means for effecting such a balance which has been frequently discussed is the "Rapid Deployment Force" (RDF). RDF has several limitations For one thing, the force will not be in place for a few years. For another the Soviets are already deployed in the region. If the Soviets were to attack the Gulf

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region, they would be launching cross-border air and ground operations. On the other hand, forces starting from the US would be thousands of miles away and would have to be airlifted over lines of communication quite vulnerable to enemy attack and subject to overflight denial. RDF also involves pre-positioning of material and equipment near the region either on ships or on land. It is not clear how the US plans to defend these ships and land facilities against a possible Soviet attack. An additional complication is caused by the likely lack of any lengthy warning through Soviet use of deception to obscure signals from the US as to the direction and extent of Soviet purposes.

Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt reportedly have offered near region facilities for the use of the United States. These offers would apparently preclude the stationing of a substantial number of US troops in these countries, but might permit the pre-positioning of equipment and weapons. While such facilities would improve US power projection capabilities to respond in a timely fashion to possible Soviet intervention as well as other regional crises, they would not be as effective as a significant local land and air presence. However, due largely to the opposition from Iraq, Iran, India, and the Soviet Union as well as political groups at home, even sympathetic governments in the area are opposed to a major US presence on their territory. Even countries such as Saudi Arabia, which wants US firmness and presence in the area, refuse to accept a substantial US military presence on their territory. Many including the Pakistanis are doubtful about US ability and resolve to assist them in the event of external aggression even if they moved closer to the US.[22]

The increased US naval presence in the area as well as initiating the use of facilities offered by Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt might increase the confidence of sympathetic groups and governments that the US is serious about the security of the region and might in turn encourage them to seek closer security relations with the US including accepting more direct US presence on their territory which in turn would increase US power projection capability.

Governments such as that of Oman which have offered facilities for the US face considerable internal opposition. Close association with the US might lead to increased opposition as these opponents are likely to be encouraged by Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union to oppose any American presence. To improve US power projection capability through a land presence in the area, the US might have to become involved in the domestic conflicts in the host countries in support of favourable, though not necessarily solely status quo, groups. Given the importance of improving US capability in the area, such an involvement might be regarded as not too expensive a price to pay for increased security.

22 For a detailed discussion of some of the regional and domestic problems affecting this area, see Z. Khalilzad, "Superpower Rivalry in the Northern Tier," *International Security*, Winter 1979–80.

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However, if the US is unwilling to risk any such direct entanglement in the internal conflicts of the countries in the area, an increased US presence might well be counter-productive and result in a net increase in the vulnerability of friendly governments.

ALLIANCE politics and power projection are measures that will require the sustained pursuit of coherently formulated directions In addition, however, there are a number of interim measures that need to be considered. One such measure concerns the controversial question of aid to Pakistan. Pakistan faces serious threats, both internally and externally, and its situation has been seriously exacerbated by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is a US ally of long standing. It was a member of SEATO as well as CENTO, and it allowed American facilities on its territory. In 1959 it signed an agreement with the US, Article 1 of which reads:

> The government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.

This agreement was reaffirmed by President Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In spite of the wording of the treaty itself, some US officials in the past have asserted that the agreement does not imply a commitment to use US forces. (Analogous interpretations were offered regarding the Shah's Iran, although Iran had a similar agreement with the US.) Such equivocation cannot remain without effect on the stability of US alliance structures or on overall US credibility. Other states can hardly fail to note, and draw conclusions from, the difference in the commitment level of the two superpowers, one of which does not stand behind even its clear statements of intent, while the other acts on its much more vaguely worded "friendship treaties." That this "action" takes place not only to support the governments the treaty was concluded with, but on occasion has the purpose of installing still better "friends," may not increase their level of trust towards the Soviet Union, but neither does it encourage any dismissal of that country's willingness to act.

In the case of the US, confusing signals continued to be sent even after the Soviet invasion and President Carter's reaffirmation of the commitment to Pakistan's security. For example, Clark Clifford stated in India that any Soviet move towards the Gulf would mean war, while Secretary of Defense Brown, testifying before Congress, was far less clear on the actual degree of US willingness to intervene in the case of an attack on Pakistan.

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In the recent discussion in the US regarding military aid to Pakistan, several key issues have emerged. The Indian objections, Pakistan's nuclear effort, and the domestic situation in Pakistan are the major obstacles to such an aid programme. While Saudi Arabia and China favour military aid for Pakistan, the Indians do not. Prime Minister Gandhi, whose country recently signed a military agreement with the Soviet Union for more than 1·5 billion dollars, has objected to potential US arms shipments to Pakistan, arguing that these arms might be used against India.

The intensity of Indian opposition is likely to depend on the type of arms the Pakistanis receive. Indians are likely to be less hostile to Pakistan's acquisition of mountain artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, and interceptors, than if she received longer-range strike aircraft like the A-7s, the F-4s or the F-15s. They are also likely to object strongly to the provision of heavy armour suited for the Punjabi plains. Some of the weapons that Pakistan might need can be provided by China. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which borders China, is regarded as a threat to their country by the Chinese leadership. The Chinese, are therefore, likely to increase their assistance to Pakistan.

Opposing American arms to Pakistan is not necessarily in the interests of India's security, either, since the prospect of Pakistan or parts of Pakistan (such as Baluchistan) falling under Soviet control has negative implications for India as well. India, too, is dependent on Persian Gulf oil, and only Pakistan separates it from Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Given the overwhelming Indian superiority in the area of conventional arms, their is little basis for worry that US arms to Pakistan would significantly affect this balance. Limiting Pakistan's conventional arms might increase that country's incentive to acquire nuclear weapons;[23] the Indians should be more worried about the prospect of a conventionally weak and irredentist Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons.

The issue of proliferation, in fact, is yet another illustration of the paradoxical policies followed by the US. Vis-à-vis the two potential nuclear rivals in south Asia, US policy has been clearly discriminatory, cutting of all aid to Pakistan, a US ally, for seeking a nuclear weapon option, and refusing to do the same in regard to India, a non-aligned country with a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and a country, moreover, which had produced its nuclear device using US material in violation of the conditions under which material had been granted. This does not mean that the objective of non-proliferation should be abandoned in the wake of the Afghan crisis. Rather, the US should seek to

[23] Motivated by the fear of a nuclear threat from India, Pakistan has been seeking to develop a nuclear capability for some time. After the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, it sought access to plutonium and enriched uranium. Although France changed its mind about supplying Pakistan with a plutonium-separating facility (an agreement reached in 1976), Pakistan is reportedly constructing a uranium enrichment facility.

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encourage both India and Pakistan to declare south Asia a nuclear-free zone and to open their nuclear facilities to international inspection. The Pakistanis have come out in favour of such an agreement. While it is doubtful that the Indians will accept such a proposal, at least a clear statement of US support would increase US credibility with Pakistan. Greater US engagement in the area and the provision of conventional arms to Pakistan are also likely to increase US leverage to influence at least Pakistan's nuclear policies.

The third consideration causing controversy is the concern that in aiding Pakistan, the US would be supporting another unpopular dictator who may use the weapons against his internal opponents rather than the Soviet Union. This is an important point, and the US will have to distinguish between supporting a country's capacity for self-defence and bolstering a particular regime. Arms supplies should be accompanied by cautionary steps; the government should be urged to hold democratic elections, and to come to terms with moderate regional opposition leaders, including Baluchis. The US should make it clear it is supporting Pakistan and not endorsing a particular regime; for this purpose, contact should be established with opposition parties possessing a popular base. Providing aid to Pakistan at the present time is likely to alienate some political groups in Pakistan. The desire to defend itself against a variety of possible external aggressions is an issue that transcends party politics, and in this goal the US might be able to cooperate with many Pakistani parties. Without a credible defence relationship with the US, the Pakistanis are unlikely to allow anything but the most modest assistance to the Afghans in their resistance to Soviet occupation.

BESIDES the Soviet threat the region surrounding Afghanistan is faced with a large number of internal and regional problems. In varying degrees, each state in the area is politically fragmented at several levels. The internal crises in the area will be influenced by the regional environment and the policies of the outside powers especially the superpowers. Despite the fact that the countries of the region are all Islamic, there are many regional conflicts including border disputes, rivalry for regional dominance, interferences in each other's domestic affairs, ideological conflicts and degree and type of dependence on outside powers. In the current conflict between Iran and Iraq most of the above elements have been present.

Iraq and Iran have been rivals for domination of the Persian Gulf for some time. Iraq has been seeking hegemony not only over the Persian Gulf but over the Arab world as a whole. In the past it made little headway because of Egypt's dominant position in the Arab world and the Shah's Iran in the Persian Gulf. It was largely Iran's military superiority that forced Iraq to enter into a settlement in 1975 which it had long opposed and to accept Iranian sovereignty over the eastern half of the Shatt-al-Arab estuary, Iraq's only outlet to the Persian Gulf.

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The Camp David accords leading to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel resulted in Egypt's isolation from the Arab world. The Iranian revolution weakened Iraq's rival in the Gulf. While the Shah's overthrow led to a substantial degradation of Iranian military capability and the subsequent political disarray in Khomeini's mass politics, the Iraqi regime saw a potential risk to its position from Khomeini's ideology and his commitment to export its revolution. The risk as seen from Baghdad was Khomeini's appeal to Iraq's majority Shi'i population against the Sunni dominated and Arab Socialist government of Saddam Hussein. To weaken Khomeini and Iran, Iraq encouraged the disintegration of Iranian armed forces and assisted Tehran's ideological and ethnic opponents while preparing for its own military action against Iran. Iran's isolation from its former military allies and arms suppliers after the overthrow of the Shah and especially once the American hostages were taken further encouraged this tendency in Iraqi policy. Baghdad abrogated the 1975 treaty and sent its forces into Iran.

At present the future of the Gulf war and its effect on internal policies of Iran and Iraq is uncertain, but its outcome could seriously undermine Western interests in the region. Increased Soviet influence in Iran could catastrophically affect Western interests and influence. This would be the case even if Iran took a more pro-Western attitude. Iran is the pivotal country in the region. It is rich in resources and strategically located. Soviet interest in the country has been persistent and is likely to increase. Soviet military assistance to Iran, as in the case of Afghanistan, might lead to more direct domination of the country by Moscow. Since Iran shares a long border with the Soviet Union, undoing Soviet influence there would be a lot more difficult than in a non-contiguous country such as Iraq.

For relative US and Soviet ability to influence developments in the Gulf region in the 1980s, the position of Iran will be decisive. With Iran under Soviet influence, including the stationing of Soviet troops there, the comparative American capability to project power to the Persian Gulf would decline. Moscow would gain direct land access to the Persian Gulf and its ability to influence developments in the region would increase substantially. Soviet control—direct or indirect—over the Persian Gulf would represent a massive threat on the economic, energy, political, and military levels. Such control would provide the Soviets with a lever to weaken and divide the American alliance with Western Europe and Japan, a consistent Soviet goal. It would also be a major change in the world division of raw materials.

It is imperative that the United States refrain from any action that could increase Iran's dependence on the Soviet Union or its allies. The Soviets seem to be encouraging the continuation of the war hoping to gain a foothold in Iran. After the Iranian revolution and since the beginning of this war they have been in a better position to achieve this goal than they have been for some time. US policies must aim at pre-

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venting these developments. Despite the existence of poor relations between Washington and Tehran, long term US strategic interests will not be served by Iran's dismemberment.

ANOTHER important measure with both interim and long-term dimensions would be the preparedness to take advantage of Soviet difficulties. Again, this will require coordination with the allies and careful analysis. The Soviets are faced with a number of critical situations in many parts of the Third World which at times have been neglected by Western observers, who have paid attention to Soviet gains rather than seeing the accompanying risks and losses and the opportunities these provide for an active policy on the part of the industrial democracies. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, where their invasion and occupation is opposed by most political groups and by the population, and resisted with various degrees of activism. In response to this situation, US estimations are tending to split into their characteristic extreme lines; while one side argues that Afghanistan is likely to become the Soviet Union's "Vietnam," the other believes that there are likely to be few serious consequences for the Soviet Union once the initial international shock wears off. These opposing interpretations are equally facile; a "Vietnam"-like situation is unlikely due to the absence of any substantial domestic opposition within the Soviet Union comparable with the anti-Vietnam movements in the US and Western Europe (with Western media going at times as far as to exercise self-censorship in regard to the activities of the Soviet Union: while there was no hesitation in filming US bombings, and "atrocities," several European TV stations recently edited out several sections of a French film team's documentary on Afghanistan showing villages and their inhabitants burning under Soviet bombs in order not to "arouse Cold War sentiments" excessively). The second error in American thinking involves the curious tendency to see the US in a bystander role, faced with objective and autonomous developments in the outside world. Whether the Soviet Union experiences serious consequences in response to its invasion of Afghanistan does not depend on fate, but on the decisions made and the actions taken by other states, especially the US and its allies. By supporting sympathetic groups, the US and its allies (including China and some Middle Eastern states) could greatly increase the costs of Soviet aggression. Some aid, such as portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, could be provided indirectly; this is also true of training programmes.

In recent private and public discussions on whether to assist the Afghan partisans, several arguments have been advanced against such aid. These arguments have included the following: that significant aid to the Afghans is not feasible because of Pakistani reluctance to allow such aid from reaching the partisans; that even if allowed, providing such aid could be dangerous for the security of neighbouring countries

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by encouraging further Soviet expansion; and that such aid would in fact be morally reprehensible because it would lead to substantial increases in the Afghan loss of life by prolonging the conflict and raising its intensity.

The considerations involving assistance to the Afghans are complex and the arguments raised against it have some justification. However, each one proceeds from a partial and fragmentary view of the situation. Often they serve as rationalizations for doing essentially nothing in a situation which is politically and morally weighted in favour of support.

It is true, as the first argument stresses, that the Pakistani government has been reluctant to allow substantial American weapons from reaching the partisans. General Zia has demanded a security guarantee from the US in case Pakistan is threatened by the Soviet Union, and such a pledge is unlikely in the immediate future. The Pakistani nuclear programme, the political situation within Pakistan, and the Congressional attitude in Washington are all unfavourable. Providing aid to the Afghans, however, is a matter of political decision. None of the obstacles is insurmountable. For instance, Pakistan allows equipment of Russian origin to reach the partisans, since these weapons, if intercepted by the Soviets can always be claimed to represent arms captured from Soviet occupation troops by the Afghan rebels. Russian equipment is available from several countries with friendly ties to the US, including the anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons most needed by the Afghans. There is also a substantial unofficial market for Soviet weapons, but the Afghans alone do not have the funds to purchase them. The US itself or, with US encouragement, the Arab oil producers, could assist the Afghans in this regard.

The second argument, that substantial aid to the resistance would increase the risk to the security of countries such as Pakistan who host the headquarters of several partisan groups, is of considerable relevance. However, the risk to Pakistani security from aiding the partisans has to be compared with the risk associated with failing to do so. An Afghan defeat leading to a pacified Afghanistan will greatly increase the Soviet capability to pressure and influence Pakistan. The internal conflicts in Pakistan certainly would provide the Soviet Union with sufficient opportunity for subversion. However, while the conflict in Afghanistan goes on, the Soviets can hardly spare much of their existing force for large ventures into Pakistan. And a Soviet withdrawal in the face of the rising costs of their occupation would increase the security not only of Pakistan but of the entire region.

The moral argument against aid to the Afghans, on the ground that it could lead to greater loss of life on the part of partisans and population, is also of mixed merit. Wisely or not, the Afghan population has demonstrated its determination to face starvation and massive sanctions to resist an occupying army and defend itself against communism and foreign control. To recommend that they submit to domination because

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the invader is more powerful than they are is an argument that denies every political value that the West stands for. To fight against oppression is, almost by definition, a fight against the material odds, and to advise a Third World country to take its beating gracefully and come to terms with the aggressor implies a serious double standard. Whether the Afghans continue to fight does not depend on the quality of their weapons alone but also on their will to resist. The weapons will, however, affect their prospects of doing more than making a heroically reckless gesture. The Afghans seem determined to go on fighting, even if all they have is homemade nineteenth-century muskets and rifles from the first world war. Even with these, they are causing far more trouble than the Soviet Union had expected. External assistance could raise the costs of Soviet occupation enough to bring about a compromise solution.

HOWEVER, neither the decision to support nor the decision to abandon the Afghans is likely to be reached on primarily moral grounds. Supporting the partisans will increase the costs of the Afghan invasion to the Soviets. With the continuation of the partisan warfare against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a number of consequences could be achieved even without an imminent military defeat. The costs for the Soviet Union could include reduced capabilities elsewhere as a result of the commitment of troops, material, and funds to "the Afghan front"; possible domestic consequences in those Soviet regions which could, in their own terminology, be referred to as their "internal colony"—the Islamic population of Soviet Central Asia, which might reach 100 million (a quarter of the Soviet Union's population) by the year 2000 and where, despite official attempts to assimilate, Islamic consciousness continues to form a type of counter-culture—and which may be susceptible to Muslim agitation if the Soviets continue the war with their ethnic and religious counterparts across the border; conflict in the succession problem within the Soviet leadership if rising costs for the invasion exacerbated factonalism; and even alliance strains vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc countries. In addition, hostility to the Soviets may increase on the part of Muslim countries and groups.

Western policies in the countries in and near the Persian Gulf have experienced major setbacks over the past few years. Developing a better understanding of the domestic and regional political dynamics of this unstable region, providing aid (either directly or indirectly) to sympathetic groups and governments, taking advantage of Soviet difficulties, and maintaining a reliable capability for containing Soviet power and defending Western interests are all essential if the West is to reverse the decline in its position in the region.

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Andrei Amalrik 1938–1980

WHEN I received the manuscript of Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?," I was sceptical about the prophecy itself, but I recognized instantly the extraordinary quality of his mind and the significance of this manifestation of the phenomenon of free political thought in the Soviet Union. When we published it in *Survey* (No. 73, Autumn 1969), *The Times* drew attention to it in an editorial entitled "When the Fish Begins to Talk." All over the world the response to the essay was simply overwhelming.

His specific conclusions might have been wrong, but he was penetrating in drawing our attention to the most relevant elements of the situation. His analyses were illuminating in a way which one could expect only from a powerful intellect drawing on personal experience and historical understanding when depicting the political and social scene in the USSR.

After that first essay we published a number of others (*Survey*, Nos. 74/75, 77, 99, 100/101). Perhaps the most memorable was the one on "Ideologies in Soviet Society" which was written while he was in internal exile in the Soviet Union. By the time we had it set up in print, Amalrik had arrived in the West. I met him in Amsterdam where he corrected the galleys and wrote a short introductory note to his article:

> "The wheel of ideologies" first appeared in my essay *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* The thought came to me at the last moment and that is why the diagram appeared there not on the pages where I am dealing with the problem of ideology. In 1974, when I was deported to Madagan, the local KGB officials gave me the published text of my essay and asked me to revise and renounce it. They even kindly provided me with the main lines of such renunciation in a written form. Although nothing came of this KGB-planned "revision," the idea of looking again at my essay after five years has not been lost: already in Madagan I had begun to tackle anew my "wheel." A year later, after my return to Moscow, during the period when I had very little time, I returned nevertheless to my "wheel," and wrote a new article on it. I thought immediately of publishing it again in your journal, sent it to you from Moscow, and when I arrived in July 1976 from Moscow to Amsterdam the printed galley-proofs of my article were already waiting for me there for correction. In this way the "wheel of ideologies" turned from the village of Akulovo in Ryazan province to Madagan (in the Far East), and from there through Moscow and Amsterdam to you in London.

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We became friends and I followed Amalrik's activities in the West. The last time I saw him was at a conference at the Hoover Institution in Stanford. Afterwards I spent more than a week with him and his wife Gyuzel, enjoying their kind hospitality at their home.

The personality of Andrei was not different from his writings: a man with strong convictions, clear mind and fiercely independent opinions. He always tried to go to the root of the matter and impatiently tended to brush away anything which detracted from it. He would not concede an argument lightly but he was ready, indeed avid, to learn. He had never read Flaubert's *Dictionnaire des idées reçues,* but he was, one might say, a personal enemy of stereotypes and clichés. Because of this he was able to isolate himself from the Soviet mental universe where mendacious ritual formulas serve as a barrier to any genuine individual thought, and because he was so un-Soviet in this respect it was easier for him than for some of his émigré friends to adjust to the cacophony of Western freedom, while retaining his critical mind.

I was fascinated both by Amalrik as a writer and a person, by Amalrik in the USSR and Amalrik transplanted in the West. I was asked by a publisher to write on this in an introduction to a collection of his essays. I did not do it, because I was not quite sure whether my impressions were sufficient for me to write about Amalrik the person, although I have written about him in the introduction to the book edition of *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* * (see the extract below).

I was looking forward to meeting Amalrik in Madrid at the conference on human rights. When I learned about his tragic death on the way to Madrid, I felt the pain of the loss as well as a feeling of absurdity even greater than on hearing about the death of Camus in a similar car crash.

That Amalrik who survived all manner of persecutions in his fight for human rights, imprisonment and exile, meningitis in Magadan, should meet his end on the road to the Madrid conference on human rights seemed to me a cruel irony. His wife, Gyuzel, was shattered; there was no way to console her. One can only say that Amalrik's short life was remarkable and fruitful and that he will be remembered.

L.L.

THE name of Andrei Amalrik was not so long ago totally unknown in the West; after the publication of his essay, "Will The USSR Survive Until 1984?," he became world famous. What is it that makes his case unique in the history of Soviet post-Stalin intellectual dissent?

Certainly not just the essay's thesis itself, which was intended as a statement of probabilities and not as a prophecy. No doubt its formulation and controversial nature largely accounted for the widespread interest in Amalrik in the sensation-hungry West, even though many did not agree with his conclusions. Yet the significance of the Amalrik phenomenon transcends the question of whether he is correct in his prognostications on the future Sino-Soviet war and the not-so-distant collapse of the Soviet empire. Amalrik's other writings (included in this

* Harper and Row, 1970.

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volume) and his subsequent fate makes it abundantly clear that we are confronted here with an unusual combination of high intelligence and civic courage, a combination which morally and intellectually ranks with the cases of Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and Sinyavsky. While these authors have different outlooks and achievements, their " crime " of indulging in independent thought under a system which prescribes correct ideas and conclusions makes them into " cases " and provides the common thread between them.

In this process they inevitably manifest continuity with the Russian past. Already the spectres of Slavophiles and Westernizers are stalking the scene. However, such traditional intellectual attitudes are very unevenly mixed among and inside individuals. For obvious reasons (the main one being Soviet cultural isolation during the last 50 years) there is a heavy preponderance of the Slavophile tradition. This is clearly visible both in Solzhenitsyn and Sinyavsky.

It is fascinating to see a manifestation of the opposite tendency in Amalrik. He is, of course, not the pure embodiment of the Westernizing tradition, for he is too Russian for that. Also, he is very individualistic in his attitudes and thought, and one cannot reduce him simply to a " type," even a Weberian " ideal type." But subject to this *caveat* it is clear that for the first time we are witnessing a Western style of thinking in one of the prominent Soviet dissenters.

The appearance of the historical Russian attitudes among young Soviet intellectuals is, of course, not just a repetition of history; it is much more than that. The Soviet intellectual trying to throw off his mental shackles has to go through a complex psychological process to rid himself of a myriad of specifically Soviet conditioned reflexes. To overcome these he has to break a number of taboos. Amalrik demonstrates how far this process can go inside the Soviet system.

In his personal comment on Amalrik's " Will The USSR Survive Until 1984?," the former *Washington Post* correspondent in Moscow, Anatole Shub, wrote (*Survey*, Winter-Spring 1970):

> Before living in Russia, I would have strongly doubted whether such a mind could exist and develop under Soviet conditions—in the same way—that, for so many years, so many outsiders were certain that " Abram Tertz " could not possibly be a young Russian literary critic, but had to be an old Jewish communist or (as some said) a Pole. Even now, when Amalrik has become a world figure, many of the kindest, best-intentioned Western scholars find it incredible that he could have developed—*independently*—not merely an original mind, but a remarkable grasp of the Western thinking about his country.

However, some less kindly critics started a veritable smear campaign in the West, saying that Amalrik is a KGB agent. Articles to that effect were published in the American, German and the Russian émigré press. They were reproduced or reported all over the world.

It was a shameful episode. Here was a young and remarkable Soviet intellectual who had attained the highest degree of individual emancipation from the Soviet mental universe, and whose personal philosophy

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was matched by his conduct in life, being crucified in the Western press for his originality and heroism. It was fortunate that, before his arrest, Andrei Amalrik managed to rebut the aspersions on his character published in the West. It is easy to understand Amalrik's feelings and his bitter irony about the "argument" used by his detractors:

> My arrest is a kind of litmus paper which is to indicate whether I am a KGB agent or not.
>
> To pose the question in such terms seems to me extremely immoral. My country is not a Roman arena. I am not a gladiator, and the Western world is not Roman plebs, watching excitedly or coolly to see whether the gladiator will really die or whether it is only a circus trick.
>
> When I was writing my books and intending to hand them over for publication, I realized that I was risking imprisonment; I was ready for it and I am ready for it now. But I thank God for every day of freedom which is given to me and which I spend at home with my wife. It seems to me that an honourable man who believes in God should not say: "He has not yet been arrested—that is very suspicious," but rather: "Thank God he has not yet been arrested, that means there is one more free man on earth."

Amalrik predicted that the KGB would arrest him in its own good time, and so it did on 21 May 1970 when he was staying in his dilapidated country cottage near the village of Akulovo, 85 miles southeast of Moscow. Both the cottage and his room in Moscow were thoroughly searched by the KGB men and five of Amalrik's manuscripts, as well as other "subversive" items (such as a copy of the Dutch edition of his book), were confiscated. In the "Open letter to Kuznetsov" he wrote: "By living in this country and by continuing to write and do what I consider right, I can at any moment be sent to prison again or be dealt with in any other fashion." But as in his view "no oppression can be effective without those who are prepared to submit to it," he was ready to challenge individually the whole might of the Soviet state and provide an example of how a "free man can and should act" under conditions of oppression. In his opinion the Soviet totalitarian structure could disappear only if Soviet citizens lost their belief in its omnipotence and their fear of it. To break its magic spell, an individual must develop an "inner freedom" and deprive the oppressors of their weapon of fear which would not be effective against those who possess such "inner freedom."

This may appear somewhat quixotic as a guideline for the population at large, or even for intellectuals, few of whom are heroes or saints, but Amalrik stressed the personal character of his conclusions:

> From childhood the regime under which I was compelled to live was organically alien to me: its culture seemed to be pitiful, its ideology false and the way of life foisted upon my fellow-citizens humiliating. I am an individualist by nature and my protest has always been a personal one. I always wanted to uphold my human worth and the right to be free myself. But I do not want to be

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understood as always thinking only of myself. I would like—and perhaps my example helps here—each of my fellow-countrymen also to feel the significance of his own personality. Only then, I think, is a struggle for common interests possible. Because a struggle for " common interests " by people with a slave psychology can and does lead only to common slavery.

One cannot help noticing the ironical juxtaposition of Amalrik's fate and that of the American " revolutionaries " like Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman. He, an authentic rebel facing a real political oppression, is awaiting in prison what can only be a mock trial; they, the TV " revolutionary heroes " who mocked American judicial procedure, are as a result, so much in demand that they are receiving sizable earnings on their (illiterate) writings and lecturings. Clearly, " doing it " has different consequences for the individuals concerned in the USSR and the USA.

How will future historians see in retrospect the Orwellian date of 1984? Will they look back on the next decade as a period of competitive decadence for the two giants? Or will there be a reversal of the present trends which would make an evolution towards a less Orwellian 1984 more likely? Amalrik's question can be asked about both countries, even though a negative reply may not be realistic about either of them. And the question is not only relevant to their internal developments, but also to the changes in their international status.

But whatever the case may be in 1984, it is altogether likely that by that time today's US " revolutionary heroes " will be forgotten, but Amalrik will not.

L. L.

Our Contributors

GARY BERTSCH is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He currently holds a NATO research fellowship to continue his work on East–West technology transfer and is the author of *Power and Policy in Communist Systems* and other books and articles.

RICHARD T. CUPITT is a fellow of the Georgia World Congress Institute. His research interests are in the areas of international trade policy in a security context.

DAVID FLOYD was for many years the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent on communist affairs and has written and translated books in that field. He is now a special writer for *NOW! Magazine*.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. He is the author of a number of books and many articles on aspects of Soviet political and military affairs. He is also a retired diplomat, his last post having been American Ambassador to Bulgaria.

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AMORETTA M. HOEBER works at the Systems Planning Corporation in Rosslyn, Virginia. She is a graduate in political science from Stanford University and has done graduate work in mathematics. She is on the board of directors of the Military Operations Research Society and is a founder of the Women's Institute of International Relations.

FRANCIS P. HOEBER is President of the Hoeber Corporation, a firm in Arlington, Virginia, which conducts defence and economic studies. He is the author of *Slow to Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles and Prudent Deterrence, A Critique of Military Applications of Modeling*, co-author and co-editor with William Schneider Jr of *Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issue for Fiscal Year 1981* and contributor to many books and journals on military and international affairs.

J. B. KELLY is a historian specializing in British relations with the Middle East. He is the author of *Eastern Arabian Frontiers* (1964), *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880* (1968) and *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (1980).

ZALMAY KHALILZAD is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. His present research interests are the rise of Islamic republicanism in Iran and nuclear power in the Third World. He has written numerous articles in these and related fields.

JOHN R. MCINTYRE is a Research Associate at the Dean Rusk Center, School of Law, University of Georgia. His main research interests lie in East–West technology transfer policy, US export control policy and comparative management.

EDWARD L. ROWNY is currently a fellow at the Smithsonian Institution's Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington. For more than six years General Rowny represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US SALT negotiating team. Giving as his reason his inability to support the SALT II agreement, he requested retirement from military service, which was effective from 30 June 1979.

EDWARD J. ROZEK is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado and director of the Institute for the Study of Comparative Politics and Ideologies. His book, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy* (1958), received a National Book Foundation Award. He is co-author with Walt W. Rostow of *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (1967). During the presidential campaign of 1980, he was a member of Reagan's Advisory Council on Foreign Policy.

ALBERT WOHLSTETTER is a co-director of Pan Heuristics in Marina Del Rey, California, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, adviser to the US Chief of Naval Operations, and a consultant to various US government agencies. He is the author of many books and articles on strategy and foreign policy.

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